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SUMMARY (English)
This thesis is broadly concentrated on decision making under uncertainty. It seeks 
to investigate how agents in financial markets make decisions at the individual 
level and how these decisions can sometimes be affected by personal traits and 
cognitive biases rather than being perfectly rational. The primary focus is on 
financial analysts in the task of conducting earnings forecasts while a secondary 
focus is on investors’ abilities to interpret and make use of these forecasts.
Simply put, financial analysts can be seen as information intermediators receiving 
inputs to their analyses from firm management and providing outputs to the 
investors. Amongst various outputs from the analysts are forecasts of earnings. 
According to decision theories mostly from the literature in psychology all 
humans are affected by cognitive constraints to some degree. These constraints
may lead to unintentional biases in the decision making and the magnitude of 
these constraints does sometimes vary with personal traits. Therefore, to the extent 
that financial analysts are subjects to behavioral biases their outputs to the 
investors are likely to be biased by their interpretation of information. Because 
investors need accuracy in the financial forecasts on which they base investment 
decisions they may end up losing money as a consequence of biased forecasts. 
Thus, relying primarily on decision theories such as social comparison theory and 
theories on confirmation bias this thesis investigates how and why pronounced 
biases in financial analysts’ forecasts documented at the market level by prior 
literature occur at the individual level and which personal traits interact in this 
process. 
The thesis relies on data from two paper-based experiments executed in-class by a 
total of 633 graduate students within the areas of accounting and finance. All 
participated voluntarily and were monetarily incentivized. The experimental 
method is especially relevant to investigate the variables or behaviors of interest in 
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an isolated setting where confounding factors can be controlled. Further, by 
relying on the experimental method, limitations in terms of access to data and 
individual specific variables are lessened. 
The thesis consists of three separate articles (referred to as papers) which are 
shortly summarized by the abstract of each paper below:
Paper 1 - Individual Risk-Willingness and Herding Behaviors in Financial 
Forecasts
Literature on financial analysts’ forecasts (FAF) documents that financial analysts 
tend to demonstrate herding behaviors and thus issue forecasts that are in line with 
consensus estimates which sometimes compromises accuracy. A number of 
explanations spanning rational economic logic, cognitive biases and social forces 
have been suggested. Relying on data from a paper-based, in-class experiment 
completed by 289 graduate students participating in the course Financial 
Statement Analysis and Valuation I posit and find support for individual risk-
willingness (or lack of) as an explanatory variable of herding behavior. 
Specifically, I predict and find that less risk-willing individual’s forecasts with 
less boldness and instead issue forecasts in line with the consensus forecast. 
Although perfect distinctions between theories are hard to make, the results are 
argued to be at least partially a result of cognitive biases and an intuitive reaction 
to uncertainty. Additionally, I find evidence that the relationship is particularly 
pronounced when bad news (rather than good news) is received prior to forecast 
revisions.
Paper 2 - Cognitive Dissonance Reduction and Confirmation Bias in Financial 
Forecast Revisions
Research has shown that confirmation bias, the tendency to seek for, and rely 
more heavily on information that is confirmatory to an initial belief as a reaction 
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to cognitive dissonance, exists for most people in various contexts. From an 
experimental setting, performed by 289 graduate students in finance and 
accounting, this paper provides evidence that people with high confidence in their 
own initial forecast are more hesitant to deem a revision necessary after receiving 
new information. This is argued to be a result of confirmation bias leading to 
inertia. This paper also finds that those hesitant to make revisions express 
increased confidence in their forecast following the new information compared to 
those revising their forecast. Thus, a non-revised forecast following new 
information in the market is not necessarily a reflection of that new information 
already being incorporated in the forecast but might also be a result of cognitively 
biased decision making. The findings have implications for studies in the context 
of financial analysts’ forecasting behavior and may add to the understanding of 
why under-reactions to new information in the market are often found.  
Paper 3 - Using Feedback to Reduce the Cost of Information Intermediation: 
Experimental Evidence 
Information intermediaries, including financial analysts and financial advisors, 
face incentives to produce biased recommendations and expend low effort. In an 
experiment with 344 finance masters students, we investigate the role of 
incentivized feedback in reducing these costs. Specifically, we have participants 
play analysts or investors, with the analysts making earnings recommendations for 
the investors in the presence of biased incentives. In the treatment condition, the 
investors provide incentivized feedback to the analysts. Consistent with 
educational learning and psychological theories, we find the presence of feedback 
reduces bias and increases effort among information intermediaries (financial 
analysts), while also enhancing information end-users’ (investors) critical 
evaluation of recommendations. Hence the potential welfare gains from 
incentivized feedback-channels are large. This research is especially timely given 
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the European Securities and Markets Authority’s proposal in 2014 to abolish 
indirect payments to analysts including the broker votes system, since that system 
acts as an incentivized feedback-channel from institutional investors to financial 
analysts.
Whereas the first two papers are solely concerned with the biasing processes 
within the individual analysts and how these are affected by personal traits and 
characteristics (risk-willingness and confidence) the third paper expands the 
perspective to include potential consequences for the users (investors) of this 
biased information provided by the analysts. 
This thesis argues that it is important to consider theories from the psychology 
literature when investigating observed behavioral biases in financial analysts’ 
forecasts. This should at least be considered as supplementary to the explanations 
drawing on perfect rationality and strategic incentives which are currently 
dominating the literature. Thus, this thesis broadly seeks to contribute to the rather 
narrow stream of literature in behavioral accounting. To the extent that findings 
from this thesis can be generalized onto the real-world it has implications for 
regulators by suggesting that biases in financial analysts’ forecasts are at least 
partly a result of unconscious reactions and determined by personal traits and thus 
broad regulations may not be sufficient. Further, investors that seek to expand 
their knowledge on potential biases in financial analysts’ forecasts should be 
interested in the findings of this thesis and perhaps it will lead to a greater demand 
for analyst-specific data in the future. Finally, analysts that are interested in 
learning how to evade being victims of behavioral biases must first require 
knowledge about how these biases occur. Findings in this thesis may help them do 
so. Although findings from this thesis are not necessarily directly generalizable to 
the biases observed in financial analysts’ forecasts on the market level, it still 
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provides important indications of central tenets and causes of these biases from the 
individual level. Future research could expand the view.   
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SUMMARY (Danish)
Denne afhandling er koncentreret indenfor beslutningstagning under usikkerhed. 
Formålet er at undersøge hvordan aktører i de finansielle markeder tager 
beslutninger på individniveau, og hvordan disse beslutninger nogle gange kan 
være influeret af personlige træk og kognitive biases 
(skævvridninger/systematiske fejl) fremfor at være fuldt rationelle. Det primære 
fokus ligger på finansielle analytikeres udførelse af estimater (forecasts), mens et 
sekundært fokus er på investorers evne til at fortolke og anvende disse estimater.
Som en simplificering kan finansielle analytikere anskues som videreformidlere af 
information; de modtager inputs til deres analyser fra ledelsen i virksomheder og 
videregiver outputs til investorer. Blandt disse outputs fra analytikerne er estimater 
af fremtidig indtjening. Ifølge beslutningsteorier, primært inden for 
psykologilitteraturen, er alle mennesker påvirket af kognitive begrænsninger i en 
eller anden udstrækning. Disse begrænsninger kan lede til uforsætlige biases af 
beslutningstagningen, og påvirkningen af disse begrænsninger kan variere med 
personlige træk. Derfor, givet at finansielle analytikere er omfattet af disse 
adfærdsmæssige biases, vil deres outputs til investorerne højst sandsynligt også 
være påvirket af deres biased fortolkning af information. Fordi investorerne 
efterspørger præcision i de finansielle estimater, på hvilke de baserer 
investeringsbeslutninger, kan biases i estimater ende med at koste dem penge. 
Derfor, på baggrund af beslutningsteorier såsom ’social comparison theory’ og 
teorier omkring ’confirmation bias’, undersøger denne afhandling, hvordan og 
hvorfor udbredte biases i finansielle analytikeres estimater dokumenteret på 
markedsniveau af tidligere studier, opstår på individniveau, samt hvilke personlige 
træk, der interagerer in denne proces.
Afhandlingen bygger på data fra to papirbaseret eksperimenter, der blev 
gennemført i klasselokalet af i alt 633 kandidatstuderende inden for områderne 
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regnskab og finansiering. Alle blev givet et økonomisk incitament og deltog 
frivilligt. Den eksperimentelle metode er særlig relevant til at undersøge variable 
eller adfærd af interesse i isolerede omgivelser, hvor forstyrrende faktorer kan 
kontrolleres. Desuden mindskes potentielle begrænsninger i form af 
datatilgængelighed ved at anvende denne metode.   
Afhandlingen består af tre separate artikler (benævnt papirer), der kort er 
opsummeret gennem hver deres ’abstract’ nedenfor (løst oversat fra originalerne 
på engelsk):
Papir 1 – Individuel risikovillighed og imiterende adfærd i finansielle estimater
Litteraturen inden for finansielle analytikeres estimaters dokumenterer, at 
finansielle analytikere har en tendens til at udvise en imiterende adfærd og dermed 
udsende ens estimater (i overensstemmelse med konsensus), hvilket indimellem 
hindrer præcision. Forklaringer spænder fra økonomisk rationalitet til kognitive 
biases og sociale påvirkninger. På baggrund af data fra et papirbaseret 
eksperiment, som blev udført i klasselokalet under kurset regnskabsanalyse og 
værdiansættelse på 289 kandidatstuderende, finder jeg belæg for hypotesen om, at 
individuel risikovillighed (eller mangel på samme) er forklarende variabel for 
imiterende adfærd. Mere præcist foreslår jeg og finder belæg for, at mindre 
risikovillige individer udarbejder estimater, der er mindre dristige og i stedet mere 
i overensstemmelse med konsensus. Selvom det er svært at sondre mellem teorier, 
argumenteres der for, at resultaterne primært er afledt af kognitive biases og en 
intuitiv reaktion på usikkerhed. Derudover finder jeg beviser på, at denne 
sammenhæng er mere udtalt, når der modtages dårlige nyheder (i modsætning til 
gode nyheder) forud for revideringer af estimater.    
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Paper 2 – Reduktion i kognitiv dissonans og ’confirmation bias’ i revidering af 
finansielle estimater
Forskning har vist, at ’confirmation bias’, tendensen til at søge efter og stole mere 
på information, der bekræfter ens oprindelige opfattelse, eksisterer for de fleste 
mennesker i mange forskellige kontekster. Ved hjælp af et eksperiment udført af 
289 kandidatstuderende dokumenterer dette papir, at mennesker med stor tillid til 
deres egne estimater er mere tilbageholdende med at revidere disse estimater, når 
ny information bliver tilgængelig. Dette anses for at være et resultat of 
’confirmation bias’, som leder til passivitet. Desuden finder dette papir, at 
mennesker som er mere tilbageholdende med at udføre revideringer, udtrykker en 
øget tillid til deres egne estimater efter at have modtaget ny information, 
sammenlignet med dem som reviderer deres estimater. Dermed er et ikke-
reviderede estimat efter ny information i markedet ikke nødvendigvis en 
refleksion af, at denne information allerede er inkorporeret i estimatet, men kan 
også være et resultat af beslutningstagning under kognitiv bias. Resultaterne har 
betydning for studier, der er interesseret i adfærdsmæssige mønstre i sammenhæng 
med finansielle analytikeres estimater samt kan bidrage til en øget forståelse af, 
hvorfor man ofte finder underreaktioner på ny information i markedet.
Paper 3 – Anvendelse af feedback til at reducere omkostningerne af 
videreformidling af information: Eksperimentelle beviser
Videreformidlere af information, herunder finansielle analytikere og finansielle 
rådgivere, har incitamenter til at producere biased anbefalinger og yde en 
begrænset indsats. Gennem et eksperiment med 344 kandidatstuderende inden for 
regnskab og finansiering undersøger vi, hvorvidt tilskyndelsen af feedback kan 
reducere disse omkostninger. Deltagerne agerer enten analytikere eller investorer, 
hvor analytikerne producerer anbefalinger til investorerne under biasing 
incitamenter. I det ene af to stadier giver investorerne feedback til analytikerne. I 
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tråd med lærings- og psykologiske teorier finder vi, at tilstedeværelsen af feedback 
reducerer bias og øger indsatsen hos videregiverne af information (finansielle 
analytikere), samtidig med at den kritiske evaluering af anbefalingerne øges hos 
slutbrugerne af informationen (investorerne). Dermed er der stort potentiale for en 
velfærdsgevinst ved incitamentsbaseret feedback. Denne forskning er særlig 
relevant givet et nyligt forslag fra European Securities and Markets Authority’s i 
2014 om at forbyde indirekte betalinger til analytikere, herunder det såkaldte 
’broker vote’-system, fordi dette system netop fungerer som en incitamentsbaseret 
feedback-kanal fra investorer til finansielle analytikere.
Hvor de første to papirer udelukkende er koncentrerede omkring de biased 
processer, som opstår hos den individuelle analytiker, samt hvordan disse er 
påvirket af personlige træk og karakteristika (risikovillighed og selvtillid), bredes 
perspektivet ud i det tredje papir til også at inkludere potentielle konsekvenser for 
brugerne (investorerne) af den biased information leveret af analytikerne. 
Denne afhandling argumenterer for vigtigheden af at inddrageteorier fra 
eksempelvis den psykologiske litteratur, når forskere undersøger adfærdsmæssige 
biases i finansielle analytikeres estimater. Som minimum bør disse indgå som et 
supplement til de forklaringer, der trækker på perfekt rationalitet og strategiske 
incitamenter, som er dominerende i litteraturen på nuværende tidspunkt. Dermed 
stræber denne afhandling efter at bidrage til den forholdsvis snævre strøm af 
litteratur inden for ’behavioral accounting’. I det omfang resultaterne fra denne 
afhandling kan generaliseres til den virkelige verden, har den betydning for 
regulatorer ved at foreslå, at biases i finansielle analytikeres estimater kan være et 
resultat af uforsætlige reaktioner og bestemt af personlige træk, hvorfor generelle 
reguleringer sandsynligvis ikke er tilstrækkelige. Yderligere kan investorer, som er 
interesserede i at udvide deres kendskab til potentielle adfærdsmæssige biases i 
finansielle analytikeres estimater, hente inspiration i resultaterne fra denne 
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afhandling, hvilket måske vil føre til en øget efterspørgsel efter 
analytikerspecifikke data i fremtiden. Endelig vil analytikere, som er interesserede 
i at lære, hvordan man undgår adfærdsmæssige biases, kunne hente inspiration i 
denne afhandling. Selvom resultaterne fra de tre studier ikke nødvendigvis kan 
generaliseres direkte til de biases i finansielle analytikeres estimater, der er 
observeret på markedsniveau, giver de alligevel vigtige indikationer på 
grundlæggende årsager til disse biases på individniveau. Fremtidig forskning vil 
med fordel kunne fokusere yderligere på årsager til biases på individniveau.
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1. MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVE
The overall motivation to write this thesis comes from a genuine curiosity and 
interest in how humans make choices and why these choices are sometimes 
systematically contrary to predictions from economic models based on perfect 
rationality. 
The simplest way of describing the viewpoint of this thesis is by a quote (-
unknown): “The same boiling water that softens the potato hardens the egg. It is 
about what you are made of, not (only) the circumstances”.
For example studies document that most individuals are right-orientated and 
consequently the lines to the right, e.g. at bathrooms or at check-ins in airports, are 
on average longer than the lines to the left. Other studies have found that we tend 
to convince ourselves to always trust our first intuition although various evidence, 
e.g. from exam situations where students are allowed to change their answers, 
goes against this as the best choice. And at auctions people generally bid more 
money on a good in order to win it than they have assessed it to be worth before 
the bidding. Whereas the first example arises largely as a consequence of inherited 
cognitive brain-mechanisms the second more likely occurs as a result of mental 
short-cuts while the latter is probably more associated with social influences or 
emotions. However, all the examples are driven by processes and mechanisms in 
the brain that we to a large extent are unaware of when they induce a reaction (in 
line with how intuition works). Thus, avoiding them is hard but in some cases it is 
possible to work our way around them if we get to know more about them. For 
instance, always choosing a line to the left will give an advantage to the extent that 
the others are unaware of this right-oriented bias and therefore do not change 
behavior.     
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The general objective for this thesis has been to study and understand behavioral 
biases in a broader context, typically by looking into research in psychology and 
educational learnings literature, in order to mirror these tendencies onto 
accounting-specific contexts. While the behavioral research stream for long has 
shown its worth in economics and gradually also in finance, behavioral accounting 
research seems to be forthcoming but still more modestly represented. However, 
various aspects in the field of accounting rely on individual judgements in 
uncertain situations. E.g. firm management need to predict benefits of a new 
investment, financial analysts need to forecast future market developments and 
auditors must assess whether financial statements correctly reflect the situation in 
a firm. By focusing on financial analysts’ decision process when making forecasts 
the main objective of this thesis is not to observe behavioral biases on the market 
level, but rather to provide insights to when and why these biases may occur at the 
individual level. 
A secondary motivation and objective for this thesis has been to learn the 
experimental method. As a university student the tools and learning insights for 
data collection, e.g. to larger assignments, are usually concentrated more on 
surveys, interviews and increasingly on archival data compared to experiments. At 
least this has been the case in the areas of my studies. Although there may be 
several good reasons for this focus in the class-rooms, the experimental method in 
the context of academic research is more prioritized. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
The literature on financial analysts is rather rich and has various focuses. The 
main cause of the widespread attention is the analysts’ central role in the capital 
markets. They are generally viewed as the most prominent users of accounting 
information and act as information intermediators between firm management and 
investors (Givoly and Lakonishok 1984; Schipper 1991; Brown 1993; Lang and 
Lundholm 1996). Thus, biased outputs may consequently lead investors to make 
sub-optimal investment decisions (Abarbanell et al. 1995) and therefore research 
aims at getting a profound understanding of the quality of the outputs in order to 
improve these as proxies for future movements in the capital markets (Kothari 
2001).
Financial analysts can be divided in two broad groups– the sell-side analysts and 
the buy-side analysts. However, the literature generally argues that sell-side 
analysts are better informed and more sophisticated than the buy-side analysts 
(Day 1986; Schipper 1991; Bence et al. 1995) partly because buy-side analysts 
often rely on sell-side analysts outputs (Core 2001; Fogarty and Rogers 2005;
Galanti 2006; Abhayawansa et al. 2015).
The outputs from sell-side analysts are rich including forecasts of earnings and 
cash flows, price targets, written reports and recommendations (e.g. Womack, 
1996; Barber et al., 2001; Brav and Lehavy 2003; Asquith et al., 2005; Bradshaw 
2011). Although it is argued that analysts’ outputs have dynamic influences and 
thus should be seen as a whole (e.g. Brown et. al. 2015), research tends to isolate 
the output of interest for simplification. Earnings forecasts are generally 
considered one of the most central outputs (Barker and Imam 2008) and have 
historically been given the most attention (Givoly and Lakonishok 1984; Schipper 
1991; Brown 1993; Kothari 2001; Bradshaw 2011). 
19 
 
Within the literature of analysts’ earnings forecasts a distinction between the focus 
of research can also be made. One stream focuses merely on the input side, 
including reporting quality (e.g. Hopkins 1996; Duru and Reeb 2002; Hirst et al. 
2004) and management incentives (e.g. Brown 2001; Matsunaga and Park 2001; 
Matsumoto 2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002; Mayew 2008). Another stream focuses 
solely on the output side including market reactions (e.g. Stickel 1991; Gleason 
and Lee 2003; Ivkovic and Jegadeesh 2004; Frankel et al. 2006; Altinkilic and 
Hansen 2009; Loh and Stulz 2011), informativeness (e.g. Lui and Thomas 2002; 
Clement and Tse 2003), and explanatory power for future market movements (e.g. 
Dechow and Sloan 1997; Shane and Brous 2001; Theo and Wong 2002). And yet 
some focus more exclusively on the individual analysts (Dugar and Nathan 1995; 
Lin and McNichols 1998; Brown 2001; Hirst et al. 2004; Jacob et al. 2008). It is in 
the latter perspective research of analysts’ decision making processes and potential 
biases are centered. 
The most widely observed systematic biases in financial analysts’ forecast are 
general optimism1 (e.g. Francis and Philbrick 1993; Lin and McNichols 1998; 
Dechow et al., 2000; Bradshaw et al. 2006; Libby and Rennekamp 2012; Cheng et 
al. 2013), pronounced herding behavior2 (e.g. Hong et al. 2000; Hirshleifer and
Hong 2003; Guedj and Bouchaud 2005; Clement and Tse 2005; Seybert and 
Bloomfield 2009; Jegadeesh and Kim 2009; Durand et al. 2014) and prominent 
underreaction to news3 (e.g. Shane and Brous 2001; Markov and Tan 2006; 
Friesen and Weller 2006).
A rather narrow stream in this literature focuses merely on theories from the 
psychology literature and on cognitive biases to explain these behaviors of 
1 The tendency to provide higher forecasts than realized.
2 The tendency to follow the consensus estimate generated from the forecast of other analysts.
3 The tendency to hesitate to fully react in the instant upcoming forecast to new information released in the market. 
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financial analysts (Markov and Tan 2006; Friesen and Weller 2006; Seybert and 
Bloomfield 2009; Libby and Rennekamp 2012). 
Friesen and Weller (2006) call for more focus on psychological factors as 
potential drivers for biases in financial analysts’ forecasts and Zhang (2006) 
argues that a more comprehensive understanding of systematic biases in financial 
analysts’ forecasts includes an expanded focus on psychological factors. Further, 
recent reviews of the literature also underline this need for an increased 
understanding of the cause of these biases by focusing on analysts’ personal traits 
(Ramnath et al. 2008; Bradshaw 2011) and argue that other methods than 
empirical studies relying on archival data need to be applied (Bradshaw 2011; 
Brown 2015). 
This thesis seeks to respond to these calls. Thus, to sum up, this thesis is merely 
concentrated on financial analysts’ forecasts at the sell-side with a main focus on 
individual analysts’ decision process, personal traits and characteristics in order to 
deepen our understanding of when and why behavioral biases occur. Specifically, 
the first paper included in this thesis (referred to as Paper 1) concentrate on 
herding behaviors in forecasting by proposing individual risk-willingness as an 
explanatory variable. The second paper included in this thesis (referred to as Paper 
2) includes individual confidence (in own estimates) as an explanatory variable of 
non-revisions in forecasts after the release of new information, indicating this to 
be a central tenet in explaining the general underreaction to news observed in 
financial markets. The third paper included in this thesis (referred to as Paper 3) 
concentrates on the potential effects on forecasting behavior of a feedback-channel 
between information intermediators and end-user. This feedback-channel is an 
integrated part of an existing compensation system for financial analysts. Thus, 
this paper expands the view compared to the other two papers by including the 
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uses of the forecasts (investors) additional to solely concentrate on the issuers of 
forecasts (analysts). 
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3. THEORY
Focusing on financial analysts’ decision making in the context of issuing earnings 
forecasts the environment is highly uncertain (and ambiguous) but they are forced 
to making decisions under these circumstances on an everyday basis. Thus, 
theories about decision making under uncertainty are applicable in this context and 
highly relevant in order to understand when and why analysts’ behavioral biases 
occur and affect their forecasts. 
All three papers rely heavily on theories of decision making under uncertainty and 
cognitive biases mainly from the literature of psychology. This section gives a
general explanation of how theories of decision making has developed and how 
the perspectives have increasing aligned across the two dominant areas of 
literatures, economics and psychology, in order to positions this thesis in a broader 
theoretical sense. At the end of this section the position in each of the three papers 
included in this thesis is stated. However, detailed descriptions of the specific 
theories that hypotheses are built on in the three papers can be found within each 
of the papers.
3.1. Rational Decision Making
Decision making under risk and uncertainty can be traced back to the neoclassic 
economic theory by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), the expected utility 
theory (EUT). While EUT models how people should make decisions (by 
maximizing expected utility) the psychology literature is more interested in 
addressing how people actually make decisions and thus challenges some of the 
basic assumptions in the economic models. Prospect theory4 (PT) by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) suggests that individuals systematically violate basic 
4 It is also in this theory the S-shaped value function was developed, illustrating loss-aversion. More specifically, 
loss-aversion occurs when mental accounting is framed by gains and losses. 
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assumptions in EUT. Thus at this time economic- and psychological literature had 
very different stands and the research perspective differed substantially between 
being narrative and descriptive.
While both EUT and PT explain behaviors of individuals facing choices with 
known probabilities these let to another stream of theories concerning choices with 
unknown probabilities. Savage (1954) developed the subjective expected utility 
(SEU) from EUT and relaxed some of the rather strict assumptions. In short, SEU 
allows people to make different (but still fully rational) decisions because of 
differences in either individual utility functions or individual beliefs. SEU 
combined with Bayesian inference (on probability and updating beliefs) has 
gained much attention. Relying on the Bayesian approach, research first focused 
on building models to make forecasts (e.g. Harrison and Stevens 1971, Pole et al. 
1994). In addition, the Bayesian approach was found useful for understanding how 
individuals conduct forecasts. Applying Bayesian rules to subjective probabilities 
(i.e. taking perspectives from SEU into account) a ground for economic literature 
and the literature of psychology to agree on the usefulness of this methodology 
and its implacability is build and behavioral economics and –psychology 
developed). Hence, research is able to better test how individuals make decisions 
under uncertainty since it allows for each individual to differently weight each 
piece of information with individual probabilities at given points of time only 
constrained by rationality (see Goldstein (2006) for a critical view). Thus, studies 
on cognitive biases no longer necessarily reflect a dismissal of the rationality 
assumption5 (as most economic theories in the field of decision making under 
uncertainty relies on). 
5 As an example from the literature on financial analysts where this approach is applied see Friesen and Weller 
(2006).
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As an alternative to mathematical modeling, Simon (1955; 1979) developed the 
idea of bounded rationality which broadly suggests that individuals are limited in 
their decision making by cognitive constrains amongst other limitations. Thus, 
according to this the perfectly rational solution is often not possible and therefore 
individuals seek to make a satisfactory solution instead. However, whether or not 
bounded rational behaviors, and thus behaviors limited by cognitive biases, can be 
defined as rational is unclear because the view on rationality differs between 
perspectives, research traditions and sometimes even between scholars within the 
same research field. 
3.2. Cognitive Biases
Cognitive biases can be viewed as processes in our mindset that lead to systematic 
deviations from standard rational decision models. They are argued to occur 
primarily due to mental short-cuts, also referred to as heuristics, which can be 
caused by innate traits, personal characteristics as well as social influences (e.g. 
Kahneman et al. 1982; Gilovich et al. 2002). These short-cuts are in many cases 
ideal for making (quick) decisions (Gigerenzer, G. 1996) but in other cases lead to 
biased decision making. The work of Simon has sat the ground for most 
theoretical frameworks and observations in the context of cognitive biases 
especially reflected in a long series of papers by Kahneman and Tversky. The 
observation of these cognitive biases has spread across various disciplines and 
literatures, including economics. There are many examples of observed cognitive 
biases e.g. the tendency to value a good higher just because it is in one’s own 
position (the endowment effect, Kahneman et al. 1991), a tendency to have 
unstable preferences of an outcome just because the (same) situation is described 
from different perspectives (the framing effect, Tversky and Kahneman 1981), the 
tendency to overestimate the probability of an event just because it is in fresh 
memory (availability heuristic, Tversky and Kahneman 1973), the tendency to be 
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more negatively affected by a loss than positively affected by a gain at the same 
size (loss-aversion and disposition effect, Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
In order to map thinking based on cognitive biases Tversky and Kahneman (1971) 
came up with a framework that has later been named System 1 and System 2 by 
Stanovich and West (2000) and gained renewed attention after the release of 
Kahneman’s book “Thinking, fast and slow (2011). System 1 is characterized by 
fast, effortless and automatic processes and System 2 is characterized by slow, 
effortful and controlled processes. Whereas System 1 is merely based on intuition 
and habits which are hard to modify (Kahneman 2003), System 2 is based on 
elaborated reasoning and thus can more easily be modified e.g. through learning 
and feedback (Einhorn & Hogarth 1981). 
There is a general agreement that the two systems should not solely be considered 
as parallel but interact with each other and can be activated at the same time. 
However, thinking of the two systems in isolation may make it easier to 
distinguish between processes and theories in decision making as opposed to 
trying to resolve whether or not a given behavior is rational or not, because the 
latter is more dependent on the viewpoint of the researcher. Therefore, drawing 
parallels to the two-system view (although this distinction is not explicitly made in 
the papers included in this thesis) this thesis is generally positioned in decision 
making by cognitions integrated in System 1 (with one exception being the last 
hypothesis in Paper 3). 
Paper 1 argues that social influences are central for herding behavior. Thus, the 
tendency to follow others with your own decision (herding), occurs partly as an 
intuitive reaction to feeling uncertain about the decision to be made (Baddeley 
2010) making the use of available heuristics more likely (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974; Gilovich et al. 2002; Kahneman 2011) and thus rely merely on explanations 
related to System 1 thinking. This paper posits that a greater cognitive resistance 
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towards uncertainty and risk leads to a greater likelihood of herding. This is the 
basis for suggesting that individual risk-willingness is positively related to herding 
towards a consensus estimate when financial forecasts are made. Paper 2 argues 
that non-revisions in the context of issuing financial forecasts can be a reflection 
of confirmation bias, the tendency to discard contradicting information in order to 
reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957; Mahoney 1977), and consequently 
lead to underreactions to new information (Lichtenstein et al.1977). Thus, new 
information is unconsciously treated as confirmatory suggesting System 1 is 
merely activated. Because people with a higher confidence in their own beliefs are 
more likely to be subjects of confirmation bias this paper posits that individual 
confidence in an initial financial forecast is positively related to the likelihood of 
not revising that forecast following new information.
In Paper 3 argues that the expectation of receiving feedback alone has an impact 
on how a task is approached because the need to retain a positive self-image 
(Festinger 1954; Steele 1988), by receiving positive feedback, is awakened in the 
cognitive processes in System 1. Therefore, this paper posits that information 
intermediators will issue financial forecasts more in line with the requests of the 
end-users when they expect them to provide feedback. Additionally, the end-users 
who provide feedback are expected to approach the task with more awareness and 
attention in line with evidence from educational literature (as opposed to the end-
users that does not provide feedback) because this appeals to meta-cognitive 
processes within System 2. Thus, it is proposed that providing feedback will 
increase the end-users critical evaluation of the financial forecasts received from 
the information-intermediators.  
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4. RESEARCH METHOD
The use of experiments to examine hypotheses has a long tradition in many 
research fields. Conducting experiments have always been especially popular to 
directly test effects e.g. from new products in the medical industry or behaviors 
related to a new political intervention. This is because the experimental method 
allows isolating the variables of interest from confounding variables. Thus, it is 
possible to observe the pure effect of the variable of interest and draw more causal 
conclusions than allowed from data gathered by other research methods such as 
surveys, interviews or archival datasets. The experimental method is therefore 
characterized by a high internal validity but on the other hand, the generalizability 
of the results from experimental studies is usually low as a result of the controlled 
environment (e.g. Smith 2014 amongst many others). In other words, experiments 
have the advantage of narrowing down the view to the problem of interest but this 
“snap-shot” approach means that typical dynamics existing in real-world settings 
are not taken into account. Conversely, empirical research relying on archival data 
may include various factors that could interact with the main variables of interest 
and may span a long time. This method therefore has high generalizability but 
because various factors are at play at the same time the internal validity is 
typically somewhat vague. Thus, the magnitude of an effect found in an 
experiment and its persistence in other settings are hard to determine or predict but 
the documentation and cause of the effect is typically concise as opposed to effects 
observed in archival data. 
In the accounting literature archival data is by far the most prominent basis for 
published papers in the top-ranked journals (Oler et al. 2010). However, the use of 
experiments has been growing for the past decade and the attention to 
experimental research in the accounting literature seems to continue to grow 
(Bloomfield et al. 2016). One of the main motivations to do experimental research 
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in this thesis rather than to rely on archival data has been to elude the risk of being 
limited by the access to data. First, considering that my research questions are 
concerned with behaviors at the individual level many variables of interest are not 
included in the databases and thus indirect proxies would have to be used. As an 
example, gender is often used as a rough proxy of risk-willingness but also for 
confidence (as an example, see Barber and Odean 2001). Two of the papers in this 
thesis (Paper 1 and Paper 2) investigate these two variables as explanatory for 
behavioral biases and thus it is crucial for this thesis to apply more direct 
measurements of these. Second, one of the papers in this thesis (Paper 3) is 
investigating behavioral effects of an existing compensation system in the market 
called the broker vote system. These so-called votes, on which this system is 
based, are not publicly accessible (Maber et al. 2014) but research call for more 
attention on the system (Brown et al. 2015). By using the experimental method the 
central mechanism of interest in the broker vote system, a feedback-channel 
between an information intermediator and an end-user of the information, can be 
simulated in the lab and thus investigated more directly and without the 
requirement of data-access.     
Relying on theories suggesting that human behavior is sometimes limited by 
cognitive restrictions which may lead to decisions based on intuition or driven by 
social forces it is implicitly assumed that people are not always aware of these 
biases. Thus, if this thesis was merely based on data from alternative methods like 
surveys or interviews the conclusions are likely to be biased by peoples’ self-
perception rather than reflecting their true behavior. This also explains why I have 
chosen the experimental method where it is possible to observe actual behavior 
instead of attempting to infer it. However, relying on surveys and especially 
interviews would have been beneficial in order to support arguments of the 
underlying reasons behind behavioral patterns and thus increase the possibility of 
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making discrimination between the underlying theories. Although there is still a 
risk of biases caused by peoples’ self-perception, debriefings and enclosed check-
questions or a questionnaire in the experimental materials has been used to address 
this. This allows me to examine if some of the key variables suffer from peoples 
self-perception and therefore also increases the validity of the results reported.
The long tradition in both psychology and economics to use experiments has led to 
a list of general procedures including for instance randomization, voluntary 
participation and disguising the exact purpose of the experiment. Because the 
general procedures in economic experiments are far stricter than in psychological 
experiments, e.g. participants must be incentivized, typically by money, and they 
may not be deceived in any way in terms of hidden information etc., the 
experiments in this thesis were designed with a special attention to the procedures 
applied in economic experiments. 
4.1. Design of Experiments 
The three papers (referred to as Paper 1, Paper 2 and Paper 3) included in this 
thesis rely on data from two experiments. For simplification the first experiment, 
which both Paper 1 and Paper 2 rely on, is referred to as Experiment A and the 
second experiment, which Paper 3 relies on, is referred to as Experiment B. 
Relevant experimental materials are provided in the appendices. Below is a 
description of the two experiments.
4.1.1. Experiment A
In this experiment the main task is referred to as the forecasting task. Here 
participants are asked to forecast EPS one year ahead for a given firm (referred to 
as Step 1). Available information they may base this forecast on are rather rich in 
information including financial statements, expectations about the industry and an 
EPS forecast from management (See Step 1 in Figure 1 below or Appendix A for 
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details about the information in the experimental materials). Thus, the participants 
have access to various pieces of information in order to best reflect the ambiguity 
faced by real-world analysts. As opposed to it they were allowed to gather the 
information themselves e.g. from the internet (which would probably have been 
closer to a real-world setting) this setting allows me to keep control over all the 
accessible information. After they have made their EPS forecast the participants 
are informed that half of the year has passed and they now receive new 
information from which they may choose to revise their EPS forecast for the year 
(referred to as Step 2). The new information includes second quarterly reports 
from this and last year and a statement that management withholds their EPS 
forecast for the year (See Step 2 in Figure 1 below or the example in Appendix B 
for details about the information the experimental materials). Striving to reflect a 
real-world setting largely all information available to the participants is actual 
information gathered from an existing firm. However, the identity of the firm is 
disguised to the participants in order to avoid that initial perceptions about the firm 
will affect their answers in the experiment. Whereas Step 1 includes the exact 
same information across all participants, and thus creates a baseline, Step 2 has 
varying information across participants along two dimensions forming four groups 
(a 2x2 between-subject design). These two dimensions are referred to as 
treatments and the variations of information between the four groups are 
illustrated in the separate boxes in Figure 1, Step 2 below. 
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Consensus-treatment
In this treatment one half of the participants receives a consensus estimate ($2.14 
EPS) based on the average of 11 EPS forecasts made by others. In a real-world 
setting financial analysts usually have access to forecasts made by other analysts 
which they may perceive as worse or better informed and/or less or more skilled 
than themselves and therefore choose to rely little or heavily on. However, they all 
have the same title as financial analysts. Conversely, if the students in my 
experiment are informed that the consensus forecasts are conducted by 11 other 
analysts they may perceive this estimate as made by experts as opposed to 
someone with the same “title” as themselves. Thus, to the degree they consider 
themselves novice compared to professional analysts it is likely that they choose 
to allocate more weight on the consensus forecasts, in the process of conducting 
their own forecast, than professional analysts normally does. To overcome this 
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potential imbalance between the experimental setting and the real-world the 
consensus estimate is framed as an average forecasts calculated from 11 
colleagues (instead of 11 analysts). The primary objective of this treatment is to 
construct the central dependent measure of Paper 1 (measuring herding behavior 
but referred to as boldness in the paper). The other half of the participants, who 
does not receive a consensus estimate, acts as a control group and functions as an 
important input to this measure.
News-treatment
In this treatment one half of the participants receives bad news and the other half 
receives good news. The news is reflected by the second quarterly report having 
been manipulated upwards or downwards (with equal magnitudes). Further, those 
receiving bad (good) news get a statement from management that the quarter went 
below (above) the expected but that management  maintain their expectations for 
the year i.e. they keep their EPS forecast for the year in both treatments. The 
primary objective is to investigate if the characteristic of news (bad or good) 
serves as a moderating effect as stated by the second hypothesis in Paper 1.
Additional Tasks
In both Step 1 and Step 2, the participants are asked to state a 90 % confidence 
interval within which they expect the EPS for the firm will fall. This task is 
included just after each of their two EPS forecasts. The primary objective of the 
confidence intervals is to construct central measures in Paper 2 (referred to as 
confidence1, confidence2 and changeconf).  
After the forecasting task is completed all participants must evaluate their own 
performance in the forecasting task compared to how they expect the other 
participants in the experiment performed. They may do so on a five-point scale 
with the middle point reflecting that they assess their own performance around
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average (see appendix C where the task is disclosed). This task provides a measure 
used in Paper 1 and Paper 2 robustness checks in which I seek to eliminate the 
influence of a dimension of confidence referred to better-than-average effects that 
may unintentionally interact with central variables of the two papers).
Hereafter a short questionnaire is included to collect demographic information 
such as participant’s age, gender, grade point average, disposable income etc. 
These answers serve as control variables in both Paper 1 and Paper 2. Participants 
are also asked to guess the main scope of the experiment by providing a couple of 
keywords. These are used to check if the overall purpose of the experiment is kept 
unknown to the participants. 
Participants are also asked to state their general risk-willingness from a 10-point 
scale. Answers from this question serve as the central independent variable in 
Paper 1. The question, from the Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP, e.g. Wagner 
et al. 2007), is framed as follows: 
How do you see yourself  - Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to 
take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please write a number between 1 
and 10, where 1 means “not willing to take risks” and 10 means “very willing to 
take risks”. 
A valuation task is included in the experiment primarily as a distraction task 
between the forecasting task and the risk-related question in an attempt to avoid 
spill-over effects. In the valuation task the participants are asked to calculate the 
value of a given firm based on hard (numerical) information. An example is 
provided in appendix D. This task is chosen because it is course relevant and 
similar to tasks that may be included as a part of the final exam for the course. 
Thus, as a secondary purpose results of the valuation task are used as a proxy for 
course related skills included as a robustness check in Paper 2. Finally, as in the 
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forecasting task the participants are asked to state a 90 % confidence interval 
within which they expect that the correct answer in the valuation task falls. This 
can be used as proxy for miscalibration which is found to affect confidence and is 
therefore also included as a robustness check in Paper 2.    
To keep early finishers occupied a section of a published academic papers 
covering next week’s topic of the course and some Sudoku’s were included at the 
end of the experiment.
4.1.2. Experiment B
In this experiment the participants are either assigned the role as a financial 
analysts or an investor. The financial analysts are asked to state an EPS forecast 
together with a written justification of that forecast for a given firm based on 
information that is framed as publicly available information and based on 
information that is framed as private information. The distribution of hard 
information between analysts and investors is illustrated in Table 1 below. The 
private information, which is only available to the analysts, is presented as a phone 
conversation with the CFO of the firm. Here the CFO expresses his concerns 
about the performance of a division in the firm indicating that the EPS will 
probably be lower than expected. 
The investors are also asked to state an EPS forecast (framed as a trading decision) 
but their informational basis is reduced compared to the analysts’ (in Table 1 the 
missing pieces of information are denoted N/A). However, each investor has 
access to one of the analysts’ EPS forecast together with the analysts’ written 
justification for that forecast (see appendix E5 for ‘the attached sheet’ where 
analysts state their answer and later this sheet is attached to the experimental 
materials of an investor). Thus, investors and analysts are matched up one-on-one 
in this experiment and the analysts are free to choose how much information they 
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want to pass on to the investors (via their written justification). The match-up are 
done with a time lag such that the analysts complete the experiment first and the 
investors that they are matched up with complete the experiment at the earliest one 
day after.  For both analysts and investors there are two treatments along which 
information varies (following a 2x2x2 between-subjects design).
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Incentive-treatment
The analysts are randomly given one of two incentives – either to diverge from- or 
converge towards a consensus estimate (see appendix E for experimental materials 
were the exact formulation of these incentives is disclosed). The consensus 
estimate is disclosed for both analysts and investors. Making the analysts’ 
(biasing) incentives transparent to the investors reflects a world with full 
disclosure of analysts’ incentives. If the analysts follow their given incentive they 
earn more money which is known to the investors.
Feedback-treatment
Additional to the incentive treatment half the investors are asked to rate their 
matched-up analysts on a five-point scale. This requirement for the investors to 
provide feedback to their matched-up analysts by rating them is known to the 
analysts before they state their forecast and written justification. A high rating will 
result in a bonus to the analyst whereas the investors are only monetarily 
incentivized to provide accurate forecasts (framed as a trading decision). This 
feedback-treatment aims to simulate an existing system in the market called the 
broker vote system. Here investors allocate votes to analysts as a reward for 
making good research and the analysts’ compensation structure are based on these 
votes.
Additional Tasks
After the forecasting task all participants are asked to answer eight questions 
including check-questions like “were you playing the role as an analysts or an 
investor?” and ”How much could you at maximum earn from the task?” (see 
appendix F for all questions to the analysts and investors respectably). These are 
merely used as exclusion criteria to make sure that the participants remaining in 
the sample provided answers based on a fair understanding of the task. Other 
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questions are concerned with which considerations the participants had when 
completing the forecasting task including questions like “Was helping the investor 
important when making your forecast?” and “Did you trust the analyst to make an 
honest forecast?”. These questions are used for robustness checks to increase the 
understanding of the underlying reasons behind the participants’ behaviors in the 
experiment in order to support the argumentation in the analyses of the main 
results in the paper.
A short questionnaire is also included in order to make a detailed description of 
the respondents including the distribution of gender and experience with trading.
4.2. Planning
The two experiments were performed on students, in the classrooms (five different 
classes in each experiment) by paper. An alternative would be to recruit students 
for example via an online recruitment system, to which they have voluntarily 
assigned, and hereafter execute the experiments in an experimental lab. However, 
no such system or an experimental lab exists at CBS. Although in-class 
experiments often lay ground for published academic papers I considered the 
potential disadvantages from this procedure, compared to lab-based experiments, 
in order to take precautions as early in the design phase as possible. The most 
prominent of them are described in detail here.        
4.2.1. Voluntary participation
Voluntary participation is important in order to assure motivation from the 
participants and thus avoid disturbing behaviors such as a participant providing 
intentional inconsistent answers in the experiment. For both experiments, which 
were executed in 2013 and 2015, respectively, it was announced one week ahead 
to the students and again on the day of the experiment. Further, the experiments 
were executed at the end of a lecture (after the topic of forecasting had been 
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extensively covered in class) in order to assure that students who did not wish to 
participate had the chance to leave class without further notice. 
4.2.2. Individuality
Before the experiments were executed all students were asked to clean their desks 
so that only the things necessary to complete the experiment was accessible (i.e. 
pencils, calculator and the experimental material). The experiments contained a lot 
of different versions (Experiment A has 16 different versions and Experiment B 
has 24 different versions); a fact which was explicitly made known to the students. 
The various versions served not only a purpose in relation to the design of 
treatments but also in order to address the potential issue that the participants did 
not sit in a lab with isolated booths but instead sat in a classroom. The 
experimenter was present in the classroom while the experiment was completed 
and did not observe any attempt from students to communicate.  
4.2.3. Randomization
In Experiment A the 289 participants are randomly assigned a version of the 
experiment leading to a roughly equally distribution of participants between the 
four groups in the forecasting task (see Figure 1, Step 2 for the number of 
participants in each group). In Experiment B the randomization approach is a little 
constrained by the matching requirement (see Table 1 where the number of 
participants in each group is reported). Because the experiments are conducted at 
different times it is possible to match up two participants entailing that the second 
participant (the investor) has access to the first participant’s (the analyst) answer 
in the task. Consequently, the overall distribution of different versions of the 
experiments was not completely random between classes in terms of the role 
(analyst or investor) but how the different versions were hereafter distributed 
between students was totally random
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4.2.4. Coding
For both experiments, I manually coded all the answers from paper into an excel 
file. Hereafter I randomly drew 25 experiments and checked the coding. When 
there was no errors found another researcher recoded 25 experiments for 
comparison. This procedure was done in order to avoid errors and adjust for 
possible subjective perceptions that could unintentionally affect the coding. 
Finally the file was exported into Stata where all statistical analyses have been 
made. Although this coding-procedure demanded a lot of time, which would have 
been avoided in a computer-based experiment, it gave me a good overview of the 
collected data and thus I assess that it has saved me some time in the phases of 
constructing variables and during descriptive analyses. 
4.3. General Considerations and Possible Limitations
Considerations prior to designing and executing an experiment were remarkably 
widespread spanning from practicalities to carefully choosing the correct wordings 
in the experimental materials. To the point where the design of the experiment was 
satisfactory additional obstacles appeared in terms of complying with general 
Danish- as well as internal university rules concerning ethics, relevance, 
approvals, monetary payments etc. Significant demands for changes to the design 
in order to comply with the rules were few but potentially impactful. All students 
that receive payments from experiments are required to be registered by social 
security number etc. which provides two main concerns. First, it is important to 
assure the students that their answers in the experiment remain anonymous 
although they need to disclose sensitive personal information in order to collect 
their payments. Since most of the students are Danish they are rather used to this 
kind of requirements so even when I explained this requirement prior to 
experiments being performed no student expressed any concern according to this 
procedure. Second, as a consequence of the rules of registration the payments 
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were delayed and could not be given in cash. According to the literature in 
experimental economics these feature may potentially affect how people behave in 
an experiment and the monetary motivation can be smaller. 
4.3.1. Subjects
I use graduate students within the areas of accounting and finance as participants 
in the two experiments that this thesis is based on. The benefits of using students 
instead of professionals are that the sample size typically is larger because 
financial analysts, as with most professionals in the context of accounting 
research, are less accessible, highly time constrained and harder to motivate 
(Libby et al. 2002). However, an ongoing discussion in experimental accounting 
research, as well as in many other streams of literature, is whether or not the use of 
students as surrogates for professionals is acceptable or decreases the external 
validity (see Liyanarachchi 2007 for a recent review on this matter in the literature 
of financial accounting).
In the 1970s professional subjects in experimental research was considered crucial 
but for at least the last couple of decades, top journals in accounting have 
increasingly accepted studies using students instead of professionals (Smith 2014). 
As examples, Bloomfield and Hales (2002) use students as surrogates for 
investors, Magilke et al. (2009) use students as surrogates for auditors, Libby and 
Rennekamp (2012) use students as surrogates for managers and Kadous et al. 
(2006) use students as surrogates for financial analysts. These are all published in 
top-journals. 
It seems to be especially accepted to use students in psychological contexts like 
information processing because students should not behave differently than 
professionals (Ashton and Kramer 1980). Therefore, some argue that experimental 
research generally overstates the potential drawbacks of using students (Brownell 
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1995). Thus, to the extent that the behaviors of interest do not depend on analyst 
specific characteristics, students are sometimes even preferable to professionals 
(Peecher and Solomon 2001; Libby et al. 2002). For instance, in the literature on 
financial analysts Whitecotton (1996) finds that analysts are even more subject to 
optimism bias than students. Further, Elliott et al. (2007) conclude that students 
are a valid proxy for professionals when enrolled in a financial statement analysis 
course as long as the complexity of the task used in the experiment is aligned with 
the level of the students. 
In my two experiments, all 633 students were enrolled in the course financial 
statement analysis and valuation. Also, they have on average completed more than 
five accounting and finance courses. Further, more than 40 % of the participants 
are active investors in stocks and around 70 % have a relevant part-time job. Thus 
I assess that students are appropriate participants in my experiments given that the 
focus is on behavioral biases, which are argued to be at least as present in 
professionals as in students, and further given that the students are well ‘educated’ 
to complete the tasks included in the experiments. Therefore, I do not consider the 
use of students in the experiments of this thesis a limitation nor do I expect it to 
decrease the external validity of the results.
4.3.2. Pre-tests 
Experiments typically incentivize by money and are therefore often expensive to 
run. Further, an experiment cannot be rerun using the same participants if 
something goes wrong. Thus, it is crucial that the design of the experiment is 
acceptable before it is executed. In an attempt to assure that the design of the 
experiment is satisfactory pre-tests are often used. They may give an indication of 
how the final results are going to turn out and any discussions with the pre-test 
participants after they have completed the experiment can be valuable. For 
example there could be wordings in the experiment that are easily misunderstood
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or the participants might add considerations and reasons behind their answers to 
the experiment that the researcher did not think about. 
In both experiments, pre-tests were executed in order to test the design of the 
experiments and to discuss any consideration that may have come to mind for 
participants when completing the experiment. First, the experiments were 
completed by a few colleagues and hereafter we discussed their answers and 
considerations they had had, leading to some changes in the experimental 
materials. Hereafter the experiments were tested by students (Experiment A was 
tested by a class of Graduate Diploma students in accounting and Experiment B 
was tested by a class of Undergraduate students enrolled in the course Behavioral 
Finance and later by a class of Graduate students in auditing) which gave an 
indication of where to set an appropriate time-limit of the experiment and also 
how the results would turn out. Minor changes were done to the experimental 
materials after these pre-tests and the experiments were again completed and 
discussed with a handful of (other) colleagues before they were performed in the 
classrooms. Naturally, all results of the pre-tests are excluded from the final 
samples. 
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5. CONTRIBUTION, IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis broadly contributes to the literature on financial analysts’ forecasts by 
shedding light on how mental constraints and social forces affect decision making 
at the individual level. Thus, drawing on theories from the educational literature 
and the literature of psychology can contribute to our understanding of when and 
why financial analysts are subjects to behavioral biases in the process of 
forecasting. 
More specifically, this thesis makes at least three separate contributions. First, 
herding behaviors in the context of financial forecasts are influenced by individual 
risk-willingness. Not only does this suggest that herding behaviors exist beyond 
rational and strategic explanations like informational- or reputational herding, it 
also indicates that herding towards a consensus can be an intuitive reaction 
connected to mental short-cuts and behavioral biases. Thus, personal traits are 
likely to affect decision making in the context of financial analysts’ forecasts to a 
larger extent than currently reflected in the literature. Second, when an initial 
forecast is conducted with high confidence the likelihood of being subject to 
confirmation bias increases. Confirmation bias can explain why some individuals 
hesitate to revise a prior forecast although new market information arrives. This 
finding adds to our understanding of why financial analysts have a general 
tendency to underreact to new information beyond existing explanations based on 
strategic incentives. Third, incentive systems based on integrated feedback-
channels between an information intermediator and end-user reduce biases in the 
information to the end-users and enhance the end-users critical evaluation of that 
information. This contributes to the ongoing debate between researchers and 
regulators if the broker vote system, which has a build-in feedback-channel 
between financial analysts and investors, should be abolished or maintained.
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Complementing the rather narrow stream of behavioral accounting research, the 
findings of this thesis have general implications for the literature on financial 
analysts’ forecasts by suggesting that an enhanced focus on decision theories from 
the psychology literature can be applicable to investigate behavioral biases at the 
individual level. Future research can implement the perspective of this thesis 
suggesting that unconscious processes such as intuition and cognitive biases may 
be important to consider in explaining observed forecast biases like optimism bias 
or underreactions to news. This thesis also proposes an alternative way of 
measuring herding behavior in controlled environments which future research may 
adapt. Further, it provides indications that increased confidence as a consequence 
of non-revisions affects the preferences for performance based payments. Future 
research may more directly address this issue in the context of bonus structures.
To the extent that findings from this thesis persist in real-world settings, practical 
implications are especially relevant for regulators. First, the positive effects of 
incentivized feedback-channels indeed suggest that the broker vote system should 
be maintained, or at least that a system with similar features should be used 
instead. Similar systems might also be considered outside the context of analyst-
investor associations where the end-user of information needs to be critical in their 
interpretation hereof. Second, to the extent that the biases observed in financial 
analysts’ forecasts can be explained by cognitive constraints and thus translates 
into more unconscious reactions, regulations in terms of disclosure may not have 
the sufficient effect. Further, findings in this thesis rely on personal traits as 
explanatory factors to behavioral biases present in the context of financial 
analysts’ forecasts. Therefore, analysts who are exposed to these biases may 
continue to (unintentionally) do so even under different circumstances suggesting 
that more customized regulations and increased accessibility of analyst specific 
data may be useful to investors. The findings of this thesis may also have 
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implications for financial analysts to the extent that they are interested in evading 
potential behavioral biases. 
The common generalizability limitations for studies based on experimental 
methods are not an exception for findings in this thesis. Thus, the magnitude and 
persistence of the results in real-world settings is hard to predict because other 
factors than those in focus in this thesis may have moderating effects. As 
examples, whereas this thesis can document individual risk-willingness as an 
important explanatory variable of herding behaviors on the individual level it 
cannot make conclusions about to what extent this effect contributes to the 
observed herding behavior of financial analysts’ forecast on the market level. Nor 
is it possible to compare with effects stemming from informational- or strategic 
herding. Similar limitations of generalizability apply to estimating whether the 
confirmation bias explanation for non-revisions can explain underreactions to 
news in financial analysts’ forecasts observed at the market level. Further, the 
documented positive effects from incentivized feedback-channels similar to 
central mechanisms in the broker vote system are potentially limited by 
relationships between the agents that could be developing in the long run. More 
specifically, if analysts and investors develops loyal relationships the allocation of 
votes may be affected by this relation and thus potentially compromising the 
welfare-enhancing effects. However, current literature investigating this issue has 
found no support for this speculation but in order to expand our knowledge on this 
issue increased data access is needed.
Despite of these limitations, findings from this thesis provides important 
indications of personal traits and cognitive biases as explanations for errors in 
decision making in the context of financial analysts’ forecasts.
46 
 
6. APPENDICES
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APPENDIX A - AVAILABLE INFORMATION TO ALL PARTICIPANTS PRIOR 
TO STATING THEIR FIRST FORECAST 
Forecasting Task
On the next page you are asked to state your one-year-ahead earnings per share (EPS) forecast for a 
particular company. Today is year 0 and you are asked to forecast EPS for year 1. 
EPS = Net Income / Number of Shares 
The company is an actual listed company but in this experiment you will just know it as “The Firm”. 
Company info:
The Firm was founded in 1892 and operates today through 842 stores in the United States, and 157 
stores in Canada, Europe, Asia, and Australia. The Firm is within the retail industry with clothes as the 
main product line. The Firm’s products are considered to be medium-price. The sales are highly 
seasonal and usually peak in the spring and fall. Approximately 25 % of The Firm’s total revenue comes 
from online sales. According to The Firm: “The brand is our lifestyle, our focus—the value of having a 
great brand is far-reaching and cannot be overstated—it’s a snowball effect”. 
Industry info:
The industry is known by its intense competition between its many players which is characterized by 
very volatile earnings and volatile stock prices. Within the last five years The Firm has experienced 
many new competitors which can be of future threat according to The Firm itself: “In light of the 
competitive challenges we face, we may not be able to compete successfully in the future. Further 
increase in competition could reduce our sales and harm our operating results and business”. 
This figure illustrates the development in stock prices for The Firm in the last ten years:  
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The Firm’s Income Statement from the annual report.  
(year 0 = current, year -3 = three years ago) 
Expectations for the industry:
The National Retail Foundation (NRF) says its retail sales forecast for year 1 predicts a growth 
of 4.1% (3.7 % year 0). Online sales are expected to increase between 9% and 12% this year.
The NRF President and CEO said: “Improvements in economic growth combined with positive 
expectations for continued consumer spending will put the retail industry in a relatively good 
place in year 1. Though headwinds from the looming debates about the debt ceiling, increased 
health care costs, and regulatory concerns still pose a risk for both consumers and retailers”.  
Expectations of The Firm:
The Firm partly explains the EPS level at year 0 by unusual expenses due to restructuring costs 
as well as an ongoing lawsuit about management ethics. The Firm expects little or no 
restructuring costs and no impact from the lawsuit in year 1. The Firm forecasts EPS for year 1 
to be in the range of $2.25 to $2.35. 
 
Task: 
I expect the EPS for The Firm for year 1 to be $________. With a probability of 90% I believe 
the EPS will then lie between $________ and $________. 
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APPENDIX B – AVAILABLE INFORMATION IN THE SECOND STAGE 
BEFORE REVISING THEIR FORECASTS (THIS EXAMPLE IS FOR THE 
CONSENSUS GROUP RECEIVING BAD NEWS)
New information in the market 
 
The first quarterly report for year 1 was roughly as expected. The second quarterly report for 
year 1, which just got released, reveals the following numbers. 
Highlights from the second quarter report, year 0 and year 1, in thousand $: 
 
Year 0, Q2 Year 1, Q2
Revenue 945,698 890,605
Gross profit 604,122 552,956
Operating income/EBIT 19,165 17,493
Net Income 11,371 10,877
 
After the release of the second quarterly report the CEO of The Firm said in a press release: 
“Because of a continued challenging environment, our sales for the second quarter were 
somewhat below plan.“ However, The Firm does not revise their total expectations for year 1. 
On the other hand, based on 14 estimates from your colleagues, expected EPS for The Firm at 
year 1 is downgraded to an average (consensus) of $2.14.
 
Please revise your EPS forecast for The Firm for year 1 (If you do not deem a revision necessary, 
please write your forecast from the prior task again). 
 
Task:
I now expect the EPS for The Firm for year 1 to be $________. With a probability of 90% I 
believe the EPS will then lie between $________ and $________.
 
50 
 
APPENDIX C – ASSESSMENT OF OWN PERFORMANCE 
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APPENDIX D – THE VALUATION TASK
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APPENDIX E – EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS IN EXPERIMENT B
E1 - EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS FOR ANALYSTS WITH CONVERGE 
INCENTIVE AND NO FEEDBACK
Forecasting earnings as an analyst 
Background
In this experiment, you will play the role of a financial analyst making an earnings forecast 
about ABC Company’s quarterly earnings. Your forecast may help other CBS students (the 
investors) in later experiments. The investors will have access to the (consensus) forecast of 
other analysts, your forecast and justification, and may have access to your compensation 
scheme. The investors will make an investment decision that may result in their making or 
losing money depending on the actual earnings that the company announces (this will be 
announced sometime after the experiment is finished). You will forecast what the actual 
quarterly earnings will be for ABC based on the information below.
ABC Company
The company makes machines used in the food processing industry. Their quarterly earnings are 
generally quite stable. Last quarter the earnings were $2.40. 
Your Phone Call with the CFO
Yesterday, you had a private phone conversation with the CFO of ABC about the dairies (milk 
processing) division and the snacks division. The dairies division makes about 60 % of the 
profits of the company and it has been under pressure from a new entrant into the market. While 
the profit of the dairies division has been falling slightly, the profit at the snacks division has 
been increasing modestly. When the phone conversation turned to the performance of the dairies 
division, the CFO seemed very nervous and defensive. 
Your Earnings View
For this quarter, recent forecasts of the 10 other analysts are normally distributed (with a 
standard deviation of 0.05) around an average (consensus) of $2.40 that is identical to last 
quarter’s earnings. The other analysts are not aware of your phone call and will not be talking to 
the CFO themselves. Therefore, you decide the consensus forecast is probably too optimistic 
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about the dairies division. You (correctly) believe the earnings could be anywhere between 
$2.20 and $2.40 (uniformly distributed). 
Your Compensation 
One analyst is expected to be fired at your firm. You probably won’t be fired if you act 
strategically with your forecast and hide in the crowd of the other analysts’ forecasts 
(consensus). If you avoid being fired you will earn your regular amount of DKK 500. But you 
will be fired and earn only DKK 100 if your forecast is the most inaccurate compared to the 
other 10 analysts (who have already made their forecasts).
Your Forecast
You must now provide a forecast (a single number) using the attached sheet and a written 
justification that may help the investors make an investment decision. Please only write your 
input in the section called ‘to be completed by the financial analyst’. 
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APPENDIX E2 - EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS FOR ANALYSTS WITH 
DIVERGE INCENTIVE AND FEEDBACK
Forecasting earnings as an analyst
Background
In this experiment, you will play the role of a financial analyst making an earnings forecast 
about ABC Company’s quarterly earnings. Your forecast may help other CBS students (the 
investors) in later experiments. The investors will have access to the (consensus) forecast of 
other analysts, your forecast and justification, and may have access to your compensation 
scheme. The investors will make an investment decision that may result in their making or 
losing money depending on the actual earnings that the company announces (this will be 
announced sometime after the experiment is finished). You will forecast what the actual 
quarterly earnings will be for ABC based on the information below.
ABC Company
The company makes machines used in the food processing industry. Their quarterly earnings are 
generally quite stable. Last quarter the earnings were $2.40. 
Your Phone Call with the CFO
Yesterday, you had a private phone conversation with the CFO of ABC about the dairies (milk 
processing) division and the snacks division. The dairies division makes about 60 % of the 
profits of the company and it has been under pressure from a new entrant into the market. While 
the profit of the dairies division has been falling slightly, the profit at the snacks division has 
been increasing modestly. When the phone conversation turned to the performance of the dairies 
division, the CFO seemed very nervous and defensive. 
Your Earnings View
For this quarter, recent forecasts of the 10 other analysts are normally distributed (with a 
standard deviation of 0.05) around an average (consensus) of $2.40 that is identical to last 
quarter’s earnings. The other analysts are not aware of your phone call and will not be talking to 
the CFO themselves. Therefore, you decide the consensus forecast is probably too optimistic 
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about the dairies division. You (correctly) believe the earnings could be anywhere between 
$2.20 and $2.40 (uniformly distributed). 
Your Compensation 
One analyst is expected to be promoted at your firm. You probably will be promoted you if you 
act strategically with your forecast and stand out from the other analysts’ forecasts (consensus). 
If your forecast is the most accurate compared to the other 10 analysts (who have already made 
their forecasts), then you will be promoted and earn DKK 300. Otherwise you will earn your 
regular amount of only DKK 100.
In addition, investors (who earn money according to the accuracy of their own forecast) will rate 
your help from 1-5 (where 5 is the highest rating). You will receive a bonus of DKK 200 if your 
help is rated 4 or 5 (this is paid whether you are promoted or not). 
Your Forecast
You must now provide a forecast (a single number) using the attached sheet and a written 
justification that may help the investors make an investment decision. Please only write your 
input in the section called ‘to be completed by the financial analyst’. 
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APPENDIX E3 - EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS FOR INVESTORS MATCHED 
WITH AN ANALYST WITH CONVERGE INCENTIVE AND NO FEEDBACK
Predicting earnings as an investor
Background
In this experiment, you will play the role of an investor making an investment decision by 
predicting ABC Company’s quarterly earnings. The outcome of that investment (reflecting your 
payment for this task) depends on your accuracy (the actual quarterly earnings will be 
announced sometime after the experiment is finished). Another CBS student (the financial 
analyst) has already made an earnings forecast that may help you. The financial analyst had a 
recent private phone conversation with the CFO of ABC. You will predict what the actual 
quarterly earnings will be for ABC, based on the financial analyst’s forecast and justification 
(see the attached sheet on the following page), together with the (consensus) forecast of 10 other
analysts (more information below).
ABC Company
The company makes machines used in the food processing industry. Their quarterly earnings are 
generally quite stable. Last quarter the earnings were $2.40. For this quarter, recent forecasts of 
10 other analysts are normally distributed around an average (consensus) of $2.40 (and a 
standard deviation of 0.05). These analysts are not aware of the financial analyst’s private phone 
call with the CFO and will not be talking to the CFO themselves.
Financial Analyst Compensation 
The firm that employs the financial analyst has announced that one analyst is expected to be 
fired. The financial analyst (correctly) believes he is less likely to be fired if he acts strategically 
with his forecast and hides in the crowd of the other 10 analysts (consensus). If he avoids being 
fired he will earn the regular amount of DKK 500. But he will be fired and earn only DKK 100 
if his forecast is the most inaccurate compared to the other analysts (who already made their 
forecasts).
Your Compensation
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Reflecting the importance of earnings announcements for investment performance, you will 
“trade the announcement”. That is, you will write down your prediction of the earnings on the 
attached sheet. If you are exactly correct, you will earn DKK 500. For every $0.01 that the 
actual earnings are away from your forecast, the payment will reduce by DKK 20 (i.e., you will 
earn DKK 460 if the actual earnings are $0.02 higher or lower than your forecast).
Your Prediction 
You must now provide a prediction (a single number) and a written justification of your 
prediction using the attached sheet.
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APPENDIX E4 - EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS FOR INVESTORS MATCHED 
WITH AN ANALYST WITH DIVERGE INCENTIVE AND FEEDBACK
Predicting earnings as an investor
Background
In this experiment, you will play the role of an investor making an investment decision by 
predicting ABC Company’s quarterly earnings. The outcome of that investment (reflecting your 
payment for this task) depends on your accuracy (the actual quarterly earnings will be 
announced sometime after the experiment is finished). Another CBS student (the financial 
analyst) has already made an earnings forecast that may help you. The financial analyst had a 
recent private phone conversation with the CFO of ABC. You will predict what the actual 
quarterly earnings will be for ABC, based on the financial analyst’s forecast and justification 
(see the attached sheet on the following page), together with the (consensus) forecast of 10 other 
analysts (more information below).
ABC Company
The company makes machines used in the food processing industry. Their quarterly earnings are 
generally quite stable. Last quarter the earnings were $2.40. For this quarter, recent forecasts of 
10 other analysts are normally distributed around an average (consensus) of $2.40 (and a 
standard deviation of 0.05). These analysts are not aware of the financial analyst’s private phone 
call with the CFO and will not be talking to the CFO themselves.
Financial Analyst Compensation 
One analyst is expected to be promoted at the financial analyst’s firm. The financial analyst 
(correctly) believes he is more likely to be promoted if he acts strategically with his forecast and 
stands out from the crowd of the other 10 analysts (consensus). If his forecast is the most 
accurate compared to the other analysts (who already made their forecasts), then he will be 
promoted and earn DKK 300. Otherwise he will not be promoted and earn the regular amount of 
only DKK 100.
In addition, you (as an investor) will be able to rate the help of the financial analyst on a scale of 
1-5 (where 5 is the highest rating). If the help is rated as 4 or 5, then the financial analyst will 
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earn an additional DKK 200 payment (this is paid whether he is promoted or not). The financial 
analyst is aware of your control over this payment.
Your Compensation
Reflecting the importance of earnings announcements for investment performance, you will 
“trade the announcement”. That is, you will write down your prediction of the earnings on the 
attached sheet. If you are exactly correct, you will earn DKK 500. For every $0.01 that the 
actual earnings are away from your forecast, the payment will reduce by DKK 20 (i.e., you will 
earn DKK 460 if the actual earnings are $0.02 higher or lower than your forecast).
Your Prediction 
You must now provide a prediction (a single number), a written justification of your prediction 
and a rating of the financial analyst’s help using the attached sheet.
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APPENDIX E5 - THE ATTACHED SHEET
TO BE COMPLETED BY THE FINANCIAL ANALYST
Enter your earnings forecast:  $ . .
(this quarter’s earnings will not exceed last quarter’s earnings)
Enter a justification of your forecast to help the Investor:
TO BE COMPLETED BY THE INVESTOR
Enter your earnings prediction:  $ . .
(this quarter’s earnings will not exceed last quarter’s earnings)
Enter a justification of your prediction:
Rate the Financial Analyst’s help on a 1-5 scale (5 being the best rating):       .
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APPENDIX F1 – CHECK-QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSTS 
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APPENDIX F2 – CHECK-QUESTIONS FOR INVESTORS 
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Individual Risk-Willingness and Herding Behaviors in 
Financial Forecasts
Simone Staehr
ABSTRACT
Literature on financial analysts’ forecasts (FAF) documents that financial analysts 
tend to demonstrate herding behaviors and thus issue forecasts that are in line with 
consensus estimates which sometimes compromises accuracy. A number of 
explanations spanning rational economic logics, cognitive biases and social forces 
have been suggested. Relying on data from a paper-based, in-class experiment 
completed by 289 graduate students participating in the course Financial 
Statement Analysis and Valuation I posit and find support for individual risk-
willingness (or lack of) as an explanatory variable of herding behavior. 
Specifically, I predict and find that less risk-willing individual’s forecasts with 
less boldness and instead issue forecasts in line with the consensus forecast. The
results are argued to be at least partially a product of cognitive biases and an 
intuitive reaction to uncertainty. Additionally, I find evidence that the relationship 
is particularly pronounced when bad news (rather than good news) is received 
prior to forecast revisions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A generally accepted meaning of herding is that people tend to follow the decision 
of the crowd as a reaction to uncertainty (Keynes 1930). This paper focuses on 
herding behavior in the context of financial analysts making forecasts. Herding 
behavior in financial analysts’ forecasts (FAF) is at least five times more 
pronounced than accuracy in FAF (Guedj and Bouchaud 2005). Consequently 
FAF can mislead investors and cause significant losses and misallocation of 
resources (see Ramnath et al. 2008, Bradshaw 2011 for recent reviews and Brown 
et al. 2015 for recent insights). Similarly to the broadly accepted meaning of 
herding that it is a reaction to uncertainty, Evgeniou et al. (2010) show that high 
market uncertainty enhances herding behavior among financial analysts. Due to 
the substantial consequences and theoretically challenging potential explanations, 
herding behavior has received significant attention from researchers (see among 
many others Cont and Bouchaud 2000; Bikhchandani and Sharma 2000; 
Hirshleifer and Hong 2003). In the literature of FAF different stands on herding 
behavior are taken and thus explanations are somewhat widespread in the area in-
between perspectives aligned with the economic literature and socio-/cognitive 
psychological perspectives depending on the research question assigned. 
One group of studies focus on the consequences of herding behavior, in particular 
studies in economics. These studies explain bubbling in financial markets as an 
extreme consequence of herding behavior (e.g. Anderson and Holt 1997). This 
stream of research in herding behavior is often referred to as informational 
herding, rational herding or cascading. Another group of studies focus on the 
causes of herding behavior. Most of these focus on practical logics or externally 
created incentives for when and why financial analysts’ herd (e.g. Trueman 1994; 
Hong et al. 2000; Clement and Tse 2005; Seybert and Bloomfield 2009). Here, 
herding is explained more as a kind of trade off for analysts e.g. following 
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incentives that may result in less accurate forecast and thus mislead the investors 
or following the best analyst in an attempt to establish a better reputation. This 
stream of research in herding behavior is often referred to as strategic- or 
reputational herding. Finally, a rather small group of studies focuses on free-riding 
or emotions to play a role when herding behavior occurs (e.g. Hirshleifer and 
Shumway 2003; Bloomfield and Hales 2009) suggesting intuition or mental short-
cuts to be more pronounced. Further, articles reviewing the literature of financial 
analysts (e.g. Ramnath et al. 2008; Bradshaw 2011) have called for more research 
on the role of individual analysts’ personal characteristics and how they affect 
forecast behaviors.
This paper aims to contribute to the literature by responding to these calls for 
research on the importance of personal characteristics. Specifically, this paper 
addresses the relationship between individual risk-willingness as a personal trait 
and herding behavior in financial forecasts at the individual level by arguing that 
dissimilarities in risk-willingness will result in different reactions to the 
uncertainty inherent in forecasting tasks. Thus, the scope of this paper is more in
line with perspectives in psychology to investigate “when” and “why” analysts 
herd rather than to “what extent” they herd, which is often the focus in economic 
literature (Rook 2006). This paper takes the view that financial analysts, as 
decision makers under uncertainty in the task of providing a forecast, to some 
extent are restricted by cognitive biases or mental shortcuts where social forces 
also play a role and they are therefore constrained in their choice to display a 
herding behavior towards a consensus estimate. In the literature on financial 
analysts’ forecasts (FAF) Hirshleifer and Hong define herding behavior as “the 
propensity of analysts to follow the consensus” (Hirshleifer and Hong 2003, p. 
374, l 2 fb.). Although the underlying research question differs from that of this 
paper this commonly accepted definition is followed. Furthermore this paper also 
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refers to making bold forecasts, or rather to the boldness in forecasts, as being the 
opposite of forecasting close to the consensus estimate (herding).
As for the theoretical predictions, this paper posits that there is a positive 
relationship between individual risk-willingness and the boldness in forecasts (less 
herding). Relying on aspects from theories and positions in social psychology such 
as group conformity (Asch 1951; 1952; 1956), social comparison theory
(Festinger 1954) and partly behavioral decision theory (Einhorn and Hogarth 
1981), it is argued that individuals with lower risk-willingness will be more likely 
to herd towards the consensus. This is because less risk-willing people feel more
need of safety in their decision making and thus they use mental short-cuts.
Therefore, conforming to the group with their forecast is more pronounced than 
for more risk-willing individuals. This is the first and primary hypothesis of the 
paper. Furthermore, this paper also seeks to add depth by developing a theory on 
differences in the strength of this relation depending on the (perceived) strength of 
external stimuli. Specifically, considering findings in psychology literature which 
presents “a general principle across a broad range of psychological phenomena” 
that in individuals’ minds “bad is stronger than good” (Baumeister et al. 2001, p. 
323) it is likely that the characteristic of news (bad or good) affects the 
relationship stated in the first hypothesis. Therefore, it is argued that the positive 
relation between risk-willingness and the boldness in forecasts will be moderated 
so that the effect of the risk-willingness is amplified when analysts are faced with 
bad company news relatively to a setting where analysts are faced with good 
company news. This is the second hypothesis of this paper.
The hypotheses are tested on data collected via an experiment using 289 graduate 
students. This method allows providing controlled stimuli and directly observing 
analysts’ individual characteristics and forecasting outcomes. First, the 
participants forecast next year’s earnings per share (EPS) based on qualitative and 
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quantitative information of an actual firm (the identity of this firm is disguised to 
the participants). This information is the same for all participants, making the 
resulting pre-manipulation forecast a baseline to which future post manipulation 
forecast revisions are compared. Before making a forecast revision (updating their 
beliefs) the participants are randomly split into four groups pre-determined by four 
different versions of the experiment. The four groups are based on a 2x2 matrix 
based on the combination of two treatments. One treatment is whether participants 
receive a consensus estimate or do not receive a consensus estimate before making 
their forecast revision. This is referred to as the consensus treatment. The other 
treatment is whether participants receive bad news or good news about the 
company in focus before making their forecast revision. This is referred to as the 
news treatment. After having made their forecast revision participants are asked a 
number of questions primarily aimed at measuring their individual risk-
willingness and to include a number of other variables as controls in regression 
analyses.
Naturally the group of participants who do not have a consensus estimate cannot 
herd (according to the definition of herding followed by this paper) when issuing 
their forecast revision. Therefore, for testing the hypotheses, the group of 
participants who receive a consensus estimate is solely included. However, the 
participants that do not receive a consensus estimate serve an important purpose as 
a control group. Specifically, each individual participant in the consensus group is 
compared with the participants in the control group that stated a similar forecast in 
the baseline i.e. before revisions. This allows me to assess the influence of the 
consensus estimate on the revised forecast of each participant in the consensus 
group by comparing their individual revised forecast with the revised forecast of 
the control group participants that were most comparable in terms of the initial 
forecast. This is the basis of the measurement of boldness.
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The results, based on t-tests, show a positive relationship between analysts’ risk-
willingness and the boldness in forecasts and thus support the first and primary 
hypothesis. This is the main contribution of the paper. The second hypothesis is 
that the strength of the relation between individuals’ risk-willingness and the 
boldness in forecasts is larger in a setting where participants receive bad company 
news than in a setting where participants receive good company news. The 
relation between individual risk-willingness and the boldness in forecasts are 
tested in each of the two subsamples formed by the news treatment. The results 
show that individual risk-willingness significantly explains boldness in the bad 
news group while the significance disappears in the group receiving good news. 
This is the second contribution of this paper. 
Various robustness checks including regression analyses are performed allowing 
to statistically testing the difference between coefficients for the two groups in the 
news treatment. The regression results suggest that there is a significant difference 
between the coefficients in the two news groups providing further support for the 
second hypothesis. Further, when control variables measuring skills and 
experience are included, the main results persist and the controls are all 
insignificant in explaining the boldness in forecasts. Rerunning all main tests 
using an alternative and simpler measure of boldness (the distance between a 
forecast revision and the consensus estimate) does not change the overall results 
except that the difference between the regression coefficients from the tests made 
separately for each of the two news groups (good-/bad news) is no longer 
significant. The latter implies that results of the second hypothesis are not as 
robust as the results of the first. Additionally, previous studies have argued that 
risk-willingness and overconfidence are somewhat related concepts and hard to 
separate. Thus, as a final robustness check it is attempted to remove a dimension 
of overconfidence (often referred to as “better than average”- effects) from the 
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measure of individual risk-willingness to get a more pure test of the effect. 
Although this reduces the sample size considerably, the results persist.
To the extent findings from this paper applies in real-world contexts, academic 
implications of the contributions of this paper related to the importance of 
personal traits found via this experiment may also be applicable in studies using 
archival data to examine other well documented biases in FAF such as general 
optimism- and conservatism bias. Hence, biases in FAF may occur because 
cognitive biases or intuitions are used to make decisions. Further, this paper also 
speaks to regulators by suggesting that broad and general enforcements may not 
be sufficient in effectively protecting investors from biased FAF. Thus, more 
customized interventions directly pointed at the financial analysts and perhaps an 
increased supply of analyst specific data to investors may be additionally useful. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section 2 contains background and 
theory followed by hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the research 
method and presents central measures and descriptive statistics. Section 4 contains 
analyses and results. In Section 5 robustness checks are presented and Section 6 
concludes.
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2. BACKGROUND, THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Herding Behavior
The phenomenon of herding behavior goes way back and is broadly the tendency 
of individuals to follow others when making decisions as a reaction to uncertainty 
(Keynes 1930). Because people generally seek to avoid uncertainty6 (e.g. Hogarth 
1975) herding behavior is a widespread phenomenon in many contexts. As 
financial analysts are forced to make decisions under uncertainty, they work in an 
environment where herding behavior is likely to occur (see Devenow and Welch 
1996; Raafat et al. 2009 for reviews). Guedj and Bouchaud (2005) conclude that 
financial analysts agree more than five times more often with each other than with 
the actual result which implies that herding behavior amongst FAF is not only 
very pronounced but in fact also compromises forecast accuracy.
Previous literature has provided a wide range of explanations of why people herd 
both in financial markets in general and also in the specific context of FAF (see 
e.g. Devenov and Welch 1996; Bikhchandani and Sharma 2000; Cont and 
Bouchaud 2000; Baddeley 2010 for reviews). The explanations can roughly be 
divided into three groups. One group of explanations hold as a central tenet that 
market participants are strictly rational and make decisions that are rational, 
purposive and oriented towards a goal of economic welfare. A second group of 
explanations can be considered in line with Simon’s (1955; 1979) idea of bounded 
rationality and acknowledge the view that individuals do act in manners that are 
not always optimal in an economic sense and may thus be rational in a wider 
context by encompassing other goals such as pleasure or satisfaction or because of
cognitive constraints (Stanovich 1999). Finally, a third group of explanations
6 Although prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) suggests a general tendency of people to behave (more) risk-willing in the loss 
domain.
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accept the idea that decisions may in fact be irrational even when judged on a 
wider range of goals leading to biased and dysfunctional behavior. The boarders 
between the categories can in some cases be blurred depending on the approach 
and perspective. However, all these above mentioned groups of explanations have 
also been found for some decades in the broader judgment and decision literature 
(Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981).
Economists generally present herding as a rational result of sophisticated logics 
that follow the principles of Bayesian updating and information cascades 
(Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Anderson and Holt 1997; Bikhchandani et al. 1998). 
Economic experiments evidence that informational herding (often referred to as 
cascading) can be reflected as a perfectly rational behavior. As an example, 
Anderson and Holt (1997) use an experimental setting to reflect how herding 
behavior can occur in financial market forecasting. The participants in the 
experiment must in turn guess from which of two urns a ball has been drawn. Each 
participant can base their decision on the color of the ball they draw (private 
signal) and from access to the guess of all the participants who have drawn a ball 
from the same urn before them (public signal). After a few participants, 
participants generally ignore their private signal and follow the prior participants’ 
guesses. This is explained as the aggregated (public) signal (of e.g. four other 
guesses) being weighted more heavily than a single private signal (e.g. that one of 
the remaining balls in urn A is blue). Importantly, this experiment underlines that 
although herding behaviors sometimes cause information cascading around the 
wrong outcome (e.g. causing financial bubbles) the behavior is in line with 
rational models. Consistent with a rational view on herding, financial analysts may 
herd by relying on other analysts to have superior information or have superior 
skills as often suggested in the literature (e.g. Clement and Tse 2005; Guttman 
2010; Kim et al. 2011). This is sometimes referred to as informational herding and 
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is considered rational. In the grey area between perfectly rational and bounded 
rationality lies the concept referred to as strategic herding. Here, external factors 
are argued to cause analysts to have strategic incentives, such as career concerns, 
which in some cases make a forecast close to the consensus the better choice 
(Hong et al. 2000).
Amongst those relying on a less narrow view on rationality, mostly pronounced in 
the literature of psychology, we find Asch (1951; 1952; 1956) who moved the 
literature towards a view of social reality with the group being central. In his line 
of experiments it was evidenced that most people conformed to a group even when 
they realized this answer was wrong. This is explained by the importance of a 
reference group to individuals and Asch argued that even when the choice to 
follow a group creates mental conflicts in the individual (because the individual 
realizes that the answer of the group is wrong) this conflict is solved by reasoning 
that the choice of a majority should be correct. Further, this is in line with 
Festingers (1954) social comparison theory suggesting that in order to evaluate 
themselves, people generally compare to others especially in situations with high 
uncertainty. Much later this view is still significant in the literature and Turner’s
(1991) work on social influences argues that numbers are less influential than the 
consensus. Additionally, Fiske and Taylor (1991) argue that even rational people 
rely on cognitive biases such as convincing themselves that ‘consensus is almost 
always correct’ implying that it is reasonable to follow it. Similar ideas are 
reflected in the literature on financial markets, where Shiller (1995) argues that, 
even after making all the correct calculations along the way, social influence alone 
can result in people making the wrong choice at the end by herding towards the 
group.
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While the work of Asch, Festinger, Turner and Shiller explain herding as a 
phenomenon that can be seen as (bounded) rational and in fact optimal if one 
considers non-economic social goals, recent experimental studies suggest 
explanations that can be considered suboptimal and a result of cognitive biases 
leading the information value of consensus to be weighted too heavily (Seybert 
and Bloomfield 2009; Libby and Rennekamp 2012). That is, herding behavior can 
also be caused by human inabilities to optimally extract information from the 
aggregated consensus estimate. Some studies further seek to explain herding with 
reference to emotions leading to heuristics (see e.g De Bondt 1999 that touches 
upon this in the context of financial analysts’ herding behavior). According to this 
view, the fear of standing out from the crowd seems to dominate the benefit of 
staying true to one’s own beliefs which can make the group consensus far more 
influential than is appropriate. In the literature of evolutionary biology it is argued
that a cause of the depth of the fear of standing out may be that it has historically 
been too dangerous in terms of survival to not be part of a group (e.g. Simon 
1990). This implies that herding is likely to correspondingly be an intuitive 
reaction to uncertainty or based on mental short-cuts because it feels like a safer
choice.
Thus in the literature on FAF, a consensus estimate is not only viewed as 
something analysts relate to in a strategic sense or as an aggregated information 
signal but also as a signal that analysts may intuitively follow to make a choice 
which feels safer. This paper supports a view that not one single theory or 
explanation can cover all aspects of herding behavior amongst financial analysts.
However, I aim to provide a targeted contribution and therefore this paper focuses
on a rather limited subset of explanations based on social psychology and in 
particular cognitive biases and the notion that herding occurs partly as an intuitive 
reaction to feeling uncertain about the decision one is about to take. As Baddeley 
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et al. (2010, p.7, l. 9 fb.) argues: “When people are influenced by social 
information then this may reflect an interaction between a deliberative learning 
process and a more instinctive, affective, emotional response”. In the following, it 
is argued that individuals’ risk-willingness is an important antecedent of this 
reaction.
Individual Risk-willingness and Herding Behavior
Risk-willingness is considered an individual characteristic influencing how people
make decisions under (risk and) uncertainty in various contexts (Brockhaus 1980). 
It is generally agreed that individuals dislike risk (e.g. Hogarth 1975). However, 
although the general notion is that most people dislike risk, the level of risk-
willingness differs between people and hence may lead them to react differently to 
the same stimulus. Further, how individuals perceive and react to risk appears a 
very ingrained personal trait sometimes attached to emotions (Slovic 1999; 
Loewenstein et al. 2001). Some studies even suggest that genetics play a role as 
risk-willingness seems to vary between individuals but to remain somewhat stable 
over time (e.g. Andersen et al. 2008) and even over generations (Zyphur et al. 
2009).
Within research of humans’ herding behavior in general (including research of 
herding in financial markets), there is widespread evidence that herding at least in 
part is a response to individuals feeling insecure about how to process stimuli
presented to them (Baddeley, 2010). Given this aversion towards the unknown
(described by Shefrin (2002) as fear of the unknown in relation to ambiguity), 
individuals are likely to use the availability heuristic which entails relying 
intuitively on information that is more available to the mind, including 
information perceived salient as it stems from a group to which one belongs
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Gilovich et al. 2002; Kahneman 2011). This 
suggests that those who most dislike uncertainty and risk, are most likely to herd, 
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because these individuals use the availability heuristic more and rely on 
information which is salient and thus easily available to the mind.
This is formally stated by the first hypothesis:
H1: The individual risk-willingness is positively associated with the 
boldness in their forecasts.
2.2. Asymmetries Caused by News (Bad/Good)
Some studies observe asymmetric patterns in FAF behavior created by different 
reactions to negative vs. positive market information (e.g Easterwood and Nutt 
1999). Studies relying on archival data (e.g. Elliot et al. 1995; Basu 1997) find that 
financial analysts use information inadequately more often in market upturns than 
in market downturns. In the same line, other studies (e.g. Conrad et al. 2006; 
Beyer 2008) conclude that financial analysts are more likely to downgrade when 
prices decline than to upgrade when prices increase. This asymmetric behavior is 
often argued to occur because management delays bad news relatively to good 
news and hence a stronger reaction to bad than good news is rationally expected in 
FAF since it contains more information7.
Nonetheless I suggest that at least part of the explanation is that individuals 
process and react differently to positive than to negative news. This assertion is 
founded in research across various fields finding that “bad” is stronger than 
“good” and that people usually are unaware of this asymmetry within themselves 
(for a review, see Baumeister et al. 2001). For instance, experimental studies find 
that negative information is more processed, weighted more strongly and provokes 
larger amplitude in brain responses compared to positive information (Anderson 
1965; Abele 1985; Peeters and Czapinski 1990; Ito et al. 1998). This asymmetry is 
7 Some studies rely on conservatism bias (e.g. Beyer 2008) whereas other rely on asymmetric loss-functions in line with prospect theory 
(Markov and Tan 2006; Raedy et al. 2006) to explain this asymmetric behavior by analysts.
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observed even in (unimportant or uninfluential) everyday events (Nezlek and 
Gable 2001) where the magnitude of these events seems to play only a modest (if 
any) role (Hajcak et al. 2006). These latter findings suggest that individuals’ 
asymmetric reaction to negative relatively to positive information is unconsciously 
generated and perhaps evolutionarily adaptive (Baumeister et al. 2001). In the 
same line, Kahneman (2003) suggests that the brain quickly decides if something 
should be perceived as good or bad which supports the idea that it provokes 
intuition rather than more elaborate thinking.
Based on the above-mentioned good/bad asymmetry I expect that financial 
analysts feel more exposed if underreacting to bad news than to good news as 
overlooking obviously negative information about the future of a firm is likely to 
be intuitively perceived as careless behavior whereas overlooking positive 
information is likely perceived as being careful. Therefore, analysts receiving bad 
news prior to revision are likely to perceive that they are exposed to more risk or 
uncertainty than analysts receiving good news. To the extent that the first 
hypothesis of this paper is supported the more risky or uncertain the situation, the 
more likely individuals are to herd with their forecasts. This is because bad news 
seems to apply to cognitive processes that are in closer connection to intuitional 
reactions to a larger extent than good news does. Therefore I expect that the type 
of news in the market (good or bad) related to the company in focus moderates the 
relationship between individual risk-willingness and the boldness in forecasts so 
that the difference in reactions between the risk-willing and the less risk-willing 
analysts stands out stronger when bad news are presented than when good news 
are presented. This is the second hypothesis of this paper:
H2: The positive relationship between risk-willingness and the boldness 
in forecasts is stronger when bad news is presented prior to forecast 
revisions (as opposed to good news). 
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3. METHOD 
The hypotheses are tested on data collected via an experiment. This method allows 
me to provide exact stimuli and directly observe analysts’ characteristics and 
forecasting outcomes (see e.g. Libby et al. 2002 for examples of when 
experimental research is particularly beneficial in financial accounting). The 
experiment in essence contains a written introduction followed by the central task 
of forecasting. After the forecasting task a short questionnaire and a small risk-
related task are included. At the end participants must choose between two lottery 
options in order to receive potential earnings. Debriefings and lottery draws were 
done in class a week after the experiment.
3.1. Design and Task
Participants face a two-step task on forecasting earnings per share (EPS) for a 
given firm (see appendices for experimental materials). In step one all participants 
receive the same information about the firm in focus. They are told that they are at 
the end of year 0 and must forecast EPS for year 1 (next year). This forecast in 
step one is named F1 and later used as a baseline. In step two participants are told 
that two quarters have passed since their first forecast and they are now asked to 
revise the EPS forecast (still for year 1) based on newly released information. This 
revised forecast in step two is named F2. Beforehand participants are (randomly) 
split into four groups differing by the information received before making forecast 
revisions in step two. The information varies randomly along two treatment 
dimensions, a consensus vs. no-consensus and a good- vs. bad news. That is, one 
half receives a consensus estimate, while the other half does not. The latter is 
referred to as the control group. One half receives good news about the firm’s 
outlook while the other half receives bad news. Thus the experiment can be 
categorized as following a 2 x 2 between-subjects design. The distribution of 
participants’ random assignment to each treatment group is illustrated by Figure 1.
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When financial analysts conduct forecasts they work under ambiguous conditions 
in the sense that various information is available to them and they need to be able 
to extract and processes the important parts of that information. The aim is to 
reflect similar characteristics of ambiguity in the design of a forecasting task. To
do so roughly two (normal) pages with both qualitative and quantitative 
information are presented in step 1 (see figure 1 for details about the information). 
Simulating a close to real-world task, actual information for an existing listed 
firm8 is largely repeated. The information contains various publicly available 
information including historical financial performance and strategy, a chart 
illustrating historical stock prices and expectations about the future of the industry. 
8 The firm is Abercrombie and Fitch with minor changes made to the public available information. However, the firm is kept anonymous to 
avoid potential biases (e.g. representativeness heuristics or confirmation bias). No participant gave the impression of knowing the identity of the 
underlying firm neither from their written answers nor at debriefings.  
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Furthermore it is stated that firm management expects EPS for year 1 in the range 
of 2.25-2.35. 
Given the 2 x 2 design there are four groups receiving slightly different 
information in step 2 but some information is common. All participants are 
informed that the first quarterly report for the firm was roughly as expected and 
that the second quarterly report is just released. Further, some highlights from last 
year’s second quarterly report are presented together with a statement from the 
CEO clarifying that the firm maintains its expectation for year 1; i.e. an EPS of 
2.25-2.35. The above mentioned information is given to all participants 
independently of the treatment group assigned meaning that the groups only vary 
along two treatment dimensions; consensus vs. no consensus and good vs. bad 
news.
Treatments
Consensus vs. no consensus: Half of the participants receive a consensus estimate 
(2.14) and are told this estimate is a result of a revision performed after the release 
of new information. The other half does not receive the consensus estimate. The 
latter is merely used as a control group to establish an effect of the consensus 
estimate, i.e. to obtain a measure of the boldness in forecasts. Thus, hypothesis 
tests are only performed on the half of the participants who receive a consensus 
estimate, since this is the only group who have a possibility to herd towards the 
consensus estimate. Because the treatment group receives one more piece of 
information than the control group (the consensus estimate) they are generally 
expected to revise their forecast according to this to the extent that they find this 
information relevant. Thus, the treatment group will most likely provide forecasts 
closer to 2.14 on average than the control group (which is tested prior to 
hypotheses testing at the end of this section). A management forecast of 2.25-2.35
(which is kept constant across all participants) and a consensus estimate of 2.14 
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are presented regardless of news treatment assigned. Thus, if the managements’ 
forecast serves as an anchoring point to the participants in the experiment it is 
expected to do so regardless of which treatment group they are assigned. 
Therefore, although it may potentially create some noise it is not expected to 
affect the results in the hypothesized directions. However, in the section with
manipulation- and other checks I make an attempt to test if the strength of the 
management forecast as an anchoring point varies according to the consensus 
treatment but I find no support for this. Further, the direction of the difference 
between management forecasts and consensus is chosen because the accounting 
literature finds managers to generally be optimistic (Kothari et al. 2009), even 
more than analysts. The decision to hold management forecasts and consensus 
constant across the news treatment is based on an ambition to hold other stimuli 
than the news stimuli constant in order to be able to isolate the effect of that 
stimulus. 
Good vs. bad news: All financial numbers in this year’s second quarterly report 
are manipulated upwards (good news group) or downwards (bad news group) 
equally in absolute terms compared to the numbers in last year’s second quarterly 
report. Further, the qualitative information (the statement from the CEO) is either 
positive in nature and indicates a positive earnings outlook (good news group) or 
negative in nature and indicates a negative earnings outlook (bad news group). 
While the numerical information regarding the quarterly reports can be 
manipulated without substantial asymmetries I recognize perceptions of written 
text (the CEO statement) may be subjective and hence vary in perceived 
magnitude amongst the readers (participants). To minimize this variation I only 
allow a few words to differ between the two groups in the news treatment. 
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Participants
The participants are 289 graduate students all enrolled in a course on Financial 
Statement Analysis and Valuation. On average, participants are 25 years old 
(mean and median), 27 % are female, 38 % invest in stocks and 67 % have a part-
time job (57 % within investment/trading, accounting or corporate finance). 
It may be argued that students are less sophisticated users of financial information 
than professional analysts. Therefore, students are likely to put more trust into the
consensus estimate if this is framed as conducted by professional analysts because 
students likely expect professionals to have superior skills or information. This is 
consistent with findings in social psychology that individuals are more likely to 
confirm to the behavior of a group if these are viewed as more skilled (Festinger 
1954; Bandura 1965). Thus, investigating herding towards experts while being a 
novice is not the scope of this paper and may potentially dilute the results. To 
overcome this issue I frame the information so that students perceive the 
consensus estimate as stemming from equally skilled people as themselves9. In a 
real-world setting, financial analysts consider other analysts more or less skilled 
than themselves in the same way as students probably consider other students 
more or less skilled than themselves. I strive to avoid making the consensus 
estimate more desirable to conform to in the experimental design than in a real-
world setting by this approach. Additionally, Libby et al. (2002) argue that 
students with sufficient knowledge of the task can, and should, be used as 
participants. Students participating in a course at this level are well familiar with 
the task of forecasting EPS and biases generally present in financial markets and I 
therefore perceive them as a relevant subject pool10.
9 Consensus is presented as an average based on 14 estimates from colleagues. Hence, the participants should view this estimate with the same 
degree of trust as financial analysts view a consensus estimated from their colleagues and are therefore not expected to herd more.
10 See Koonce and Mercer (2005) for further discussions of students as surrogates for sophisticated participants. See also Whitecotton (1996) 
where professional analysts are found with a larger optimistic bias than MBA students. 
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Procedure
The experiment was completed on paper in class. Only pens and calculators were 
allowed as aids. Participants were given a limited time frame to complete the 
experiment11. Following standard guidelines in economic experiments only little 
verbal introduction prior to the actual experiment was given. In the experimental 
material a more substantial written introduction was included (see Appendix D). 
In the written instructions it was stipulated that participation was voluntary, that 
all tasks should be solved in order and that communication was not allowed. Not 
complying with the rules lead to exclusion from the experiment and a lost 
opportunity to receive monetary compensation. However, the experimenter, who 
was present throughout all experiments, found no reason to exclude anyone. All 
experiments were executed by the same experimenter.
Participating in the experiment included potential monetary gains in line with 
tradition in experimental economics. This is expected to enhance participants’ 
effort in the experiment and thus help capturing a natural behavior. Inspired by 
Davis and Holt (1993, Chap. 2) I included a lottery offering few but relatively 
high stakes to motivate people to make an effort. The lottery chances are based on 
performance, the choices made throughout the experiment and luck combined. 
Thus, participants are not given any direct monetary incentives to play strategic 
with their forecast e.g. to stand out from the other participants or follow the 
management or consensus estimate. Nor are they directly incentivized to be 
accurate with their forecasts although the intention with the payment structure is to 
imply, without saying, that accuracy is beneficial.
11 Pre-tests by colleagues and Graduate Diploma students gave an indication of where to set the time limit in order to balance a bit of time 
pressure (as professional analysts too experience) but still receive predominantly complete answers. Answers from pre-tests are excluded from 
the final sample.  
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I follow experimental instructions by Libby and Rennekamp (2012, p 208 footnote 
13) and denote all earnings from the experiment in an experimental currency 
(“Coins”) and the exchange rate of the experiment currency is unknown until the 
end of the experiment. Participating in the experiment offers a chance to earn 2000 
coins convertible to lottery tickets. All lottery prizes are of $286. Chances of 
winning depend on the amount of experimental currency earned during the 
experiment. This amount depends on the participant’s choices during the 
experiment in manners that award effort and insight. For instance uncompleted 
tasks always lead to fewer coins. Participants are (truthfully) informed that lottery 
draws cannot be completed until the next lesson as their earned coins need to be 
calculated manually to determine their individual performances. The week after 
executing the experiment debriefings and lottery-draws were (transparently) done 
in the class-room. 
In total 10 participants won the lottery whereas each received $286. This 
corresponds to an average hourly wage of around $14 per participant. Further, the 
prize ($286) is about 62 % of their average self-reported monthly disposable 
income ($395) which I believe to be sufficiently high stakes. Because Andersen et 
al. (2008) find risk-willingness to sometimes vary with personal finances I check 
but find no income effect. The participants reported monthly disposable income 
and their individual answer in the risk related task has no noteworthy correlation.
At the debriefing, none expressed concerns about the specific calculation of coins. 
Nor did anyone question if the best solution to the forecasting task was also the 
most accurate or how it was calculated.
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3.2. Measurements and Descriptive Statistics
Boldness
By keeping the information constant across participants in the first step a baseline 
is created. As Welch (2000, p. 394, l. 12 fa.) points out at the end of his paper 
“…if a researcher had access to…information sets available to individual analysts 
when making decisions, one could discriminate between true herding and 
information that is simply received simultaneously and interpreted likewise by two 
analysts.”. This is what the setting of this paper is aiming for. To measure the 
boldness in forecasts, I take advantage of the baseline being the first forecast (F1) 
that all participants conduct based on identical information. I do so by comparing 
each individual participant in the consensus group with the participants in the 
control group that have a similar F1. Thus, by comparing the individual revised 
forecast (F2) in the consensus group with F2 of the participants in the control 
group that stated a similar F1 and thus have approximately the same baseline I can 
capture the effect of the consensus estimate. This is the central idea underlying the 
measurement of boldness. According to Bernhard et al. (2006, p. 658, l. 14 fb.) a 
forecast is unbiased if “…it corresponds to the analyst’s best estimate of earnings 
given all available information…In its most basic form, herding amounts to 
biasing a forecast away from an analyst’s best estimate, toward the consensus 
forecast of earlier analysts; while anti-herding amounts to biasing a forecast away 
from that consensus.” Following this idea of when a forecast is biased because of 
herding, the idea of the boldness measurement in this paper is as follows; First, for 
each individual in the consensus group I start by identifying all participants in the 
control group who have submitted similar forecasts in F1. I perceive similar 
forecasts as forecasts that differ with less than 0.1012. E.g. if a participant in the 
consensus group stated a F1 of 2.10 I match him/her with all participants from the 
12 The results generally persist if the interval is changed. I tried intervals of 0.05 and 0.15. Results are available on request. 
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control group that stated a F1 within the interval 2.00 – 2.20. I do this separately 
for each participant in the consensus group. Thus, for each participant in the 
consensus group I can now identify how the participants in the control group that 
stated similar forecasts in F1 behave with their revised forecast of F2. This allows 
me to estimate how each participant in the consensus group would likely have 
behaved with their F2 if they had not additionally received a consensus estimate.
Consequently, comparing F2 for each participant in the consensus group (F2actual)
with the average of F2 of their matched participants from the control group (F2pure)
enables me to estimate the direct effect of the consensus estimate and thus allows 
recognizing the boldness in forecasts. 
The measure of boldness for each individual in the consensus group measures the 
degree to which F2actual is close to F2pure relatively to the consensus and can be 
formulated like this: 
Boldness = |(F2actual – Consensus)| / |(F2pure – Consensus)|
Where: 
F2 actual = the actual revised forecast for each individual in the 
consensus group
Consensus = the consensus estimate of 2.14 given to the consensus 
group
F2 pure = the average of the revised forecast for the matched 
participants in the control group 
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If:
Boldness > 1, then I assign it 1.
F2pure < Consensus < F2actual or F2pure > Consensus > F2actual, then I 
assign it 1.
Because I cap the formula by 1 the measure of boldness in forecasts can only take 
values between 0 and 1. If F2 for the consensus group is exactly at consensus (i.e. 
F2actual = Consensus) the formula assigns it 0 reflecting the very least bold 
forecasts (most herding). If F2 for the consensus group moves away from the F2 
of the matched participants in the control group and towards consensus (i.e. F2pure 
< F2actual < Consensus or F2pure > F2actual > Consensus) the formula assigns a 
value between 0 and 1 depending on how much it moves. Hence, a value of 0.5 
reflects a F2 for the consensus group exactly between the F2 of the matched 
participants in the control group and consensus. Further, if F2 for the consensus 
group moves away from the F2 of the matched participants and also away from 
the consensus estimate (i.e. F2actual < F2pure < Consensus or F2actual > F2pure >
Consensus) it is assigned 1 by the formula reflecting the most bold forecasts. 
Finally, a group (42 observations) of participants move away from F2 of their 
matched participants and state a F2 on the other side of the consensus estimate 
(i.e. F2pure < Consensus < F2actual or F2pure > Consensus > F2actual). I perceive this 
group as having extreme boldness in their forecasts by placing their forecast on the 
other side of the consensus estimates than the control group does. In a paper on 
herding behavior of financial analysts’ forecasts Clement and Tse (2005) perceive 
all forecast revisions that move in the other direction than consensus relative to 
their own prior forecast as bold (measured by a dichotomous variable). Thus, I 
manually assign a 1 to this group13. However, a small amount of participants in 
13 If these 42 observations are not assigned a 1 but instead use the formula the general results still persist.
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this group (15 observations of the above mentioned 42 observations) is also 
moving in a direction contradictive to their news signal with their F2 (i.e. F2pure <
Consensus < F2actual and receiving bad news or F2pure > Consensus > F2actual and 
receiving good news). I am sceptic if their behavior should be perceived as 
ignorant instead of extremely bold. I check if the behavior of these 15 participants 
could be explained by the position of the management forecast in the experimental 
materials. However, F2 of these participants are not significantly closer to the 
management forecast than F2 for the rest of the participants. Because I am 
doubtful about how the behavioral motive of this small group should be 
interpreted I drop these 15 observations14.
Because this measure of boldness in forecasts requires at least one observation in 
the control group that is 0.1 or less away from the F2 made by each participant in 
the consensus group I lose 17 observations which do not meet this requirement. 
This leaves a total sample of 115 observations for which a value for the boldness 
measure can be calculated.
Risk-Willingness
My main measure of risk-willingness (RiskWillingness) is based on answers to a
question from the Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP, e.g. Wagner et al. 2007):
How do you see yourself  - Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to 
take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please write a number between 1 
and 10, where 1 means “not willing to take risks” and 10 means “very willing to 
take risks”. 
14 If these 15 observations are included the general results persist except for the regression analyses in robustness checks where the difference 
between coefficients for RiskWillingness in the two news groups gets insignificant. 
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The measure has been widely used to determine individual risk-willingness as a 
personal trait to predict behavior (e.g. Weber et al. 2012; Caliendo et al. 2014). 
Although sometimes criticized by economic literature for being too subjective and 
not directly incentivizing participants to respond according to their true 
preferences, this 10-point scale measure is recently validated by a number of 
studies comparing risk measures across literatures and domains. The authors 
concluded that this measure is the best all-round predictor of risky behavior across 
various domains (Dohmen et al. 2005; Wagner et al. 2007; Dohmen et al. 2011). 
In the experiment by Dohmen et al. (2011) the measure is compared to other 
popular risk measures including lottery choices and is proven to outperform other 
measures in terms of predicting behavior. These results are further supported by 
Lönnqvist et al. (2015). Further, Charness et al. (2013) argue that this measure 
might be more applicable in experimental settings to reflect real-world behaviors 
than measures frequently used in economic experiments. Thus, I perceive this 
measure of individual risk-willingness as appropriate for the purpose of this paper. 
I drop one participant that did not respond to this question leaving the sample with 
128 observations for which a value for the risk-willingness measure is obtained.
I do not perform list-wise deletions and I therefore allow my sample size to vary 
between variables.
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Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
3.2. Manipulation and Other Checks
After the main task is completed I check the overall understanding of the 
experiment. 78.2 % of the participants wrote that the experiment was about 
behavioral finance, risk-perception, expectations, decision making or similar,
reflecting a good general understanding. Furthermore only six participants wrote 
keywords like “influence from others” or “adjustments to news” indicating that 
there was a low risk that participants gave answers that were affected by their 
understanding of the theory and hypotheses. Rerunning the main analyses without 
these participants show largely the same results (not reported, available on 
request). Therefore, in order to keep the sample size as large as possible I do not 
drop any observations according to this. I also check whether the management 
forecast impacts participants’ F2 more in the group that does not receive 
consensus (control group) than in the group that additionally gets a consensus 
estimate (consensus group) and therefore have more points to anchor on. If this is 
the case, one would expect the control group rather than the consensus group to 
act in line with management who do not revise their forecast. However, results 
from a t-test refute this idea. The difference between numbers of participants who
do not revise their forecast in the control group (46) and the consensus group (47) 
n Mean Median SD Min Max 1
1. Boldness 115 0.69 1 0.40 0 1
2. RiskWillingness 128 6.07 6 1.76 1 10 0.20**
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations between the two main variables.                                                                                        
Stars indicate significance on level: ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.
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is insignificant (t-stat. = -0.01). When additionally sorted on the news treatment 
the results remain insignificant. These results indicate that though the decision to 
include and hold constant the management forecast in the experimental design 
may create some noise, it does not seem to have a differential effect on the four 
groups of participants. Therefore management may influence forecasts but seem 
unlikely to bias the results in the hypothesized directions.
Treatment Effects 
To test the effects of my treatments and to validate the measure of boldness in 
forecasts, if and how the participants respond to the consensus-treatment is
investigated. I generally expect that the consensus group (the group that 
additionally receives a consensus estimate of 2.14) revises their forecasts 
significantly closer to the consensus estimate than the control group because the 
participants should assess this extra piece of information as relevant to incorporate 
in their forecast revisions. T-tests are used to test if the absolute distance to the 
consensus estimate is significantly different for the two groups in the consensus 
treatment. In line with my expectations, results of the t-test15 confirm that 
participants in the consensus group revise their forecasts significantly closer to the 
consensus estimate with a mean distance to consensus of 0.33 compared to a mean 
distance to consensus of 0.54 for the control group (t-stat. of 4.25, two-tailed). 
Further, I test and find that the absolute difference between F2 in the consensus 
group and the F2 of their individually matched participant in the control group are 
significantly different from zero (t-stat. of 5.57). This suggests that the consensus 
estimate causes a behavioral difference between the two group’s revised forecasts. 
I therefore conclude that the consensus treatment works as expected (providing 
additional information to the consensus group) and believe that the measure of 
boldness in forecasts reliably captures the intended.
15 All results are generally supported by non-parametric tests (available on request). 
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Furthermore I want to test if the characteristic of news received prior to revision 
affects the participants’ forecasting behavior. In this test the control group (the 
group that does not receive a consensus estimate) is excluded. I use a t-test to test 
if F2 is significantly different for the two groups formed by the news-treatment 
(i.e. the group that receives good news prior to revision and the group that receives 
bad news prior to revision). The mean of F2 for the good (bad) news group is 2.15 
(1.92), just above (somewhat below) the disclosed consensus estimate. This 
difference is statistically significant (t-stat. of -2.25, two-tailed) suggesting the 
news-treatment has the anticipated effect. 
As expected, the measure of risk-willingness does not vary significantly with any 
treatment in the forecasting task confirming the randomization effect (results not 
tabulated, available on request). 
Hence, the experimental design and manipulations work as intended and I 
therefore move on to test the two main hypotheses in the next section.
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4. ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
As stated in H1, I expect that the individual risk-willingness is positively 
associated with the boldness in forecasts. This hypothesis is tested on the 115 
consensus group participants for whom Boldness can be measured. To allow for t-
tests the participants are split into two groups based on the median value of 
RiskWillingness. Hence, participants who stated a higher value than 6 on the 10-
point scale called RiskWillingness are assigned a 1 and referred to as the More 
RiskWilling group, the other half receive a 0 and are referred to as the Less 
RiskWilling group.  
Results of the t-test (the first column in Table 2 under the headline “Total 
Sample”) show that the least risk-willing group has a mean Boldness of 0.58 
whereas the most risk-willing group has a mean Boldness of 0.81. The two means 
are significantly different at the 0.01 level (t-stat. of -3.14, two-tailed). The results 
n Mean n Mean n Mean
Less RiskWilling 61 0.58 28 0.47 33 0.68
More RiskWilling 54 0.81 22 0.86 32 0.77
t-stat (two-tailed) -3.14*** -3.76*** -0.99
z-stat -2.73*** -3.14*** -0.83
Means of Boldness  tested on total sample and for the two news groups respectively.                                                              
T -statistics (t-tests) and z-statistics (Mann-Whitney tests) are reported for two-tailed tests of difference in means.                
Stars indicate significance on level: ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.
Total Sample Bad News Good News
TABLE 2
T-tests of Differences in Boldness Between the Two RiskWillingness Groups
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are supported by non-parametric tests. These results support H1 stating that 
individual risk-willingness is positively related to the boldness in forecasts16.
My second hypothesis predicts that the type of news (good vs. bad) received prior 
to forecast revisions moderates the relationship between individual risk-
willingness and the boldness in forecasts. I expect that the relationship is stronger 
for the bad news group than for the good news group. To test this, the sample is
split by the news-treatment and the tests of H1 are rerun (results tabulated in Table 
2 in extension of results of H1).
The results (the second and third column in Table 2 under the headlines “Bad 
News” and “Good News”) show a significant difference between the boldness in
forecasts in the least risk-willing group and the most risk-willing group for the 
subsample of participants receiving bad news prior to forecast revision (t-stat. of -
3.76, two-tailed). However, the significance disappears when the same test is 
conducted for the subsample receiving good news prior to forecast revision (t-stat. 
of -0.99, two-tailed). These results are generally in line with H2 that the 
relationship between individual risk-willingness and the boldness in forecasts is 
more pronounced when bad news is received prior to forecast revisions. In the 
next section, where the robustness of the main results are tested partly by the use 
of regression analyses, I further test if the coefficients for the two news groups are 
statistically significant different from each other which may strengthen my 
interpretation of the results of H2. 
16 Additional tests of sensitivity to this procedure of cutting the measure of risk-willingness by the median of 6 largely reveal the same results. 
When the measure of risk-willingness is cut by 5 results are significant at the 5 % level (t-stat. = -2.26) and when cut by 7 results are significant 
at the 10 % level (t-stat. = -1.78).
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5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In this section I check if the main results are robust to alternative ways of 
measuring boldness and to other methods of analysis. Finally, main tests are rerun 
based only on a subsample which allows subtracting one dimension of confidence 
that might interact with individual risk-willingness. This is done to make sure 
confidence (rather than risk-willingness) is not driving the results.
5.1. Alternative Measure of Boldness
Studies relying on archival data cannot isolate the effect of a consensus estimate 
on financial analysts’ forecasting behavior as the experiment allows me to do in 
this study. Therefore, many studies rely on proxies of boldness. A common way of 
measuring boldness in earnings forecasts in the FAF literature is by the absolute 
distance from each individual (revised) forecast to the consensus estimate, 
sometimes ranked (e.g. Hong et al. 2000). Inspired by these studies, I measure the 
distance of the revised forecast (F2) to the consensus estimate (2.14) for the 
consensus group in and rank each distance relatively to the other participants in 
the consensus group (i.e. the control group is excluded). I name this measure 
Boldness2 and treat it as a continuous variable. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are shown for all main and control variables 
in table 3 (descriptions of these controls are found in the next paragraph). T-tests 
related to hypotheses testing are rerun. All results persist (available on request) 
suggesting support of the hypotheses even with this less nuanced measure of 
boldness in forecasts. In the next section control variables are introduced and 
regression analyses are run separately for both measures of boldness.
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5.2. Regression Analyses
To test the robustness of the main results from t-tests I further test the hypotheses 
using OLS-regressions. This model includes control variables that could 
potentially influence the boldness in the participants’ forecasts. Further, it allows 
for a more sophisticated statistical test of H2. 
Controls
Experience and skills may influence the boldness in forecasts (Clarke and
Subramanian (2006); Leone and Wu 2007; Jegadeesh and Kim 2009; Jiang and
Verardo 2013). To control for aspects of experience and skills I follow the use of 
proxies in prior literature (e.g. Dearman and Shields 2005) and include four 
variables. The first variable (Course) equals 1 if a participant already passed one 
or more other courses on graduate level in accounting/finance, 0 otherwise. The 
second variable (Grade) reflects the participants’ grade point average from the 
bachelor’s studies on a five-point scale with 3 reflecting a grade point average 
around the median for the year. A higher number reflects a better grade point 
average. The third variable (Invest) takes the value of 1 if people invest in stocks 
and 0 otherwise. The fourth variable (Job) equals 1 for people with a relevant part-
time job and 0 otherwise. 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Boldness (Boldness2) and RiskWillingness have a moderate positive correlation of 
20 % (23 %). None of the control variables correlates significantly with any of the
main variables. 
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Results
As stated in H1 I expect the individual risk-willingness to be positively associated 
with the boldness in forecasts. This hypothesis is tested on the 115 participants in 
the consensus group using an OLS regression with Boldness as the dependent 
variable and RiskWillingness as the main independent variable. Further, the four 
control variables described above are included. Hereafter the test is rerun but 
including Boldness2 as the dependent variable. Table 4 shows the result of the 
following models: 
Model 1a:
	
	0 	1 RiskWillingness 	2 Job 	3 Invest 	4 Grade + 5 Course + i
Model 1b:
	
	0 	1 RiskWillingness 	2 News 	1 RiskWillingness 	2 News 	3
Job 	4 Invest 	5 Grade 	6 Course + i
The full model insignificantly explains 8 % of Boldness in the forecasting task (F 
(5, 100) = 1.80, p < 0.12). RiskWillingness explains Boldness significantly with a 
coefficient of 0.05 suggesting that more risk-willing people are more likely to 
make bold forecasts (away from the consensus estimate) than are less risk-willing 
people17. This is in line with my predictions in H1. However, all controls are 
insignificant suggesting the model might improve if some variables are dropped. 
Using a backwards selection I try different combinations but all other versions of 
the full model decreases R2 whereas the significance of RiskWillingness persists. A 
forward selection reveals the same results. A VIF test shows no sign of 
17 As often implied in the literature males are generally more risk-willing than females. Thus, as expected additional analyses reveals that 
RiskWillingness are significantly correlated with gender (22 %) in my data as well. I therefore implement an interaction term between 
RiskWillingness and gender in the regression model but this interaction term turns out highly insignificant in explaining Boldness (coefficient = 
0.01, t-stat. = 0.25, p-value = 0.80). Thus, relations between individual risk-willingness and gender do not seem to drive the results of this paper.
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multicollinearity with the highest (mean) VIF being 1.10 (1.04) which is well 
below the recommended ceiling of 10 (Kutner et al. 2004)18.
I rerun the regressions but include Boldness2. Table 5 shows the result.
The support of H1 generally persists with Boldness2 included as the dependent 
variable. However, this model is statistically significant in opposed to the model 
18 All main variables (but none of the controls) are treated as normal based on a Shapiro-Wilk test for normality and a skewness- and kurtosis 
test for normality. Further, RiskWillingness shows no sign of endogeneity based on a Durban Wu-Hausman test. 
~ t ~ t ~ t ~ t chi z
RiskWillingness 0.05** 2.20 0.11*** 2.89 0.11*** 2.82 0.00 0.10 4.14** 2.03**
News 0.74** 2.25
RiskWillingness * News -2.12** -2.12
Job 0.04 0.41 0.05 0.58 0.04 0.25 0.06 0.50
Invest -0.10 -1.25 -0.06 -0.74 -0.08 -0.67 -0.05 -0.47
Grade 0.02 0.34 0.00 0.10 -0.01 -0.10 0.03 0.42
Course -0.08 -1.01 -0.09 -0.14 -0.01 -0.13 -0.16 -1.43
n 106 106 46 60
R² 0.08 0.14 0.25 0.05
F 1.80 2.00* 2.58** 0.61
Model 1a Model 1b Bad News Good News
TABLE 4 
Regressions of RiskWillingness on Boldness while Controlling for Experience and Skills
Stars indicate significance on level: ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.                                                                                                                                           
Model statistics are reported separately for each model at the end of the table.                                                                                                                                 
Tests of difference between coefficients (Bad vs. Good) are two-sided.
Bad vs. Good
~ t ~ t ~ t ~ t chi z
RiskWillingness 5.61** 2.5 8.96 2.17** 8.53** 2.15 2.69 0.98 1.14 1.07
News 37.31 1.15
RiskWillingness * News -5.92 -1.16
Job 8.83 0.95 9.17 0.94 -9.68 -0.57 20.29 1.83
Invest -14.93* -1.98 -13.11* -1.66 -14.88 -1.24 -9.16 -0.86
Grade -6.58 -1.56 -7.11* -1.70 -2.14 -0.33 -9.27 -1.82
Course -5.90 -0.74 -5.94 -0.76 -4.15 -0.36 -2.8 -0.25
n 113 113 49 64
R² 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.15
F 3.44*** 2.39** 2.71** 2.81**
Stars indicate significance on level: ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.                                                                                                                                        
Model statistics are reported separately for each model at the end of the table.                                                                                                                           
Tests of difference between coefficients (Bad vs. Good) are two-sided.
TABLE 5
Regressions of RiskWillingness on Boldness2 while Controlling for Experience and Skills
Model 2a Bad News Good News Bad vs. GoodModel 2b
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where Boldness is included as the dependent variable. This suggests that I may 
improve the explanation of what determines the boldness in forecasts by including 
controls only when the measure of boldness in forecasts cannot isolate the 
behavior from other factors. Further, for both dependent measures RiskWillingness
is only significant in the group receiving bad news. While the difference between 
the coefficients for RiskWillingness in the two subsamples is significant for the 
model including Boldness, is it insignificant when Boldness2 is included as the 
dependent variable. This suggests that results of H2 should be interpreted with a 
bit of caution while results for H1 seem very robust. However, the fact that the 
relationship between individual risk-willingness and the boldness in forecasts is 
only significant in the bad news group for both measures of boldness still indicates 
different behaviors in the two groups.
5.3. Confidence Driving the Results
Prior studies suggest risk-willingness and confidence are overlapping constructs 
which can be difficult to separate (e.g. Slovic 1999; Loewenstein et al. 2001). 
Further, Moore et al. (1999) and Menkhoff et al. (2006) find some aspects of 
confidence19 to affect herding behavior in forecasts. I therefore retest my 
hypotheses on a subsample attempting to control for one dimension of confidence 
sometimes referred to as the “better than average”-effect (Svenson 1981).
Just after the forecasting task is completed participants are asked to evaluate their 
own performance in the task relatively to how they expect others have performed,
on a five-point scale20. Inspired by methods used by Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2007) I rerun my tests but include only the 49 participants answering in the 
middle of this scale (3) reflecting that the expect their own performance to be 
19 Referred to as illusion of control and positive illusions.
20 Given this task is performed just after the forecasting task the participants’ perception of their own performance could potentially be affected 
by the treatment group they were assigned in the forecasting as. I therefore test for this but find no treatment effects on this measure of BTA-
effects.  
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around average. Thus, the behavior of these participants should be unaffected by 
their individual perception of their performance in the forecasting task and 
therefore I expect to get a purer effect of individual risk-willingness on herding 
behavior.
Results from t-tests (Table 6) on the relevant subsample reveal about the same 
results as t-tests on the full sample. People that are more risk-willing are 
significantly more likely to make bolder forecasts supporting H1. When the 
sample is split according to the news treatment the significance persists for the bad 
news group but disappears for the good news group suggesting support of H2. 
Although the sample size is reduced significantly and the results therefore should 
be interpreted with some caution, I believe that this attempt to remove a possible 
confounding dimension from my main results adds credibility to the findings from 
the primary analyses.
n Mean n Mean n Mean
Less RiskWilling 22 0.46 11 0.42 9 0.51
More RiskWilling 27 0.78 9 0.91 13 0.73
t-stat (two-tailed) -2.96*** -3.22*** -1.41
z-stat -2.64*** -2.36** -1.48
Means of Boldness  tested on total sample and for the two news groups respectively.                                                              
T -statistics (t-tests) and z-statistics (Mann-Whitney tests) are reported for two-tailed tests of difference in means.               
Stars indicate significance on level: ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.
TABLE 6
Total Sample Bad News Good News
T-tests of Differences in Boldness Between the Two RiskWillingness Groups on the Subsample 
Assessing Their Own Performance as Around Average
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6. CONCLUSION 
This study concentrates on decision making under uncertainty comparable to the 
environment of financial analysts in the process of conducting forecasts. The 
literature on financial analysts is concerned about so-called biases, such as herding 
behaviors, since they can decrease the usefulness of the forecasts by 
compromising accuracy. Because herding behavior is a very pronounced 
mechanism in FAF, that more often results in biased forecasts than in accurate 
forecasts, an improvement of the understanding of how personal traits like 
individual risk-willingness may impact this behavior is important and called for. 
In this paper I predict that less risk-willing people are more likely to herd towards 
consensus with their forecasts than are more risk-willing people. Further, I expect 
this relationship to be more pronounced when bad news is received prior to a 
forecast revision than when good news is. To this end I rely on recent findings in 
the literature on financial analysts and on theories mainly in the literature of 
behavioral- and social psychology. Thus, I accept the perspectives that cognitive 
biases and social forces play a role in explaining herding behavior. The predictions 
are tested based on a 2x2 between-subjects experimental setting using 289 
graduate students as participants. The experiment involves a close to real world 
forecasting task where forecast revisions are solicited from participants. 
Supporting the predictions I find that less risk-willing people do herd more 
towards a consensus estimate than more risk-willing and that these findings are 
largely driven by an effect found in the subsample consisting of those receiving 
bad news prior to the forecast revision. The results suggest that forecasting 
towards the consensus is not solely an outcome of informational herding 
(expecting others to have superior information or skills) or based on strategic 
incentives such as reputational advantages. Rather, it seems that part of the 
explanation of why some individuals display a herding behavior can be connected 
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to mental short-cuts and behavioral biases leading to a more intuitive reaction
based on personal traits like individual risk-willingness.
This paper seeks to contribute to a rising literature generally suggesting that 
personal traits affect decision making to a much larger extent than reflected by its 
attention in current literature. Thus, expanding the view beyond perfectly rational 
agents and relying more on bounded rationality and sub-optimal decisions in the 
chase to understand herding behaviors of financial analysts might move the 
literature in the desired direction (e.g. the call from Bradshaw (2011)). For 
instance, future research may be concerned with the degree to which observed 
biases in FAF (e.g. herding behavior, optimism- or conservatism bias) on the 
individual level may occur from more unconscious mechanisms such as intuition, 
cognitive biases or emotions. Extensions of our knowledge on this matter may 
serve as important inputs to improve the usefulness of FAF as proxies for future 
movements in the stock market. Further, because the results in this paper partly 
shed light on decisions made from intuitions that can be affected by personal traits 
this paper also speaks to regulators by suggesting that broad and general 
enforcements may not be sufficient in effectively protecting investors from biased 
FAF. If intuitions play a more pronounced role than previously assumed, analysts’ 
exhibiting a herding behavior are likely to continue on that path even if external 
incentives change. Hence, more customized interventions directly pointed at the 
financial analysts to change their instinctive behavior and perhaps an increased 
supply of analyst specific data to investors may be useful. Finally, as a secondary 
contribution this paper suggests a method to capture and measure herding behavior 
which may inspire other studies relying on setting where information can be 
controlled.
Although the experimental method used in this paper has the advantage of 
controlling information and isolating herding behaviors from confounding factors 
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and thus more directly associate it with individual risk-willingness, limitations 
concerning external validity and generalization are recognized. Specifically, this 
experimental setting is not directly able to discriminate between the effects of 
different theories about herding behavior on the participants’ behavior e.g. 
separating informational herding from social herding or herding related to 
cognitive biases. However, the setting provides no strategic or reputational 
benefits of herding which makes an explanation of the results that solely relies on 
this aspect of herding unlikely. Further, although participants in this setting may 
have informational reasons to follow the consensus estimate, explaining the 
relation to variations in individual risk-willingness by strict rational models or 
informational herding theories seems unfitting.
While the results pertaining to the relationship between individual risk-willingness 
and herding behavior seem quite robust the results about the news-treatment as a 
moderator are a bit more sensitive. This sensitivity could be related to how the 
magnitude of the news is perceived. Future research could directly address this 
issue by varying the magnitude of news in a controlled setting to investigate 
whether the results of this paper persist. Finally, while the experiment in this paper 
relies on forecasts from a single round setting (including two forecasts for each 
participant) without feedback on performance it could be interesting to see if the 
results persist in a setting with multiple rounds and immediate feedback where 
learning effects are likely to be present. One could imagine that a learning effect 
reduces individuals’ tendency to rely on intuition because solving the task for the 
first time may demand more cognition than solving it for the second or third time. 
However, it is equally likely that intuitive thinking increases with experience of 
the task because it may result in more comfort and hence decrease individuals’ 
perceived need for more elaborate analyses. In the latter case, results from this 
paper are likely more generalizable than expected. Nevertheless, it was assessed 
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that implementing multiple rounds could potentially bias the results from e.g. 
spill-over effects and thus the drawbacks of addressing the limitations of a single 
round experiment by including more rounds would dominate the benefits. 
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APPENDIX A
AVAILABLE INFORMATION TO ALL PARTICIPANTS PRIOR TO STATING 
THEIR FIRST FORECAST (F1)
Forecasting Task
On the next page you are asked to state your one-year-ahead earnings per share (EPS) forecast 
for a particular company. Today is year 0 and you are asked to forecast EPS for year 1. 
EPS = Net Income / Number of Shares 
The company is an actual listed company but in this experiment you will just know it as “The 
Firm”. 
Company info:
The Firm was founded in 1892 and operates today through 842 stores in the United States, and 
157 stores in Canada, Europe, Asia, and Australia. The Firm is within the retail industry with 
clothes as the main product line. The Firm’s products are considered to be medium-price. The 
sales are highly seasonal and usually peak in the spring and fall. Approximately 25 % of The Firm’s 
total revenue comes from online sales. According to The Firm: “The brand is our lifestyle, our 
focus—the value of having a great brand is far-reaching and cannot be overstated—it’s a 
snowball effect”. 
Industry info:
The industry is known by its intense competition between its many players which is characterized 
by very volatile earnings and volatile stock prices. Within the last five years The Firm has 
experienced many new competitors which can be of future threat according to The Firm itself: 
“In light of the competitive challenges we face, we may not be able to compete successfully in the 
future. Further increase in competition could reduce our sales and harm our operating results and 
business”. 
This figure illustrates the development in stock prices for The Firm in the last ten years:  
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The Firm’s Income Statement from the annual report.  
(year 0 = current, year -3 = three years ago) 
Expectations for the industry:
The National Retail Foundation (NRF) says its retail sales forecast for year 1 predicts a growth 
of 4.1% (3.7 % year 0). Online sales are expected to increase between 9% and 12% this year.
The NRF President and CEO said: “Improvements in economic growth combined with positive 
expectations for continued consumer spending will put the retail industry in a relatively good 
place in year 1. Though headwinds from the looming debates about the debt ceiling, increased 
health care costs, and regulatory concerns still pose a risk for both consumers and retailers”.  
Expectations of The Firm:
The Firm partly explains the EPS level at year 0 by unusual expenses due to restructuring costs 
as well as an ongoing lawsuit about management ethics. The Firm expects little or no 
restructuring costs and no impact from the lawsuit in year 1. The Firm forecasts EPS for year 1 
to be in the range of $2.25 to $2.35. 
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APPENDIX B
AVAILABLE INFORMATION TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONSENSUS-
TREATMENT GROUP (ADDITIONALLY RECEIVING A CONSENSUS 
ESTIMATE) THAT RECEIVED BAD NEWS PRIOR TO STATING THEIR 
REVISED FORECAST (F2)21
21 The pieces of information that vary across treatments are underlined.
New information in the market 
 
The first quarterly report for year 1 was roughly as expected. The second quarterly report for 
year 1, which just got released, reveals the following numbers. 
Highlights from the second quarter report, year 0 and year 1, in thousand $: 
 
Year 0, Q2 Year 1, Q2
Revenue 945,698 890,605
Gross profit 604,122 552,956
Operating income/EBIT 19,165 17,493
Net Income 11,371 10,877
 
After the release of the second quarterly report the CEO of The Firm said in a press release: 
“Because of a continued challenging environment, our sales for the second quarter were 
somewhat below plan.“ However, The Firm does not revise their total expectations for year 1. 
On the other hand, based on 14 estimates from your colleagues, expected EPS for The Firm at 
year 1 is downgraded to an average (consensus) of $2.14.
 
Please revise your EPS forecast for The Firm for year 1 (If you do not deem a revision 
necessary, please write your forecast from the prior task again).
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APPENDIX C
AVAILABLE INFORMATION TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONTROL 
GROUP (NOT RECEIVING A CONSENSUS ESTIMATE) THAT RECEIVED 
GOOD NEWS PRIOR TO STATING THEIR REVISED FORECAST (F2)22
New information in the market 
 
The first quarterly report for year 1 was roughly as expected. The second quarterly report for 
year 1, which just got released, reveals the following numbers. 
 
Highlights from the second quarter report, year 0 and year 1, in thousand $: 
 
Year 0, Q2 Year 1, Q2 
Revenue 945,698 1,000,791 
Gross profit 604,122 655,288 
Operating income/EBIT 19,165 20,837 
Net Income 11,371 11,865 
After the release of the second quarterly report the CEO of The Firm said in a press release:   
Despite a continued challenging environment, our sales for the second quarter were somewhat 
below plan.inued challenging environment, our sales for the second quarter were some 
On the other hand, based on 14 estimates from your colleagues, expected EPS for The Firm at 
year 1 is upgraded to an average (consensus) of $2.14. 
 
Please revise your EPS forecast for The Firm for year 1 (If you do not deem a revision 
necessary, please write your forecast from the prior task again). 
22 The pieces of information that vary across treatments are underlined.
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Cognitive Dissonance Reduction and Confirmation Bias in 
Financial Forecast Revisions
Simone Staehr
ABSTRACT
Research has shown that confirmation bias, the tendency to seek for, and rely 
more heavily on information that is confirmatory to an initial belief as a reaction 
to cognitive dissonance, exists for most people in various contexts. From an 
experimental setting, performed by 289 graduate students in finance and 
accounting, this paper provides evidence that people with high confidence in their 
own initial forecast are more hesitant to deem a revision necessary after receiving 
new information. This is argued to be a result of confirmation bias leading to 
inertia. This paper also finds that those hesitant to make revisions express 
increased confidence in their forecast following the new information compared to 
those revising their forecast. Thus, a non-revised forecast following new 
information in the market is not necessarily a reflection of that new information 
already being incorporated in the forecast but might also be a result of cognitively 
biased decision making. The findings have implications for studies in the context 
of financial analysts’ forecasting behavior and may add to the understanding of 
why underreactions to new information in the market are often found.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
Financial analysts provide earnings forecasts amongst other inputs to investors’ 
investment decisions (Givoly and Lakonishok 1984) and have consequently 
spurred great research attention (for recent literature reviews and insights see 
Ramnath et al. 2008; Bradshaw 2011; Brown 2015). Some concentrate on the 
output side such as when and why earnings forecasts are more informative (e.g. 
Lui and Thomas 2002; Clement and Tse 2003), better at explaining stock prices 
(e.g. Dechow and Sloan 1997; Shane and Brous 2001; Theo and Wong 2002; 
Elgers et al. 2003) as well as how the market reacts to changes in the forecasts 
(e.g. Baginski et al. 1990; Stickel 1991; Gleason and Lee 2003; Ivkovic and 
Jegadeesh 2004; Chen et al 2005; Frankel et al. 2006; Altinkilic and Hansen 2009; 
Loh and Stulz 2011). Others concentrate exclusively on the input side such as 
reporting quality (e.g. Hopkins 1996; Duru and Reeb 2002; Hirst et al. 2004) or 
management incentives (e.g. Brown 2001; Matsunaga and Park 2001; Matsumoto 
2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002; Mayew 2008). Further, while some studies 
concentrate on external drivers like environmental factors (e.g. Haw et al. 1994; 
Hopkins et al 2000) and regulations (e.g. Berger and Han 2003; Ivkovic and 
Jegadeesh 2004) others focus on more internal factors such as analysts’ incentives 
(e.g. Dugar and Nathan 1995; Lin and McNichols 1998; Jacob et al. 2008) and 
expertise (e.g. Mikhail et al. 1997; Brown 2001; Hirst et al. 2004). In addition to 
the above mentioned studies, in order to understand the analysts’ decision process 
in more detail, the research has advanced towards perspective from social- and 
cognitive psychology.
Most commonly researchers “examine correlations between inputs, outputs, and 
conditioning variables to understand the analysis process” (Bradshaw 2011, p. 6, 
l. 5 fb.). By focusing more directly on the financial analyst a line of research has 
found behavioral biases such as herding behavior (e.g. Hong et al. 2000; Clement 
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and Tse 2005; Jegadeesh and Kim 2009; Durand et al. 2014) to sometimes be 
influential to analysts’ decision process. Further, a narrower stream of research 
concentrates on psychological factors or biases to explain analysts behaviors such 
as herding behaviors (explained by miscalibration) (Glaeser and Sunstein 2007; 
Seybert and Bloomfield 2009; Libby and Rennekamp 2012) and underreactions 
(explained by asymmetric loss functions by Markov and Tan 2006, and by 
cognitive dissonance by Friesen and Weller 2006). This is where this paper seeks 
to contribute.
The dynamic market environment, in which financial analysts work, requires 
constant awareness because new information is often released and analysts are 
expected to consider this information in their forecasts. Thus, when new 
information becomes available in the market (e.g. when firm management issues 
quarterly reports) financial analysts have to decide if their prior forecasts should 
be revised following this new information and to what extent. However, no study 
has focused on what causes analysts to not change their prior forecast following 
new information. That is, following new information in the market which 
otherwise leads most analysts to revise their forecasts, what make some analysts 
decide not to revise their prior forecasts? Since releases of quarterly reports is a 
very common event that leads to many forecast revisions (Barron 1995; Cooper et 
al. 2001) this paper mainly relates to the release of a quarterly report when 
mentioning a release of new information in the market.
There are at least two strands of reasons why analysts sometimes decide not to 
revise their prior forecast upon receiving new information. The first is related to 
the content of information received by the analysts. That is for example, if the new 
information in the market is interpreted by the analysts as none value-adding for 
instance by being in line with an analyst’s prior expectations and therefore already 
included in the prior forecast. This group of reasons would generally suggest 
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similar behavior by the analysts, i.e. upon release of new information analysts 
would revise or not revise depending on the content of the information. The 
second is related to the fact that individuals (i.e. financial analysts) place different 
emphasis on the new information they receive. This element of reasons suggests 
that analysts would vary in their response to new information. When faced with 
the same new information, some would revise while others would not. 
Complementing prior research this paper focuses on aspects of the latter strand, 
i.e. the manner in which individuals receive, treat and react to new information, to 
explain why financial analysts sometimes refrain from revising their forecast upon 
receipt of new information which leads other analysts to revise. In the accounting 
literature, Koonce and Mercer (2005) suggest confirmation bias as a plausible 
explanation of why financial analysts sometimes reach very different conclusions 
about a company’s future performance from identical information. Following the 
suggestion by Koonce and Mercer (2005) this paper relies on psychological theory 
about cognitive dissonance and confirmation bias to explain why some individuals 
do not revise a forecast upon reception of new information. And further why 
individuals, who do not revise, tend to subsequently strengthen their confidence in 
own forecasts compared to those individuals who actually react on the new 
information and revise. 
Cognitive dissonance occurs when our brains are faced with information 
contradicting our beliefs (Festinger 1957; Festinger and Carlsmith 1959; Aronson 
1968). In order to solve this mental disturbance individuals tend to disregard the 
contradicting elements of the information - often unconsciously (Nickerson 1998). 
When dissonance leads to a biased reaction to new information towards a prior 
belief, it is often referred to as confirmation bias (Mahoney 1977; Edwards and 
Smith 1996). Inspired by the view of these studies, this paper seeks to explain 
financial analysts’ revision behavior by looking at their decision processes. 
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Experimental research in accounting has occasionally applied confirmation bias 
but focused on other issues than analysts’ revisions. For instance Mayew (2008) 
argues that managers suffer from confirmation bias because they seem to favor 
analysts that share their own view about future prospect of the company. Further, 
Nocera (1999) rely on confirmation bias to explain analysts’ behaviors during the 
dot.com crash in the 1990’s. 
This paper theorizes that analysts receiving new information may pick out the 
dimensions of the new information which best fit with prior beliefs so that the 
same information may be interpreted differently by different analysts who tend to 
all interpret in line with their prior beliefs. The possibility of making information 
fit with prior beliefs is higher the stronger prior beliefs are. This leads to the 
hypothesis that strength of prior beliefs is positively associated with the likelihood 
of a non-revision. Thus, by drawing on psychological literature this paper argues 
that a possible cause of non-revisions in forecasts following new information is 
confirmation bias.
Further, this paper argues that the non-revision in turn strengthens beliefs as 
oppose to revisions. The argument for this is related to cognitive dissonance 
reduction (a central tenet of confirmation bias). According to Festinger (1957) 
dissonance almost always occurs after a decision has been made. He predicts that 
the chosen (rejected) alternative gets more (less) attractive after the decision is 
made due to dissonance reduction. Therefore, even if most people are unaware of 
this bias, after a decision is made, people rely more heavily on confirmatory 
information. Consequently, this makes them indisposed to reduce their confidence 
in that decision even after new and disconfirming information arrives (Pitz 1969). 
When new information is perceived as confirmatory, the strengths of people’s 
beliefs even increases (Foran and DeCoster 1974; Tiller 1983). 
140 
 
In line with suggestions of this paper, experimental studies in related literatures 
have shown that people tend to find a revision of their initial belief less necessary 
if they are presented with confirmatory information (Yaniv et al. 2009) and that 
confirmation bias increases our confidence in our own belief (Plous 1991). In line 
with how prior studies test similar hypotheses this paper relies on the experimental 
method.
The experiment in this paper is executed on 289 finance and accounting graduate 
students. By providing a wide range of quantitative and qualitative information 
regarding an existing firm, this paper’s experiment strives to replicate the 
complexity of information that financial analysts are required to sort and process. 
Participants are asked to use the available information in order to conduct a one
year ahead EPS forecast and to provide an interval in which they feel 90 % 
confident that the true earnings will fall. This interval is used to gauge the strength 
of their beliefs i.e. their individual level of confidence in their own forecast. 
Hereafter, participants are presented with new available information about the 
market and firm in focus (e.g. the release of a quarterly report) and asked to revise 
their prior forecast according to this information and again state a 90 % confidence 
interval. 
The hypotheses are tested and supported by regression analyses and t-tests. The 
confidence in the participants’ own forecast is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of a revision. This is interpreted as confirmation bias leading 
individuals with high confidence in their initial belief to be more likely to perceive 
information as confirmatory and hence be more hesitant to revise their prior 
forecast following new information. Further, not revising the forecast after 
receiving new information is positively associated with an increase in confidence 
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indicating that individuals becomes more confident in their own forecast as a 
result of not revising it. This is interpreted as individuals seeking to validate their 
choice of not revising a forecast in order to reduce dissonance by committing to 
their own beliefs and thus increase their confidence in their own forecast. A 
number of additional tests pertaining to alternative explanations, and alternative 
statistical methods indicate the robustness of these findings.
This paper contributes in at two least manners to the understanding of financial 
analysts’ forecasts in general and non-revisions (or very modest revisions) in 
particular. Firstly, the paper shows that analysts can vary much in their reactions 
following identical information for reasons that relate not necessarily to the 
context (e.g. other analysts’ forecasts) but more to the course of actions the 
analysts happen to be following for justified or unjustified reasons. This 
contribution arises because this paper applies an experimental method which 
allows controlling the information available to the participants which is not 
possible when using other methods such as empirical analyses of archival data. 
Further, other methods typically lack direct measures of individual level of 
confidence which this paper posits as an important addition to the explanation. 
Second, complementing the research on cognitive dissonance in relation to 
analysts’ forecasting behavior by Friesen and Weller (2006) this paper contributes 
by highlighting the need to consider psychological factors and cognitive biases in 
order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of forces that drive analyst 
forecasts. As previously inferred in the literature of financial analysts’ forecasts by 
Zhang (2006) an improved understanding of reactions caused by cognitive biases 
may very well add to the explanation of systematic errors in financial forecasts 
such as analysts’ underreactions to new information. Thus in aggregated data on 
financial analysts’ forecasts, confirmation bias may contribute to general observed 
underreactions to news. 
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Findings from this paper shed light on the individual decision process related to 
financial analysts deciding whether or not to revise a current forecast. Whereas 
prior studies ignore non-revised forecasts for methodological and theoretical 
reasons, this paper argues that reasons of why these forecasts are not revised 
following new information in the market may be important to consider. Hence, 
findings from this paper can have practical implications in terms of guidelines of 
when and how financial analysts should be required to make forecast revisions in 
an attempt to reduce behavioral biases like confirmation bias. As an example, it 
might be beneficial in terms of minimizing the risk of inertia to require, internal in 
the firms, that financial analysts provide suggestions of revisions of the forecasts 
of other financial analyst’s prior forecasts following new information.     
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; In Section 2 theory and 
hypothesis development are included. Section 3 describes the method, 
measurements and includes descriptive statistics. In Section 4 analyses and results 
are presented. Section 5 includes robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
After an introduction to the applied theory, this section presents two separate 
hypotheses that can be tested separately but may predict a casual path when 
combined (see Figure 1 at the end of this section). When referring to a revision 
opportunity this paper largely talks about the release of quarterly reports as a 
source of new information available in the market although many other 
information sources might be applicable as well.
Whereas economic literature often assumes that people update their beliefs in a 
strict rational manner the literature on psychology generally accepts that once 
people have formed a belief it is rather resistant to change (e.g. Klayman and Ha 
1987). This paper relies on the latter perspective and perceives an initial belief in 
the case of financial analysts as the forecast made prior to a revision opportunity. 
2.1. Mental Reasoning and Heuristics
Every time an individual makes a decision, the brain uses complex mechanisms to 
help process, sort and understand information in order to create the best possible 
foundation for a judgement. Shortcuts in cognitive processing, sometimes referred 
to as heuristics, are essential in decision making (e.g. Kahneman et al. 1982a; 
Gilovich et al. 2002) to sort information and quickly discard useless information 
thus helping individuals to make decisions without spending too much cognitive 
effort and within a not too wide timeframe (e.g. Gigerenzer, G. 1996). But the
same shortcuts can also lead to cognitive biases and thus contribute to bias 
individuals’ information selection and prejudice the perception of the available 
information in ways that may end up biasing their judgements and decisions (e.g. 
Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Fiske 1991). 
When faced with an upcoming decision, individuals tend to rely on an anchoring 
point and adjust beliefs with reference to this point (Kahneman et al. 1982a; see 
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also Furnham and Hua 2011 for a thorough review of anchoring). In the case of 
financial analysts’ forecast revisions, one anchoring point, amongst many possible 
points such as a consensus forecast, last year’s earnings, management’s forecasts 
etc., is likely to be the individual’s initial belief; i.e. the forecast made prior to a 
revision opportunity. In this paper, analysts’ prior forecasts are considered the 
central anchoring point. One suggested explanation of anchoring bias relies on 
aspects of cognitive dissonance wherefrom confirmation bias is developed. These 
concepts are discussed in detail below and set the basis for developing the two 
hypotheses of this paper.
Cognitive Dissonance and Confirmation Bias
Cognitive dissonance occurs when individuals are presented with evidence that 
contradicts their initial perception or past choices (Festinger 1957; Festinger and 
Carlsmith 1959; Aronson 1968). The generally accepted theory of cognitive 
dissonance was first formulated by Festinger (1957) and later reformulated by 
Aronson (1968). According to the theory contradictive evidence provokes a 
discomfort in the mind. Because all individuals are more or less primed to solve 
the mental disturbance that contradicting information makes in the mind, people 
attempt to make all evidence consistent and hence reduce this mental discomfort. 
One way to defend a belief and hence solve the cognitive disturbance is to 
disregard the contradicting elements of the information rather than changing the 
belief because we generally prefer to view ourselves as smart. Thus disregarding 
contradicting evidence is more aligned with this view of being smart, believing we 
have the correct belief, than changing our belief is (Festinger, 1957; Akerlof and 
Dickens 1982; Frey 1986; Olson and Stone 2005). Effects of cognitive dissonance 
are shown in many contexts. E.g. fund investors’ positive bias is conditioned by 
previous investment decisions (Goetzmann and Peles 1997) and may even explain 
the puzzle of the disposition effect; i.e. the tendency to be more reluctant to realize 
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loses than gains (Chang et al. 2016). Further, Egan et al. (2007) provide evidence 
that cognitive dissonance and consequently reactions to favor a prior belief exists 
even in monkeys and small children suggesting the underlying mechanisms of 
cognitive dissonance to be at least partially evolutionarily adaptive and thus may 
provoke unintentional behaviors.
Confirmation bias23 is the tendency to search for information consistent with an 
initial belief and the tendency to evaluate contradictory information more critically 
than confirmatory information (e.g. Mahoney 1977; Edwards and Smith 1996; 
Jonas et al. 2001). Hence, confirmation bias can be a reaction to cognitive 
dissonance leading to underreactions to new information (Lichtenstein et al. 1977) 
and has proven to be strong, persistent (Arkes 1991) and occurring unconsciously 
(e.g. Nickerson 1998) in line with Egan et al.’s (2007) conclusion regarding 
cognitive dissonance. In the case where an initial belief is strong, confirmation 
bias may lead to inertia effects (Geller and Pitz 1968), i.e. the tendency to be 
reluctant to change a belief, as a consequence of making a commitment to one’s 
initial belief in order to reduce cognitive dissonance (Pitz 1969).
The existence of confirmation bias is usually evidenced by experimental studies. 
As an example, Plous (1991) provides evidence of confirmation bias by first 
detecting all participants’ initial perception of nuclear power (pro- or against). 
Thereafter their attitudes towards nuclear power are again observed after 
providing all participants with identical but new informative material about 
nuclear. As expected, results showed an increased strength of individuals’ 
respective initial perception of nuclear (pro- or against) in about 50 % of the 
participants in both groups (pro- or against) after receiving the same informational 
23 Also referred to as congeniality bias (e.g. Eagly and Chaiken 1993).
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material. Only 7 % in each group expressed a decreased confidence in their own 
initial perception (the remaining participants expressed no change in their initial 
perception). The explanation for such difference in interpretations of exactly the 
same informational material is assigned confirmation bias. 
In line with theory of dissonance leading to confirmation bias and experimental 
evidence it is likely that financial analysts facing new information will process this 
information in a way that makes them perceive it as confirmatory to their beliefs. 
However, the degree to which each individual is likely to be exposed to 
confirmation bias is expected to be reflected by the confidence or strength of that 
initial belief. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1982b) confidence can be 
seen as a measure of individuals’ uncertainty. More specifically, “A statement of 
confidence expresses One's uncertainty in a prediction, estimate or inference to 
which one is already committed…Confidence is the subjective probability or 
degree of belief associated with what we "think" will happen.” (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1982b, p. 12, l. 16 fb.). Hence, individual confidence in an estimate, e.g. a 
financial forecast, is perceived as a reflection of the strength of that initial belief. 
Although financial analysts are generally considered too confident about their own 
forecasting abilities (e.g. Barber and Odean 2001) their individual confidence in 
their own forecasts is likely to vary amongst them (e.g. Brenner et al. 1996; 
Hirshleifer 2012). Thus, analysts holding a high confidence are expected to be 
committed to that belief to a higher degree and hence be more hesitant to revise a 
prior forecast than analysts with less confidence in their initial belief. Because 
confirmation bias generally leads to underreactions to new information (e.g. 
Lichtenstein et al. 1977) it is likely that analysts will underreact to new 
information by not revising it at all when being subjects to confirmation bias 
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Thus, the first hypothesis of this paper posits that individual who conducted a 
forecast with high confidence are more resistant to revise this forecast following 
new information because they most likely will treat this information as 
confirmatory to their initial beliefs (their prior forecast):    
H1: Confidence in an initial forecast is negatively related to the 
likelihood of a forecast revision following new information.
Cognitive Dissonance Reduction
When confirmation bias leads to inertia effects, as a reaction serving to reduce 
cognitive dissonance, it will further lead to a greater confidence in that belief 
(Budescu and Yu 2006). The reason for this is, that after new information is 
received and no revision is deemed necessary people commit to their initial belief 
and hence reduce the cognitive dissonance similar to a validation of their belief 
(Pitz 1969). That is, one dimension of Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive 
dissonance predicts that once a decision is made, this decision is perceived even 
more attractive than it was prior to the decision due to dissonance reduction. 
Hence, after deeming a revision unnecessary following new information the 
confidence in people’s own estimates increases (Foran and DeCoster 1974; Tiller 
1983). In line with this, in an experiment by Yaniv et al. (2009) participants are to 
estimate calories and may choose to revise their answer following information 
about their peer’s estimates. Some are given randomly chosen peer estimates and 
some are given peer estimate particularly chosen to fit with the participant’s initial 
estimate. Although the participants are completely aware whether the peer 
estimates presented to them are randomly picked or picked to be as close to their 
own initial estimate as possible, confirmatory peer estimates lead to fewer 
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revisions than random peer estimates. Hereafter, Yaniv et al. investigate how the 
participants’ individuals’ confidence in beliefs changes after a revision 
opportunity. The study finds that the participants’ confidence increases more in 
the cases where a revision is not deemed necessary relatively to when a revision is 
deemed necessary suggesting that revising an estimate leads to limited trust in that 
estimate as opposed to non-revised estimates. This is in line with theory of 
dissonance reduction since being only presented with confirmatory information, 
although this information is transparently selected in a subjective way, leads to 
less cognitive dissonance and thus a greater confidence in the initial belief as 
oppose to when contradicting information appears.   
The focus of Yaniv et al.’s (2009) experiment is to make a design where 
information to participants prior to a revision decision is either confirmatory to 
their prior belief or randomly chosen. But the experiment does not shed light on 
the possible variation between participants’ perceived need for a revision if they 
all receive similar information prior to revisions. In the case of financial analysts, 
new information in the market such as quarterly reports is accessible to all 
analysts. Thus it is usually the case that all financial analysts will consider the 
need for a forecast revision following the same information set. Given that 
confirmation bias is driven by individuals unconsciously seeking for, and relying 
more on, confirmatory information, it is likely that even when people receive 
similar information those more prone to be subjects to confirmation bias (and 
hence those less likely to revise their prior belief) increases in confidence 
compared to those less inclined to be subjects to confirmation bias. This is stated 
by the second hypothesis of this paper: 
H2: Not revising a forecast following new information is positively 
related to the subsequent confidence in the forecast.
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The hypotheses can be illustrated by the following path:
Figure 1 – Hypothesized path.
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3. METHOD AND MEASUREMENTS
The main task in this experiment is a forecasting task (described in detail below). 
After the forecasting task the participants are presented with a valuation task, 
primarily serving as a distraction task, and are hereafter asked to answer a short 
questionnaire24. At the end of the experiment participants must choose in which of 
two different lotteries they wish to participate in order to determine their final 
monetary compensation. Experimental materials are provided in the appendices.
3.1. Forecasting Task
The forecasting task follows two stages. In the first stage, participants are given 
historical information about a firm in focus as well as future prospects of the firm 
and industry (see Appendix A). From this information, they are first asked to state 
a one year ahead EPS forecast (referred to as F1) together with a confidence 
interval within which they feel 90 % sure that the realized EPS will lie. Hereafter, 
in the second stage, they are told that the first two quarters of the year have gone 
by and participants are now provided with new information including the latest 
quarterly report25 (see Appendix B). From this new information, they are asked to 
revise their prior EPS forecast for the year-end (referred to as F2) and to state a 90 
% confidence interval for their revised forecast. Allowing participants to not 
revise may unintentionally induce status quo bias; i.e. in terms of participants who 
deem a revision necessary but choose not to revise, simply to reduce effort. In an 
attempt to minimize the risk of this, participants are required to re-enter their prior 
forecast as opposed to not entering anything when a revision is perceived 
24 Because the forecasting task lays ground for directly testing the hypotheses and the valuation task merely serves 
as a distraction task but are used as inputs to robustness checks, it is not described in further detail here.
25 This news information varies across two treatments because this experiment additionally serves as basis for 
another paper. These two treatments are i). whether or not the new information contains a consensus estimate and 
ii). whether the new information reflects a positive or negative outlook for the company. These variations are 
expected to create noise in the data in the same way as noise is expected in archival data. However, to make sure 
that the treatments does not create systematic differences in the data that may drive the results of this paper, 
robustness checks in section 5 control for the differences in the experimental materials.  
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unnecessary. This requirement is expected to reduce a potential status quo bias 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). 
To reflect the wide range of information types and sources that professional 
financial analysts base their forecasts on, the information available to participants 
in this experiment is rather rich. Hence, quantitative information, including 
excerpts from the firm’s financial accounts, industry growth forecasts and earnings 
expectations from management may provide participants with various anchoring 
points to which they can allocate more or less weight when conducting their first 
EPS forecast. Furthermore, participants are given qualitative information, 
including statements and press releases from industry experts and the firm’s CEO. 
This information is likely to be very subjectively perceived by the participants and 
hence interpreted differently in their respective first EPS forecasts. The new 
information participants subsequently receive in order to revise their EPS forecast 
contains highlights from the income statement of this year’s second quarter 
together with last year’s second quarter. Further, management underlines that the 
competition in the market is rather tough but at the same time their own EPS 
forecasts of the year are maintained (which were estimated in the beginning of the 
year). Hence, the information is rather ambiguous and leaves room for 
participants’ individual perceptions and interpretations of the information. All 
participants have full discretion in terms of whether they revise or do not revise as 
well as in terms of the direction (upgrade or downgrade), if they choose to revise.
Because this experiment additionally serves the purpose of another paper two 
variations in the information provided in the second stage of the forecasting task 
are present. In the robustness checks these two treatments are controlled for and 
all results persist. 
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This design is not constructed to form expectations of how participants should
process the given information pieces or to predict which outcome they are more 
likely to state. Nor is it possible to predict which EPS forecast is the correct 
outcome. Instead, this experimental design allows for predictions about 
participants’ post-decision behavior, i.e. how they are likely to treat new 
information depending on their first forecast. More specifically, relying on theory 
about cognitive dissonance leading to confirmation bias, this paper makes 
predictions about how participants will revise their forecast after receiving new 
information by considering each participant’s size of confidence interval in their 
first forecast as a reflection of their strength of belief in that forecast. Participants 
with greater strength in beliefs are more likely to react to confirmation bias by 
inertia and hence be hesitant to revise their forecast following new information. 
Hence, they feel more strongly committed to their forecasting decision which 
further reduces the cognitive dissonance and thereby strengthens their belief in 
their decision. This is illustrated by Figure 2 below. Confirmation bias is more 
likely to occur in environments where the general uncertainty about the correct 
outcome is high, where there is no immediate feedback and where information is 
provided sequentially (Jonas et al. 2001). These are all characteristics present in 
the environment financial analysts’ work. Therefore, because of the ambiguity in 
the information (i.e. the combination of qualitative- and quantitative information 
pieces) participants receive to base their forecasts on, this setting is expected to be 
suitable for the purpose of the paper and at the same time reflect a realistic 
simulation of the environment that financial analyst’s work in.
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Figure 2 - the two stages in the forecasting task together with steps in mental 
processing expected from theory.
3.2. Procedure and Participants 
The experiment was conducted in-class on graduate students following the course 
‘Financial Statement Analysis and Valuation’. The experiment was announced one 
week in advance and all students participated on a voluntary basis. Pens, papers 
and calculators were the only effects allowed during the experiment. Naturally, 
communication of any kind was forbidden. The experiment took 40 minutes to 
complete and all participants remained seated until the experimenter announced 
that the experiment was finished. Debriefings and lottery draws were transparently 
done in-class a week after the experiment was executed.
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289 graduate students participated in the experiment. 14 of those failed to provide 
all the required responses in the forecasting task and were therefore dropped. 
Further, 9 participants gave extremely wide confidence intervals for their first 
forecast (the top 3 %) and are therefore also dropped. The remaining 266 
participants are on average 25 years old and 27 % are female. 68 % have a 
relevant part-time job and 38 % are actively investing in stocks. Following their 
profiles they are assumed to have sufficient knowledge to complete the tasks and 
that the behaviors investigated in this paper are fairly comparable between these 
participants and professional analysts (see e.g. Libby et al. 2002 for a discussion 
of when students can be used as participants). 
Compensation
Participants are informed at the beginning of the experiment that they are able to 
earn money by participating. During the experiment they will earn so-called coins 
(an experimental currency) which are later converted into lottery tickets by an (at 
that point) unknown exchange rate (comparable to the design of Libby and 
Rennekamp 2012, p. 208 footnote 13). In order to earn real money they have to 
win a lottery which is further explained to them at the end of the experiment where 
the exchange rate is also announced. However, it is made clear to the participants 
from the beginning of the experiment that their final amount of coins depends on 
their performance in the experiment and that unsolved tasks always leads to fewer 
coins. Hence, they are encouraged to make an effort in all tasks of the experiment 
and to make as accurate answers as possible. A stream of literature argues that 
how people process information according to their prior beliefs and attitudes is 
influenced by their motivation to state accurate answers (e.g. Chaiken et al. 1989; 
Kunda 1990; Chaiken et al. 1996; Wyer and Albarracín 2005; Chen et al. 2015). 
When motivation for accuracy is low, it may create an increased motivation to 
defend an existing belief as opposed to making an effort to state a correct answer. 
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Hence, incentivizing participants to make an effort to provide an accurate forecast 
in the forecasting task (and to be correct in the valuation task) is expected to 
mitigate their motivation to defend their prior beliefs and hence contribute to the 
reliability of the results. 
At the end of the experiment, participants are presented with two optional lotteries 
and asked to choose to participate in one of them (see Appendix C for 
experimental materials were the lotteries are describes to the participants). The 
first lottery is a random draw with known probabilities. In this lottery everyone 
who chooses to participate has an equal chance of winning independently of their 
performance in the experiment. In the second lottery, the probabilistic properties 
are unknown but based on the amount of coins each participant has earned during 
the experiment. The scheme of the lottery is known to students and is referred to 
as the performance based payment method. All winners of the lotteries, 
independent of which of the two lotteries is chosen, earn $ 286. In total, 10 
participants won the lottery corresponding to an average hourly wage of $14 for 
all participants.
3.3. Measurements and Descriptive Statistics
To measure the initial confidence participants have in their forecasting estimates, I 
use the size of the confidence intervals that they are asked to state after each 
forecast (see e.g. Deaves et al. 2010; Ben-David et al. 2013; Glaser and Iliewa 
2014 who uses the same measure). However, according to Langnickel and 
Zeisberger (2016), the use of confidence intervals may be problematic in the sense 
that people do not seem to change the size of their stated intervals when they are 
asked to state confidence intervals for different percentage levels. That is, people 
seem to state more or less the same confidence interval when they are asked to 
report e.g. 90 % confidence intervals compared to when they are asked to report 
e.g. 80 % confidence intervals. Although I acknowledge this criticism of the use of 
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confidence intervals in general, this paper is only interested in variations between 
individuals’ perceived confidence expressed by confidence intervals and not the 
absolute size of the intervals compared to actual results. Thus, I do not expect this 
particular criticism to be relevant for this purpose that this paper uses the 
confidence intervals for.
In the experiment of the current paper, the absolute size of the confidence interval 
increases the higher the value the participants provide as their forecasting estimate 
(positive correlation of 28 %, not tabulated). As an example, participants that state 
an EPS forecast around $4 in the experiment (F1) are more likely to provide a 
wide confidence interval (e.g. $3 - $5) than participants stating an EPS forecast 
around $2 (e.g. $1.5–$2.5). Because I want to capture the confidence participants 
feel about their own forecast, I do not want this proxy to be affected by the level 
of the value they asses the forecasting estimate is around ($2 or $4 in the above 
example). Therefore, I construct a measure of the size of the confidence interval 
where the level of the upper bound- and the level of the lower bound are related 
and refer to this measure as confidence1 for F1. Thus, in the above example both 
participants will receive a value of 0.6 for confidence1 (3/5=0.6 vs. 1.5/2.5=0.6)
although the absolute size of their confidence intervals varies (2 vs. 1). 
Additionally, to address empirical challenges related to this measure different 
robustness checks are made.
Confidence1 = lower boundf1 / upper boundf1
Thus, the larger the value of confidence1 the lower interval and/or the higher 
values in the interval. Hence, larger numbers reflect more confidence.
Analogously, confidence2 is constructed to reflect the participants’ confidence in 
F2 which is further used to calculate the change in the participants’ confidence:
Confidence2 = lower boundf2 / upper boundf2
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To measure whether their confidence increases or decreases in F2 compared to 
F1the following variable is constructed:
Changeconf = confidence2 – confidence1 
Thus, positive values indicate an increase-, negative values indicate a decrease-,
whereas zero indicates no change in the confidence after a revision opportunity.
To reflect whether a revision has been made or not, a dummy called 
revisiondummy is constructed. This dummy takes a value of 1 if a revision has 
been made, 0 otherwise.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 below. 
n Mean Median SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5
1. F1 266 2.46 2.30 1.07 1.00 8.11
2. F2 266 2.15 2.10 0.89 0.30 7.50 0.72***
3. confidence1 266 0.74 0.82 0.22 0.00 0.99 -0.01 0.05
4. confidence2 266 0.73 0.81 0.23 0.00 0.99 -0.06 0.11* 0.86***
5. changeconf 266 -0.01 0.00 0.12 -0.65 0.41 -0.11* 0.11* -0.23*** 0.31***
6. revisiondummy 266 0.65 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.12** -0.10* -0.15** -0.20*** -0.10
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations between all variables.                                
Stars indicate significance on level: ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.
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4. ANALYSES AND RESULTS
Following the procedure of Libby and Rennekamp (2012) the hypotheses are 
tested by regression analyses (logit- and OLS models) as primary tests and 
additionally supported by t-tests (not tabulated).
The first hypothesis states that those who have a greater confidence in their first 
forecast (measured by confidence1) will be more hesitant to revise that forecast 
after receiving new information compared to those showing a lower confidence. 
Panel A of Table 2 shows results of an ordered logit model where confidence1 is 
regressed on revisiondummy. The model is significant at the 1 % level (LR chi2 
(1) = 6.14, prob > chi2 = 0.01). The results support H1 with confidence1 being 
significantly negatively associated with revisions (p = 0.02, two-tailed). Thus, 
those with more confidence in their own forecast (reflected by larger values of 
confidence1) are more likely to not revise their forecast (retain their forecast) than 
those with lower confidence in their forecasts. Results from t-tests (not tabulated) 
further support H1. Those who do not find a revision necessary (92 participants) 
have a mean confidence1 of 0.78. This is significantly larger than those finding a 
revision necessary (174 participants) who have a mean confidence1 of 0.71 (t-stat. 
of 2.43).
The second hypothesis states that those not revising their first forecast have more 
confidence in their second forecast (F2) as oppose to those revising. Results 
shown in Panel B in Table 2 are from an OLS regression where changeconf is 
regressed on revisiondummy with confidence1 included as a control. The model is 
significant at the 1 % level (F (2, 263) = 9.74, Prob > F <0.001). Results from this 
test are in line with the prediction of H2. Revisiondummy is significantly 
negatively associated with changeconf (p = 0.03, two-tailed) even after controlling 
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for the confidence in the first forecast (confidence1)26. Thus, those that choose to 
retain their forecast instead of revising it after receiving new information become 
relatively more confident than those who make a revision after receiving new 
information. Further, confidence1 is negatively associated with changeconf (p < 
0.001, two-tailed) suggesting that the more confident participants feel about their 
first forecast the less likely they are to increase in confidence in their second 
forecast. Results of t-tests (not tabulated) are further in line with predictions by 
H2. Those who decrease in confidence (88 participants) predominantly deem a 
revision necessary after receiving new information (mean revisiondummy of 0.97). 
This is significantly more than for those who increase (or have no change) in 
confidence (178 participants, mean revisiondummy of 0.51). This difference in the 
post-revision confidence change is significant at the 1 % level (t-stat. of 8.44). 
Together, the results confirm that forecasts made with a high initial confidence 
more often results in a hesitation to revise relatively to forecasts made with a 
lower initial confidence. This is in line with theory arguing that confirmation bias 
leads to more persistence in initial beliefs suggesting a positive relationship 
between confidence and the likelihood of being subjects to confirmation bias. 
Further, the results provide evidence that confirmation bias, because it leads to 
selective use of new information and hence make people more likely to perceive 
information as confirmatory to their initial beliefs (first forecasts), further 
increases the confidence in their revised forecast. In other words, people that feel 
strongly confident in their own beliefs are more prone to be subjects to 
confirmation bias which leads to even further increase in their confidence.  
26 The significance persists without any controls. This is further supported by t-tests (described in detail below).
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Panel A: Test of H1
Test of the effect of first-forecast confidence on revisiondummy
Term Expectation Estimate Std.Error z-ratio p-value
Intercept -1.79 0.51 3.15 <0.001
confidence1 - -1.54 0.65 -2.38 0.02
LR chi2 (1) = 6.14, prob > chi2 = 0.01
R² (Pseudo) = 1.79 %
Panel B: Test of H2
Test of the effect of revisions on changeconf
Term Expectation Estimate Std.Error t-ratio p-value
Intercept 0.11 0.03 3.97 <0.001
confidence1 -0.13 0.03 -4.09 <0.001
revisiondummy - -0.03 0.02 -2.24 0.03
F (2, 263) = 9.74, Prob > F <0.001
R² = 6.90 % (adj.R² = 6.19 %) 
TABLE 2                                                         
Tests of Hypotheses                  
Panel A shows results based on a logit  regression.                                                     
Panel B shows results based on an OLS regression.                                                    
Directional expectations are shown for the independent variable of interest.            
N = 266 in all analyses. 
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5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In this section I check for the sensitivity of the measure of confidence, alternative 
explanations and drivers of the main results of this paper and finally I try to 
separate a related dimension of confidence from the measure of confidence used in 
this paper.
5.1. Sensitivity of Confidence Measure - Lottery Choice
When individuals increase in their confidence during the forecasting task it could 
reflect that they perceive their own performance as relatively better than people 
who decrease in confidence during the task does. If this perception is strong 
enough, those with an increased confidence in the forecasting task should prefer to 
participate in the performance based lottery more often than those with a 
decreased confidence. I therefore predict and test if participants who increase in 
confidence (measured by changeconf) prefer the performance based payments to a 
higher degree than participants who do not increase in their confidence. 
To reflect if the participants prefer the performance based lottery, a dummy called 
perfdummy is constructed. This dummy takes a value of 1 if the performance 
based lottery is chosen, 0 otherwise. 87 participants prefer the performance based 
lottery. The dummy variable perfdummy has a mean of 0.33 (standard deviation of 
0.47).  
Table 3 shows results from a logit regression supporting the prediction about a 
positive association between an increase in confidence after a revision opportunity 
and a preference of performance based payment. The model is significant at the 5 
% level (LR chi2 (3) = 8.87, prob > chi2 = 0.03). Changeconf is positively 
associated with perfdummy (p = 0.09, two-tailed) with a coefficient of 2.17. This 
indicates that the more a participant increases in confidence from the first forecast 
to the second forecast the more likely that participant is to choose the performance 
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based lottery. Importantly, this result is persistent even when controlling for 
confidence1 and revisiondummy27. Because the participants show behaviors in line 
with how their confidence changes in the forecasting task (reflected by their 
decisions in the lottery choice task, i.e. that those who increase in confidence are 
more likely to choose the performance based lottery) it could indicate that analysts 
hesitant to revise their forecast following new information, are more likely to 
prefer performance based payment structures as a possible consequence of 
confirmation bias. These results are additionally interpreted as supportive 
evidence of confidence intervals as a proxy of individual confidence validating the 
primary measure of this paper. 
27
A probit model and t-tests supports this result (not reported).
Test of the effect of change in confidence on perfdummy
Term Expectation Estimate Std.Error z-ratio p-value
Intercept 0.19 0.53 -0.36 0.72
confidence1 -0.98 0.61 -1.60 0.11
revisiondummy 0.28 0.29 0.98 0.33
changeconf + 2.17 1.30 1.68 0.09
LR chi2 (3) = 8.87, prob > chi2 = 0.03
R² (Pseudo) = 2.64 % 
Results based on a logit  regression.                                                                            
Directional expectations are shown for the independent variable of interest.            
N = 266. 
TABLE 3                                                         
Robustness Test                  
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Lottery vs actual earnings
Measuring the performance of the total experiment by total earnings in the 
experiment (where the valuation task is also influential on the total earnings) there 
is no significant difference between the performance of participants with an 
increased confidence in their forecasting task compared to participants with a 
decreased (or unchanged) confidence in their forecasting task (t-stat. of 0.38). 
Those with an increased confidence in the forecasting task have a mean of total 
earnings of 1,086 coins from the experiment which is not significantly different 
from the rest which have a mean of 1,096 coins. This suggests that participants 
increased confidence in the forecasting task, presumably driven by effects of 
confirmation bias, are unfounded and hence that an increased preference of getting 
paid by performance may make then worse off. 
5.2. Alternative Test of Main Results - Nearest Neighbor Matching (Average 
Treatment Effects)
This paper seeks to make inferences about the relation between confidence and 
revision behavior but does not include either variable as a direct randomized 
treatment in the experimental setting. Hence, implicit assumptions that no other 
variables than the one of interest causes systematic changes in the dependent 
variable are not directly addressed by previous tests (regressions and t-tests). By 
applying the method of the nearest neighbor matching (e.g. Abadie and Imbens 
2006; 2012), most commonly used on observable data where randomized 
treatments are not possible or desirable (such as event-studies using archival data 
or medical studies where a treatment might be unethical), I am able to simulate 
participants that are identical on a range of defined parameters and thus isolate the 
treatment variable as the “only” varying factor. For example, it is likely that a 
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certain type of people is generally more optimistic and hence states a higher F1 
and thus a wider confidence interval in the experiment than others. If the design of 
the experiment makes it more obvious to revise a lower forecast than a higher one 
(or vice versa) then the participants’ hesitation to revise a forecast is likely to be 
driven by the position of their first forecast as a consequence of their general 
optimism, rather than as a reaction to cognitive dissonance because of their level 
of confidence. Nearest neighbor matching can be used to address the issue. 
Therefore, tests are done conditioned on the value of each forecasting estimate to 
make sure that the results are not driven by how realistic the participants first 
forecast are according to the new information since this may additionally drive 
their decision of whether to revise or not.
In the following, all main analyses are re-run with nearest neighbor matching. 
Because this paper relies on an experimental setting with varying information 
along two dimensions28 (for the purpose of another paper) it is additionally 
important to check that these variations does not influence the main results of this 
paper. Hence, in order to make sure that results from this paper are not 
unintentionally driven by effects of these two treatments, I include a requirement 
in the tests that treatments are exact matched29.
Participants are matched across the value of their first forecast (F1) and across the 
two dimensions by which the new information they receive prior to revisions vary 
(exact matches). Table 4 first reports differences in confidence according to 
whether participants revise or do not revise their forecast (H1). 
28 One group of participant is given a positive outlook for the firm in focus in the second stage of the forecasting 
task whereas the rest is given a negative outlook. Further, in the second stage of the forecasting task, one group of 
participants is additionally given a peer-estimate conducted by other financial analysts whereas the rest is not given 
that estimate. However, all information in the first stage of the forecasting task are the same across participants.
29 Because both confidence1 and changeconf are continuous variables there is a small risk of large-sample bias. I 
rerun the tests using a Stata command (biasadj) suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2006) to avoid this potential 
issue. All results persist (available on request). 
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The results show that if the participants’ confidence in their first forecast 
(measured by confidence1) was 7.26 % lower than it actually is they would have 
chosen to revise their forecast as opposed to retaining their prior forecast after 
receiving new information (revisiondummy changes from 0 to 1). Next, the table 
reports differences in revisions according to whether participants increase in 
confidence or decrease in (or have unchanged) confidence (H2). The results show 
that if participants resistance to revise occurred 51.45 % more often than it 
actually does they would have increased in confidence (changeconfdummy going 
from 0 to 1) as opposed to have a decreased (or unchanged) confidence in their 
revised forecast compared to their first forecast. Both results are significant at the 
1-% level providing additional support of the two main hypotheses in this paper. 
Also, I run a similar test to check if my results of the sensitivity analysis of the 
measurement of confidence persist. I test the differences in the change in 
H1 H2
revisiondummy changeconfdummy
7.26***
(2.79)
-50.83***
(-10.60)
n 266 266
Min./Max. matches 1/11 1/5
Results based on nearest neighbor matching (treatment effects).
Conditioned on F1 and exact match requirement by the two variations in the 
information provided in the second stage of the forecasting task.
Coefficients in percent (z-values).
Min./Max. Matches report the min./max. number of matches at least one observation was made with.
Stars indicate significance on level: ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.
TABLE 4                                                    
Robustness Checks of Hypotheses                  
% Change in interf1
% Change in revisiondummy 
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confidence according to whether participants prefer the performance based lottery 
or not using nearest neighbor matching with the same requirements as the above 
tests. Results (not reported) show that if participants change in confidence in their 
revised forecast as oppose to their first forecast (measured by changeconf) was 14 
% higher than it actually is they would have preferred the performance based 
lottery (perfdummy going from 0 to 1, z-stat. of 2.30). Hence, all main results and 
the sensitivity analysis of the measurements of confidence are supported by using 
this alternative method. I interpret this as evidence that the main results are not 
driven by variations in the experimental materials or the absolute value of each 
participant’s first forecast (F1) 30.
5.3. Better Than Average-Effects
A related but different dimension of individual (over-) confidence31 (argued by 
e.g. Svenson 1981) is referred to as better-than-average effects (BTA). BTA refers 
to the tendency of people to evaluate themselves as better than average and hence 
could be a possible alternative explanation of why some people choose to revise 
their forecasts and some do not. After the forecasting task, participants are asked 
to evaluate their own performance in the task compared to the other participants in 
the experiment. They provide answers on a five-point scale where 3 reflects those 
who consider themselves as having an “around average” performance in the 
forecasting task. Thus, by re-running t-tests of H1 limited to those that consider 
their own performance around average (119 observations) the results should be 
unaffected by the dimension of confidence called BTA (Niederle and Vesterlund 
30 All results persist when personal characteristics like gender, age, experience (if they have a relevant part-time job 
and whether or not they invest in stocks) and skills (grade average from their bachelor education and results from a 
valuation task additionally included in the experimental materials) are further required as matches in the model 
(results available on request).
31 Further, results of this paper generally persist when controlling for another dimension of (over-) confidence 
named miscalibration. Participants in this experiment are perceived as well-calibrated in the cases where they 
correctly evaluate their own performance after the valuation task and/or in the cases where the correct answer to the 
valuation task lies within their 90 % confidence interval +- 5 % on each side of the range. Results not reported.   
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2007). Results of this test on the subsample remain significant at the 5 % level (t-
stat. of 2.11) supporting H1. 
Together, results of the main tests of hypotheses are robust to alternative 
explanations of the participants’ behavior in the forecasting task of the 
experiment. That is, the results are not driven by alternative variables like the 
concrete number of each participant’s first forecast (F1) or variations in the 
experimental materials. Nor are the results driven by BTA effects. This supports 
my theoretical reasoning according to which participants seem to react on their 
increased confidence in the forecasting task as a consequence of confirmation bias 
by preferring the performance based lottery to a greater extent. 
Results of this paper suggest that the initial confidence people form a belief from 
will determine the likelihood of them being subjects of confirmation bias. Further, 
it indicates that confirmation bias gives people an unjustified comfort in their own 
performance (by choosing the performance-based payment method more often 
although their performance are not better) due to an increased confidence.
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper focuses on the level of individual confidence that a forecast is made 
with (reflected by the width of a confidence interval) and its relation to non-
revision behaviors. Prior research has found that revisions in financial analysts’ 
forecasts add informational value to the users of these forecasts under various 
circumstances. However, biases in financial analysts’ forecasts are also observed. 
One bias previously observed is a general tendency to underreact to news. This 
paper uses the experimental method and relies on cognitive decision theory to 
explain one of many potential causes of why financial analysts sometimes hesitate 
to revise an existing forecast following new information and thus contributes to 
the general underreaction to news. 
The first of two main results of this paper suggests that when individuals make 
financial forecasts with high confidence they are more likely to be hesitant to 
revise these forecasts after receiving new information. This is in line with theory 
of confirmation bias (Mahoney 1977; Edwards and Smith 1996) as a mechanism 
to reduce cognitive dissonance and with findings in a related experiment by Yaniv 
et al. (2009). The findings complement suggestions from Koonce and Mercer 
(2005) and findings from Friesen (2006) that confirmation bias, as a reaction to 
cognitive dissonance, drives non-revision behaviors in the perspective of financial 
forecasting and thus may lead to general underreactions. The findings can serve as 
inputs to when and how guidelines to revision requirements could reduce effects 
of cognitive biases on financial analysts’ forecasts in the pursuit to make financial 
forecasts more accurate and informative to the users. Further, the finding might be 
important for future studies using archival data on financial analysts’ forecast 
revisions as the finding highlights that non-revisions do not necessarily signal that 
the information is already incorporated in the current forecasts. Thus, future 
research may generally benefit from investigating when and why financial 
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analysts hesitate to revise a forecast following new information. Although most 
research assumes a non-revision following new information to be a reflection that 
the information has little or no new informational value or represents a way for 
analysts to minimize effort, little seems to be known about the internal 
requirements or norm in the firms in terms of forecast revisions. If we expand our 
knowledge on this issue we may be able to enlarge our understanding of 
observable biases in financial analysts’ forecasts such as underreactions.
The second result of this paper is that the decision to not revise a forecast 
following new information affects the individual level of confidence in that 
forecast. The finding suggests that a non-revised forecast leads individuals to 
having an increased confidence in their own forecast compared to the confidence 
in revised forecasts. This is consistent with theory of cognitive dissonance 
reduction (Festinger 1957; Aronson 1968) and with prior findings by Plous 
(1991). The findings suggest that individuals, who stay devoted to their own 
beliefs by not revising their forecast, not only have more confidence in the first 
place but also enhance that confidence compared to individuals who revise their 
own beliefs. This is not necessarily in line with standard decision theory such as 
Baysian updating of beliefs. These findings also contribute to the general literature 
on cognition in financial decision making by suggesting that individual confidence 
is an important factor to consider when investigating confirmation bias in different 
contexts. Although this paper focuses on individual confidence reflected by the 
size of a confidence interval in the context of forecasting, other dimensions of 
confidence may be applicable as well. Future research could address this in the 
context of financial analysts for example by following the method used in an 
experimental setting by Libby and Rennekamp (2012). Here they elicit managers’ 
confidence in various dimensions including personal traits like miscalibration and 
optimism. 
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Further, analyzing the sensitivity of measuring individual confidence by 
confidence intervals I find indications that the participants’ greater confidence 
following a non-revision compared to the confidence following a revision are not 
driven by actual performance. However, an additional analysis reveals that 
individuals with an increased confidence in this setting are more likely to choose a 
performance-based payment method at the end of the experiment (framed as a 
lottery choice). This may further indicate that this (unfounded) greater confidence 
for analysts that are hesitant to revise their forecasts, argued to occur as a result of 
cognitive dissonance reduction, results in a greater preference of performance 
based payment contracts compared to analysts that revise their forecasts. Thus, 
being more inclined to confirmation bias not only dilutes the individuals’ 
information search and gives them a biased ground to base their forecasting on. It 
also seems to bias their view on their own performance. However, while this study 
is not designed to draw direct conclusions on this matter, future research could 
address this issue as it may contribute to important practical implications in the 
context of payment schemes and bonus structures. 
The use of an experiment allows me to control the information flow available to 
the participants while at the same time capturing the individual confidence each 
forecast is made with. Both factors are impossible to control and observe directly 
from archival data. Holding the information flow constant across participants is 
important in order to eliminate possible confounding effects whereas directly 
measuring individual confidence is crucial in order to investigate its relation to 
non-revision behaviors. For these reasons the experimental method is found 
particularly applicable for the purpose of this paper although usual limitations of 
the experimental method such as generalizability also apply here. Thus, although 
the experimental design seeks to simulate a real-world setting e.g. by providing 
information to participants from various information sources, it may not be fully 
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generalizable. As an example, although all results persist when robustness checks 
are performed conditional on possible confounding factors, this study is not able to 
draw inferences about the magnitude of the effects on professional financial 
analysts in their natural environment.  
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APPENDIX A – Experimental Materials from the First Stage in the 
Forecasting Task
Forecasting Task
On the next page you are asked to state your one-year-ahead earnings per share (EPS) forecast for a 
particular company. Today is year 0 and you are asked to forecast EPS for year 1. 
EPS = Net Income / Number of Shares 
The company is an actual listed company but in this experiment you will just know it as “The Firm”. 
Company info:
The Firm was founded in 1892 and operates today through 842 stores in the United States, and 157 
stores in Canada, Europe, Asia, and Australia. The Firm is within the retail industry with clothes as the 
main product line. The Firm’s products are considered to be medium-price. The sales are highly 
seasonal and usually peak in the spring and fall. Approximately 25 % of The Firm’s total revenue comes 
from online sales. According to The Firm: “The brand is our lifestyle, our focus—the value of having a 
great brand is far-reaching and cannot be overstated—it’s a snowball effect”. 
Industry info:
The industry is known by its intense competition between its many players which is characterized by 
very volatile earnings and volatile stock prices. Within the last five years The Firm has experienced 
many new competitors which can be of future threat according to The Firm itself: “In light of the 
competitive challenges we face, we may not be able to compete successfully in the future. Further 
increase in competition could reduce our sales and harm our operating results and business”. 
This figure illustrates the development in stock prices for The Firm in the last ten years:  
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The Firm’s Income Statement from the annual report.  
(year 0 = current, year -3 = three years ago) 
Expectations for the industry:
The National Retail Foundation (NRF) says its retail sales forecast for year 1 predicts a growth 
of 4.1% (3.7 % year 0). Online sales are expected to increase between 9% and 12% this year.
The NRF President and CEO said: “Improvements in economic growth combined with positive 
expectations for continued consumer spending will put the retail industry in a relatively good 
place in year 1. Though headwinds from the looming debates about the debt ceiling, increased 
health care costs, and regulatory concerns still pose a risk for both consumers and retailers”.  
Expectations of The Firm:
The Firm partly explains the EPS level at year 0 by unusual expenses due to restructuring costs 
as well as an ongoing lawsuit about management ethics. The Firm expects little or no 
restructuring costs and no impact from the lawsuit in year 1. The Firm forecasts EPS for year 1 
to be in the range of $2.25 to $2.35. 
 
Task: 
I expect the EPS for The Firm for year 1 to be $________. With a probability of 90% I believe 
the EPS will then lie between $________ and $________. 
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APPENDIX B – Experimental Materials from the Second Stage in the 
Forecasting Task
New information in the market 
 
The first quarterly report for year 1 was roughly as expected. The second quarterly report for 
year 1, which just got released, reveals the following numbers. 
Highlights from the second quarter report, year 0 and year 1, in thousand $: 
 
Year 0, Q2 Year 1, Q2
Revenue 945,698 890,605
Gross profit 604,122 552,956
Operating income/EBIT 19,165 17,493
Net Income 11,371 10,877
 
After the release of the second quarterly report the CEO of The Firm said in a press release: 
“Because of a continued challenging environment, our sales for the second quarter were 
somewhat below plan.“ However, The Firm does not revise their total expectations for year 1. 
On the other hand, based on 14 estimates from your colleagues, expected EPS for The Firm at 
year 1 is downgraded to an average (consensus) of $2.14.
 
Please revise your EPS forecast for The Firm for year 1 (If you do not deem a revision necessary, 
please write your forecast from the prior task again). 
 
Task:
I now expect the EPS for The Firm for year 1 to be $________. With a probability of 90% I 
believe the EPS will then lie between $________ and $________.
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APPENDIX C – Experimental Materials Describing the Lottery Choice
You have now earned between 610 and 2000 coins from this experiment corresponding to 
between 61 and 200 tickets. 
Even though your total number of tickets is not transparent to you, you now have to 
decide how you want to use your tickets. All the other participants are given the same 
options as you. The two options are explained in detail below. 
Options:
• The Blue Lottery – Play the lottery by converting all your tickets from this 
experiment into one blue lottery ticket. Your chances in this lottery do not depend 
on your performance in the experiment or on the choices of other participants. 
Instead there is one winner for every blue ticket pile. A blue ticket pile always holds 
an amount of tickets corresponding to half the number of people in this classroom 
right now. Your chances in this lottery are therefore 1:60 if there is a total of 120 
people, 1:40 if there is a total of 80 people, and so on. The winner is found by a 
random draw. If you win the blue lottery you earn DKK 2,000 before tax.
• The Purple Lottery – Play the lottery by converting all your tickets from this 
experiment into the same amount of purple tickets (the experimenter is able to 
calculate this from your answers). The more tickets you have the greater chances of
winning. Your chances in this lottery depend on your performance in the 
experiment and depend on the choices of other participants. Your specific chances 
in this lottery are therefore unknown as they are influenced by the total pile of 
purple lottery tickets. The total pile consists of all purple lottery tickets from the 
people in this class room right now that choose to play this lottery. There is one 
winner of this lottery. The winner is found by a random draw. If you win the purple 
lottery you earn DKK 2,000 before tax.
Please tick off the box representing which lottery you want to play:
 The Blue Lottery  The Purple Lottery
Your answer is binding and cannot be redone at any time! 
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Using Feedback to Reduce the Cost of Information 
Intermediation: Experimental Evidence
Simone Staehr, Nigel J. Barradale, and Thomas Plenborg
ABSTRACT
Information intermediaries, including financial analysts and financial advisors, 
face incentives to produce biased recommendations and expend low effort. In an 
experiment with 344 finance masters students, we investigate the role of 
incentivized feedback in reducing these costs. Specifically, we have participants 
play analysts or investors, with the analysts making earnings recommendations for 
the investors in the presence of biased incentives. In the treatment condition, the 
investors provide incentivized feedback to the analysts. Consistent with 
educational learning and psychological theories, we find the presence of feedback 
reduces bias and increases effort among information intermediaries (financial 
analysts), while also enhancing information end-users’ (investors) critical 
evaluation of recommendations. Hence the potential welfare gains from 
incentivized feedback-channels are large. This research is especially timely given 
the European Securities and Markets Authority’s proposal in 2014 to abolish 
indirect payments to analysts including the broker votes system, since that system 
acts as an incentivized feedback-channel from institutional investors to financial 
analysts.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The complexity of financial markets creates a pivotal role for information 
intermediaries, who process underlying data and make recommendations for 
information end-users. As examples, equity analysts process firm-specific data and 
make recommendations for institutional investors and financial advisors process 
market data and make recommendations for individual investors. However, as 
with all agency-type relationships there can be conflicts, with information 
intermediaries expending low effort or presenting biased information. This paper 
uses the experimental method to argue that incentivized feedback-channels can 
ameliorate this conflict. For the information intermediaries, the expectation of 
feedback increases effort and reduces bias. For the information end-users, 
providing feedback enhances the critical evaluation of recommendations. Both 
effects imply feedback-channels have a welfare-enhancing role to play in financial 
market design. The experiment, and much of the discussion, is framed in terms of 
financial analysts making earnings forecasts, but because the findings are argued 
to occur in line with social-psychological mechanisms results of this paper are also 
more broadly applicable within financial markets.
The bias in analyst forecasts is the subject of academic studies and regulatory 
oversight due to potential negative consequences for investors (Abarbanell et al. 
1995). The main academic findings are a tendency of financial analysts to be 
overly optimistic (Rajan and Servaes, 1997; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Dechow et 
al., 2000; Chan et al., 2003; Bradshaw et al., 2006; Libby and Rennekamp 2012), 
have a desire to herd towards the consensus estimate (De Bondt, W. F. 1999; 
Hirshleifer and Hong 2003; Guedj and Bouchaud 2005; Jegadeesh, N., and Kim, 
W. 2009; Evgeniou et al. 2010; Jiang, H., and Verardo, M. 2013) or to stand out 
from the crowd (Hong et al. 2000; Hong and Kubik 2003; Clement and Tse 2005). 
Legislation that has strengthened the regulatory oversight includes Regulations 
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Fair Disclosure (2000), Regulation Analysts Certification (2002), the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002), and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (2010). Partly in response to regulation, a method of paying for 
research has developed that is known as “the broker vote system”. This system 
allows investors to apportion their overall trading activity and vote for analysts 
that provide good research so that sell-side departments supplying more valuable 
communications receive greater aggregate commission in subsequent periods 
(Goldstein et al. 2009; Groysberg et al. 2011; Brown et al. 2015; Maber et al.
2014).
While less studied in the finance and accounting literatures, theories in educational 
learning and psychology argue that providing as well as receiving feedback causes 
increased cognitive reflection, referred to as metacognition (Garner 1987;
Falchikov 2004). Those receiving feedback tend to feel more responsible and 
motivated to adapt their output to the feedback provider (see e.g., Berkowitz et al. 
1963; Butler and Winne 1995; Topping 1998; Black et al. 1998; Pope 2001; 
Atkins 2002; Brown et al. 2013). In line with social comparison theory (Festinger 
1954), reactions due to the expectations of feedback are expected to occur not only 
for monetary reasons but also to maintain a positive self-image. Meanwhile, those 
providing feedback process information more thoroughly, with enhanced 
reflection and increased insight into task performance (see e.g., Stefani 1994; Van 
Lehn et al. 1995; Topping 1998; Cheng and Warren, 1999; Topping 1998; Davies 
2000; Althauser and Darnall 2001; Venables andSummit 2003; Li and Steckelberg 
2006). This research implies that feedback-channels may enhance the alignment 
between the behaviors of a feedback receiver and the goals of a feedback provider, 
while simultaneously providing the feedback provider with enhanced insight into 
those behaviors. In the setting of the current paper, the agency cost of information 
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intermediaries is reduced while the critical evaluation by the information end-
users is enhanced.
We rely on an experimental setting with a relevant subject pool of 344 master 
students in finance. In a 2x2x2 between-subject design, we test how the 
implementation of a feedback-channel affects forecasting behaviors from the 
analyst’s and the investor’s perspective, respectively. Participants are randomly 
assigned the role of an analyst or an investor, and each analyst is randomly 
matched one-to-one with an investor to simulate an information cascade. All 
participants are monetarily incentivized and a post-experiment questionnaire 
including check-questions is implemented. Since the broker votes determine 
trading commissions and thereby part of the professional financial analyst’s 
compensation (Maber et al. 2014), it is analogous to the incentivized feedback 
system of the current experiment.
We find empirical support for the hypothesis that implementing a feedback 
channel reduces analysts’ response to bias incentives and increases their effort 
towards the investors’ needs. Without feedback, analysts with a diverging 
incentive forecast significantly further away from consensus than those with a 
converge incentive, but in the presence of feedback there is no significant 
difference between the two groups. This is argued to be a combined reaction to a 
reduction in the monetary benefits of following a private incentive and a cognitive 
encouragement to maintain a positive self-image by receiving good feedback from 
the investor in line with psychological theory. Further, included in the robustness 
checks, the feedback channel increases the number of words analysts’ disclose in 
their written justifications to the investors also reflecting an enhanced effort. 
We also find empirical support for the hypothesis that implementing a feedback-
channel makes the investors more critical of the analysts’ forecast. In particular, 
the feedback-channel results in the investors’ forecasts moving towards the 
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consensus and away from the analysts’ recommendations both in the case where 
the analysts were facing an incentive to diverge from the consensus but also when 
the analysts were incentivized to converge towards the consensus. This is 
consistent with the feedback-channel increasing the investors’ evaluation of 
alternate information sources. Answers from the check-questions support this 
interpretation: when a feedback channel exists, significantly more investors 
answer that moving away from the analyst’s biased forecast and towards the 
consensus forecast is the best strategy to apply. Further, those investors matched 
with analysts with a diverging incentive report that they trust the analysts 
significantly less when a feedback-channel exists indicating a more critical and 
less naïve approach. Additionally, when a feedback-channel exists, investors 
assess their own performance as being better (as opposed to when no feedback-
channel exists) suggesting an increased confidence in their forecasts. When we ask 
the analysts the same question their confidence in their own forecasts is unaffected 
by the feedback-channel. Thus, investors’ enhanced attention in the task due to the 
feedback-channel seems to additionally increase their self-reliance whereas 
analysts’ does not feel either better or worse of.
Our findings are of specific relevance to the broker votes system. As an 
incentivized feedback channel, this system will reduce the bias and increase the 
effort of equity analysts while enhancing the institutional investors’ critical 
evaluation of recommendations by making them less naïve towards the analysts’ 
inputs and rely more on alternate information sources. This is an extension to the 
existing academic research which primarily documents and describes the 
commission-allocation system (e.g. Maber et al. 2014) and moves the literature 
towards an evaluation of its institutional and psychological impacts. Also, to the 
extent that we find positive impacts of the system, we highlight some unintended 
consequences of the European Securities and Markets Authority’s proposed 
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prohibition of indirect payments (ESMA 2014, Section 2.15), which would 
effectively prohibit the broker votes system in the Europe.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, background 
research, theory and hypotheses development are included. Section 3 describes our 
method, measurements and includes descriptive statistics. In Section 4, our results 
including robustness checks are presented. Section 5 concludes.
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2. BACKGROUND, THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Background
Financial analysts provide guidance to institutional investors in various forms, 
including earnings forecasts and recommendations, by mainly using information 
from firms such as quarterly reports and management forecasts (Lees 1981). Since 
analysts analyze and interpret complex information, they are often referred to as 
information-intermediaries i.e. between firm management and investors (e.g. Lang 
and Lundholm 1996). Due to this agency-type relationship, there can be conflict 
with analysts expending low effort or presenting biased information. Amongst 
many examples research finds financial analysts to obtain private information 
from management and respond with overly optimistic forecasts in exchange (e.g. 
Francis and Philbrick 1993; Cheng et al. 2013). Research also documents that 
analysts may provide biased forecasts as a result of a desire to stand out from the 
crowd due to career concerns (Hong et al. 2000; Hong and Kubik 2003; Clement 
and Tse 2005), or a desire hide in the crowd due to uncertainty (Hirshleifer and 
Hong 2003; Guedj and Bouchaud 2005; Evgeniou et al. 2010). Analysts’ biasing 
incentives may result in investors making suboptimal investment decisions (e.g. 
Abarbanell et al. 1995).
A typical response to these constraints has been to increase regulation in order to 
protect investors. Regulation Analysts Certification (2002) requires financial 
analysts to disclose payments received in connection with their reports and 
moreover to make a written statement that their reports truly reflect their personal 
beliefs. In the same year, strict rules about disclosure of any affiliations or 
ownership between the analysts and the investment banks to the covered security 
(among many other requirements) were imposed. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
added control over analysts’ contracts by implementing so-called Chinese walls 
and further limiting ties between analysts’ compensation and investment banking 
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earnings in the attempt to reduce analysts’ conflicts of interest. Further, proposals
on educating the investors or more paternalistic approaches such as limiting their 
trading opportunities have been developed e.g. by requiring investors to own a 
certain amount of wealth or to obtain a license before trading. However, critics 
highlight potential drawbacks of these regulations and proposals. For example, 
Fisch (2005) argues that requiring too much independence of the analysts will 
eventually make them add a fee to their reports to avoid public dissemination of 
their analyses in order to maintain the value to institutional clients. Thus, 
mandated independence of financial analysts potentially reduces investors’ access 
to information. Further, evidence suggests that investors are not capable of making 
sufficient use of the extensive disclosure on analysts’ conflict of interest (e.g. 
Alexander et al., 1998; Barber and Odean, 2001; Kelly et al., 2012; Firth et al., 
2013). Thus investors are claimed to be generally too naïve towards the 
information provided by analysts and prior interventions has failed to sufficiently 
enhance their critical assessment of the analysts work. Critics also claim that 
regulators go too far in their effort of de-biasing investors. For example, limiting 
investors’ trading opportunities does not necessarily make them better off, if the 
alternative is that investors have to invest in asset classes where the risk-reward 
relation is not as attractive as the stock market.
Broker Votes
The broker vote system is a process whereby institutional investors vote to assess 
the value of research services from analysts and to determine how to allocate 
research commissions (Brown et al., 2015). As part of the broker vote process, 
sell-side brokers request that larger clients communicate the rationale for their 
decisions, including voting outcomes for the broker’s analysts. The signals from 
this reporting system are used to credit analysts for their contributions to 
investors’ trading revenues and thus encourage the production of valuable 
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analyses to investors (Maber et al. 2014). As such, the feedback channel from 
investors to analysts serves as a way to mitigate some of the perverse incentives 
that analysts have from direct trading commissions (Hayes et al. 1998; Irvine 
2004; Jackson 2005; Irvine et al. 2007; Juergens and Linsey 2009; Groysberg et al. 
2011; Beyer and Guttman 2011). The broker vote system may also mitigate intra-
firm contracting frictions such as allocation of bonuses among analysts (Maber et 
al. 2014). 
Maber et al. (2014) document that broker votes reflect a reward from investors to 
analysts for providing valuable fundamental research. They also find that sell-side 
brokers use the votes as an allocation method to indirectly reward individual 
analysts for contributions to brokerage-wide commission payments. Thus, the 
broker vote system seems to reward analysts’ expertise and is not biased towards 
trading volumes or relationship interest between the agents. In a survey, Brown et 
al (2015) find that broker votes are very important to the analysts. For example, 
most analysts state that their bonuses are directly affected by broker votes. 
Further, 83% of analysts indicate that broker votes are very important to their 
career advancement. 
2.2. Theory and Hypothesis Development
Theory generally suggests that people respond to feedback by enhancing their 
performance (Cyert and March 1963). The need of feedback in order reflect on 
and judge one’s own performance is often a central mechanism used as a tool to 
increase motivation in different contexts e.g. incitement- and bonus contracts 
(O'Reilly et al. 1988). Further, the need to focus on social factors and not solely 
monetary motivations in order to understand mechanisms of feedback is important 
(Panadero 2016). In this paper, we use the term feedback in a broader sense 
whereas other papers may refer to it as evaluation or assessment (of others work).
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Although it is generally accepted that both receiving and providing feedback can 
be an important learning tool (e.g. Van Gennip et al. 2009), which enhances the 
capability of self-assessment (Mason and Reinholtz 2015), it can be important to 
distinguish between the role of receiving and the role of providing feedback since 
it sometimes demands different cognitive mechanisms (Topping 1998; van 
Zundert 2010). Therefore, in cases where the goals of the feedback receiver and 
feedback provider differ it is relevant to focus on the two agents separately 
(Panadero 2016). Whereas financial analysts are generally found to also have 
other incentives than providing accurate earnings estimates the investors are 
generally assumed to strive for accuracy. Thus, in the context of the broker vote 
system, where financial analysts receive feedback from the investors, this 
separation between providing and receiving feedback is potentially important.
Thus, we draw attention to analysts’ behavior when they expect feedback and to 
investors’ behavior when they must provide feedback. Below we develop 
hypotheses for analysts, as feedback receivers, and investors, as feedback 
providers, separately.
2.2.1. Receiving Feedback (The Analysts’ Role)
One aspect of receiving feedback is concentrated on the ability to compare one’s 
own performance with the performance of others in order to relatively assess one’s 
own performance more objectively. According to social comparison theory 
(Festinger 1954) the tendency of comparing one’s own performance against 
others, has been suggested as an important input for humans self-feelings at least 
since humans became social animals (Rousseau 1754/1984) and can be observed 
even in small children (Butler 1992) as well as in other species (Gilbert et al. 
1995). 
When people seek to evaluate their own performance they do so to assess 
themselves precisely (self-assessment, Trope 1986), confirm their own sense of 
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self (self-verification, Swann 1983) and keep a positive self-image (self-
enhancement or self-affirmation, Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987; Steele 1988; 
Suls and Wheeler 2000). According to Jordan and Audia (2012 p. 214) the latter 
point about self-affirmation is especially important to consider in settings with 
feedback since it may (unconsciously) influence the cognitive perception of 
received feedback and consequently provoke behaviors inconsistent with 
otherwise assumed by performance theories. 
Self-affirmation theory, originally proposed by Steele (1988), posits that people 
have a general drive to maintain self-integrity. Consequently, people seek to avoid 
threats to their image of themselves (Sherman and Cohen 2006). Because people 
generally seek to develop and sustain a positive self-image (Beach and Tesser 
1995) they pursue an opportunity to evaluate their performance against others. 
This drives a general competitive behavior where ability and effort in a task are 
central (Garcia and Tor 2007). Therefore, the existence of feedback in tasks have 
for long been argued and proved to be an effective tool to increase motivation, 
effort and performance not only in order to achieve monetary gain but also to 
enhance a positive self-image (Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987; Smith 2000; 
Greenberg et al. 2007). 
In line with the self-affirmation theory, and not only because of monetary 
incitements, we find it likely that the build-in feedback channel in the broker vote 
system affects analysts’ forecasts and written reports due to a desire to maintain a 
positive self-image. 
Relying on self-affirmation theory Salovey and Rodin (1984) provided 
experimental evidence that people get negative emotions (more anxiety, 
depression and a bad mood) from receiving negative feedback in a dimension that 
is important to their self-image. Further, literature in educational learning has for 
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long been studying the effects of feedback (e.g. Butler and Winne 1995; Kluger 
and DeNisi’s 1996; Topping 1998; Black et al. 1998; Pope 2001; Hanrahan and 
Isaacs 2001; Atkins 2002; van den Boom et al. 2007; Brown et al. 2013). 
Although most of these studies has investigated the effects of receiving feedback 
on future performance (Topping 1998), the expectation of feedback itself may in 
fact also improve the feedback receiver’s current performance. In an experimental 
study Berkowitz et al. (1963) find that performance increases when the feedback 
receivers are informed that the feedback providers have access to their 
productivity data. This is the case even in conditions where the feedback receivers 
are explicitly informed that their evaluation will not be affected by their individual 
productivity data. Berkowitz et al. (1963) explain this with the feedback receiver’s 
feeling a sense of responsibility to the feedback provider and respond by increased 
effort towards the feedback provider’s expected needs. More recently, Vollmeyer 
and Rheinberg (2005) (unexpectedly) conclude from an experiment that when 
people expect feedback after a task they use better strategies from the beginning of 
the task and argue this to be a result of increased motivation. Thus, expecting 
feedback seems to change how people generally approach the task and their 
considerations of how the provider of the feedback will value their performance.     
The need for people to be evaluated by others (Baumeister 1982; Brown and 
Gallagher 1992) and hence strive for positive feelings in order to retain or improve 
their self-image (Lazarus 1991; Smith 2000) makes the existence of feedback an 
important driver to complete a task for the receiver of the feedback. Since 
expecting feedback increases motivation in the task and the feedback receiver’s 
responsibility toward the feedback provider we conjecture that when analysts 
expect feedback from investors they will approach the task differently. We find it 
likely that analysts will make an increased effort when evaluated by investors 
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through mechanisms like the broker vote system in order to maximize the chance 
of receiving positive feedback and thus minimize the risk of harming their positive 
self-image. Because analysts generally consider broker votes as important to 
receive (Brown et al 2015) we expect that analysts engage in cognitive processes 
in line with social comparison theory in order to maintain a positive self-image by 
receiving votes from the investors as a reflection of a reward for doing a good job. 
More specifically, we expect analysts to react less to other biasing incentives and 
disclose forecasts more in line with investors’ requests compared to analysts that 
do not expect to receive feedback. This leads to our first hypotheses.
H1: The feedback-channel induces a reduced reaction to private 
incentives in analysts’ forecasts.
2.1.2. Providing Feedback (The Investors’ Role)
Bangert-Drowns et al. (1991) argues that it is important to focus on what people 
can gain from providing feedback instead of solely focusing on the receivers of 
feedback. In the case of the broker vote system, investors are able to provide 
feedback to analysts about their investment advice. Because a broad stream of 
research in educational literature agrees that a requirement of providing feedback 
increases the need for cognitive regulations, this opportunity for investors to 
allocate broker votes is likely to affect how the investors approach and perceive 
the outputs from the analysts. As examples, regulating cognition in the context of 
providing feedback is basically metacognitive activities that control our thinking 
and learning (Brown 1987; Schraw and Moshman 1995). This is said to increase 
people’s awareness of comprehension breakdowns and use of attentional 
resources (Schraw 1998) in tasks. It includes enhanced planning prior to a task 
(Miller 1985), increased thinking (Stefani 1994), a greater ability to diagnose 
misconceived knowledge (Van Lehn et al. 1995), more constructive reflection 
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(Topping 1998; Cheng and Warren, 1999), increased attention (Topping 1998), 
better self-performance (Davies 2000; Althauser and Darnall 2001), enhanced 
knowledge of the subject (Venables and Summit 2003) and more inspiration (Li 
and Steckelberg 2006).
Thus, this evidence supports that providing feedback stimulates the cognitive 
activities. For example, Falchikov (1995) and Freeman (1995) find that providing 
feedback enhances the awareness and attentional resources. Panadero (2016) also 
finds that providing feedback creates a setting where people learn about their own 
strengths and weaknesses. Thus, being required to provide feedback strengthens 
peoples’ abilities to understand the task and how the person, to whom feedback 
must be provided, solved the task including an increased understanding of the 
persons’ strategies and motives. Because the broker vote system requires investors 
to provide feedback to analysts it is likely that this feedback process will regulate 
investors’ cognition and thereby increase their awareness and attentional 
resources. We therefore conjecture that investors, who provide feedback to 
analysts, will increase their awareness and attention towards the analyst’s work 
including a more careful consideration of the analyst’s incentives and an improved 
ability to diagnose biased information. This will impose a more skeptical use of an 
analyst’s biased earnings forecasts when investors make trading decisions and a 
greater reliance on other sources of information. Thus, in a setting where the 
consensus forecast serves as the other source of information we expect that 
investors giving feedback to analysts will provide forecasts closer to the consensus 
forecasts than investors who are not required to provide feedback to analysts. This 
leads us to the second hypothesis.
H2: The feedback-channel decreases investors’ weighting of the analyst’s 
forecast and increases the weighting of the consensus forecast.
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3. METHOD, MEASUREMENTS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
3.1. Task and Design
This paper-based experiment follows a 2x2x2 between-subjects design. In the 
main task participants are asked to conduct an earnings forecast for a given firm, 
either as an analyst or as an investor. Creating an information cascade, each 
analyst is matched with an investor who has access to the analyst’s forecast and 
justification. Based on hard and soft information the analysts (investors) state an 
earnings forecast (prediction) for a given company and write a justification for 
their forecast. Although similar, we refer to the analysts’ estimates as a forecast 
and to the investors’ estimates as a prediction for simplification. The investors 
participate in the experiment at a later time than the analysts and the written form 
ensures that communication is anonymous. This anonymity is important since 
some studies, although providing scared results, suggest that friendships might 
interact with how people conduct and perceive feedback (Falchikov 1995; Hunter 
and Russ 1996; Corgnet 2012). In order to further minimize the risk that some 
participants recognize the matched fellow student, e.g. by the handwriting, we 
make sure that no matches are done within the same class. Thus, we expect that no 
participants in our study are able to recognize who they are matched with. An 
example of the experimental materials available to analysts and investors 
respectably is provided in the appendices. After the main task, check-questions 
and a short questionnaire are completed. 
Participants and Procedure
The participants are 344 finance Master Students all assigned the course Financial 
Statement Analysis and Valuation. On average participants are 25 years old and 27 
% are female. Participants have on average completed five courses within finance 
and accounting, 44 % invest in stocks, and 73 % have relevant part-time 
employment (51 % directly related to finance or accounting). 
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The experiment was conducted at the end of the lecture on financial forecasting in 
five different programs. All experiments were conducted by the same 
experimenter and the experimenter was present in the room during the experiment. 
The experiment lasted approximately 25 minutes. Students had the option not to 
participate in the experiment.
A written introduction on the front page of the experimental materials was read 
out loud by the experimenter and participants were then encouraged to ask 
clarifying questions before the experiment began. In the introduction, participants 
were given standard experimental information including that all their belongings 
must be put away, that their answers are treated anonymously, that they must 
remain seated during the entire experiment and that all communication during the 
experiment is prohibited. We describe the topic of the experiment as “this 
experiment is related to the reports of financial analysts and how investors use 
those reports” and the participants are shortly introduced to the construction of the 
forecasting task (e.g. we explain that they will be assigned one of two roles and 
also that answers from analysts are matched up with investors). Different versions 
are included (known to the participants) in order to avoid possible benefits of 
copying answers from the person next to them and to allow us to identify 
participants that may do so (Table 1 illustrates the different versions disguised as 
three different companies). Feedback on individual performances was available 
online to all participants within one week after the experiment was executed. 
Forecasting Task
For the forecasting task, the analysts are given “hard” and “soft” information. The 
hard information includes last quarter’s earnings, an earnings range (uniformly 
distributed) in which this quarter’s earnings will be, and information about ten 
competing analysts (their average and the standard deviation of their forecasts). 
The soft information concerns a recent private conversation the analyst had with 
205 
 
the company CFO implying a decrease in this quarter’s earnings compared to last 
quarter. Here the CFO expresses concern about the performance of a division that 
makes around 60 % of the total profit. Based on this, we told the analysts that 
given the phone call “the consensus forecast is probably too optimistic about the 
dairies division”. Since the ten competing analysts are not aware of the private 
phone conversation, the soft information provides a plausible scenario for the 
analyst’s superior knowledge (i.e., the true earnings range).
All investors receive the same hard information as the analysts excluding the 
earnings range and its distribution (unless their matched analyst chooses to 
disclose this information in the written justification). However, the investors have 
information corresponding to the upper point of the true earnings range because 
they are informed that this quarter’s earnings will not exceed last quarter’s 
earnings. Further, investors have access to their matched analyst’s forecast and 
written justification. They are also informed about the analyst’s phone call with 
the CFO but do not receive any details about it (unless their matched analyst 
chooses to disclose this information in the written justification). 
Treatments
Following a 2x2x2 between-subjects design, besides assigning each participant the 
role as an analysts or an investor, we randomly manipulate the information in two 
ways: First, we incentivized analysts to either diverge from or converge towards 
the consensus estimate referred to as the incentive-treatment. And second, we 
included an incentivized feedback-channel where the quality of the analysts’ 
answers was rated by the investors referred to as the feedback-treatment. 
Incentive-treatment
The analysts face one of two private incentives to either diverge from- or converge 
to the consensus. For the diverge incentive, the analysts are informed that they will 
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be promoted (and earn more money) if they “stand out from the crowd” so that 
their forecast is more accurate than any forecast provided by the ten other analysts. 
For the converge incentive, the analysts are informed that they will avoid being 
fired (and earn more money) if they “hide in the crowd” and their forecast is not 
the most inaccurate compared to the other ten analysts’. 
The investors are truthfully told about the analyst’s financial incentive and the 
analysts are aware of this shared information with the investors. 
Feedback-treatment
Half the analysts will receive further earnings (framed as a bonus) if their matched 
investor rates them 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the best rating. Their 
matched investor is given the same information about the analysts’ rating. 
However, the investors are told that their own earnings from the experiment are 
not affected by the rating they choose to give their matched analyst. Further, 
investors are informed that the analysts are aware of the investors control over 
their earnings. 
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Compensation
Following Davis and Holt (1993, Chap. 2) the experiment is monetarily 
incentivized. Approximately 10 % of the participants are paid according to their 
performance. Hence, all participants are expected to make an effort in the 
experiment in order to receive the highest possible payments. This determination 
is conducted by rolling a ten-sided die at the end of each session and paying the 
participants with a matching last digit of their identification number.32 The 
payments are made in local currency, but for presentation purposes we convert the 
amounts in the text to USD. Across the sessions, the total payment of $2,495 was 
distributed between 43 winners equivalent to average earnings per winner of $58. 
For all participants this corresponds to an average hourly wage of $17.33
The analysts with an incentive to diverge (converge) in the non-feedback 
treatment are paid $75 if they are promoted (not fired) and $15 if they are not 
promoted (are fired). The analysts in the feedback treatment are paid $45 if they 
are promoted (not fired) and $15 if they are not promoted (are fired), plus a bonus 
of $30 if the investors rate analysts’ performance as 4 or 5. Thus, the payment 
difference according to the incentives is reduced in the feedback-treatment (from 
$75 to $45) but the total maximum and minimum payment for all participants 
playing analysts are the same across treatments. 
The investors are paid $75 less an amount due to the absolute distance of their 
prediction from the true earnings, calibrated such that the payment is reduced to 
$15 if their deviation from true earnings equals the range provided to the analyst. 
32 All answers are treated anonymously and we therefore identify participants by an identification number. This 
number consists of six digits where the first two represent the month of birth and the other four digits are equal to 
the last four digits of their phone number. Participants are asked to write this six-digit number on the front page of 
the experiment before the experiment starts. All experiments are handed in to the experimenter before a die decides 
the winning number.
33 The payments were made approximately a week after the session to allow for matching of analysts and investors. 
The check-questions and questionnaire are also incentivized by small amounts (i.e. 30 cents for every correctly 
answered check-question). 
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After the experiment, the true quarterly earnings from the firm are randomly 
drawn from the range provided to the analysts.
3.2. Exclusion Criteria and Manipulation Checks
We drop three analysts whose forecasts are outside the range provided (having 
been informed of the true range) and three investors whose forecast is above last 
quarter’s earnings (having been informed that this quarter’s earnings will not 
exceed last quarter’s earnings). Since the investors are not informed of a lower 
bound, we do not impose that as an exclusion criterion. Thus, we perceive these 
six dropped participants as having misunderstood the central task of the 
experiment. The remaining sample is 338 participants who are distributed between 
treatments as illustrated by Table 234.
34 Note that scheduling conflicts, with the investors participating in later sessions than the analysts, resulted in 
fewer investors than analysts.
Converge Diverge Converge Diverge
Analyst 49 49 46 48 192
Investor 32 30 44 40 146
Total 338
TABLE 2                                                       
Observation distributions                                            
The number of observations from the total sample assigned to one of two 
roles (analyst or investor) and two treatments (diverge vs. converge 
incentive and no-feedback vs. feedback).
No Feedback Feedback
Role Total
192 146
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3.3. Measurements and descriptive statistics
Because the experiments have different versions (see e.g. Table 1 above or Table 
1A in appendix G for a more detailed view) the main variables are calculated 
relatively according to the disclosed consensus estimate/the upper point of the true 
earnings range. Hence, the participants’ reported forecasts and predictions in the 
experiment are used as inputs to construct our main variables which are described 
in further detail below.
Dependent Variables
For the analysts, we measure their individual deviation from their forecast to the 
consensus estimate which corresponds to the last quarter’s earnings and the upper 
point of the true earnings range, scaled according to the true earnings range. We 
refer to this continuous variable as Devcon and measure it as:
Devcon = (Consensus Estimate – Analyst Forecast) / Length Range 
I.e., 0 is an analyst’s forecast at the consensus, while 1 is a forecast at the lower 
bound. The expected earnings value is the center of the true earnings range, taking 
a value of 0.5, and we expect this to act as an anchor for analysts (along with the 
consensus).
The investors do not receive the true earnings range but are instead provided with 
the consensus and the analyst’s forecast. To construct a variable analogous to 
Devcon, we use the matched analyst’s forecast as a center point, since this 
obviates the need to use the true earnings range that the investors do not possess. 
We refer to this continuous variable as Devana and measure it as:
Devana = (Consensus Estimate – Investor Forecast) / (2 x (Consensus 
Estimate – Analyst Forecast)) 
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We scale the investors forecasts with a value of 0 being at the consensus, 0.5 being 
at the matched analyst’s forecast35, and 1 being twice (or more) as far from 
consensus as the matched analyst’s forecast.36
Independent Variables
We include the two treatments as dichotomous independent variables. We refer to 
the incentive-treatment as incentive. Here, the analysts are given an incentive to 
converge to (framed as a nearly firing in the firm of the analyst) - or to diverge 
from (framed as a nearly promotion in the firm of the analyst) the consensus 
estimate. We assign the incentive variable a value of 1 (0) if analysts are given an 
inventive to diverge from (converge to) the consensus estimate. Further, we refer 
to the feedback-treatment as feedback. Here, the investors rate the advice of their 
matched analysts on a scale from 1 to 5 (with 5 being the best rating). We assign 
the feedback variable a value of 1 for the group of analysts and investors with 
feedback, 0 otherwise. Because of randomization, we expect no correlations 
between our two treatments. Descriptive statistics for all main variables are found 
in Table 3.
35 Where the analyst and investor both forecast at the consensus, then a value of 0.5 is taken.
36 We cap this measure at 1. This implies that in cases where investors are even further away from their matched 
analysts’ forecasts than twice the distance devana equals 1. 
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As expected our two treatments are not correlated (a correlation of 0.001) 
suggesting a successful randomization of the experiments. Our measure of 
analysts’ deviations from the consensus estimate, devcon, is not correlated with 
any of our treatments whereas our measure of investors’ adjustments to analysts’ 
forecasts, devana, is moderately negatively correlated with both treatments. The 
latter suggests that investors adjust more towards consensus when analysts have an 
incentive to diverge and when a feedback-channel exists. The variable effortwords 
lastly included in Table 3 reflects the number of words analysts disclose in their 
written justifications to investors as a proxy of effort. This variable is used as a 
robustness check of H1.
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4. RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
4.1. The impact of a feedback-channel on analysts as feedback receivers (H1)
To test our first hypothesis, we include the distance between analysts’ forecasts 
and the consensus estimate (devcon) as the primary variable. To test the effect of
our two treatments, we use t-tests and support the results with non-parametric 
tests. Results are reported in Table 4. We report only two-tailed tests. Appendix F 
includes an illustration (Figure 1) of the test results for H1.
H1 predicts that participants playing the role as analysts in the experiment will 
disclose more honest forecasts if a feedback-channel exists, and thus react less to 
their biasing incentives. Results in Table 4 show that the analysts in the control 
group (no feedback) provide significantly different forecasts according to their 
incentive (t-stat of -2.01). These analysts with a converge incentive forecast on 
average 41.5 % below consensus, while the ones with a diverge incentive forecast 
on average 51.4 % below consensus. On the other hand, for the analysts in the 
treatment group (with feedback) there is no effect (t-stat. of -0.24). With feedback, 
these analysts with a converge incentive forecast 50 % below consensus, while the 
ones with a diverge incentive forecast 51.2 % below consensus. These results 
support H1; i.e. the introduction of a feedback-channel reduces analysts’ reactions 
to the incentives which results in less biased forecasts according to the investors’ 
desires (the middle of the range). We interpret this reduced reaction to private 
incentive as if the analysts are more concerned about the investors’ needs. In line 
with social comparison theory, analysts do so in order to maintain a positive self-
image reflected by a wish to receive a better rating from the investors and thus not 
only for monetary reasons.
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4.2. The impact of a feedback-channel on investors as feedback providers 
(H2)
To test our second hypothesis, we use the measure of investors’ directional 
adjustments to the analysts’ forecasts (devana) as the primary variable. 
We conjecture in H2 that the feedback-channel will increase investors’ awareness 
and attention towards the analyst’s work. This will impose a more skeptical use of 
an analyst’s earnings forecasts when investors make trading decisions and a 
greater reliance on other sources of information which in this experiment is the 
consensus estimate. To test the effect of our two treatments on the investors’ 
adjustment behaviors we use t-tests and support the results with non-parametric 
tests. Results are reported in Table 5. We report only two-tailed tests. Appendix F 
includes an illustration (Figure 2) of the test results for H2. 
In line with H2, investors with a feedback-channel adjust their forecasts more 
towards consensus (0.381 vs. 0.533) with the difference of 0.152 being strongly 
significant (t-stat of 3.23). This effect remains robust across the converge- and 
diverge-incentive groups, with investors with a feedback-channel moving closer to 
consensus by 0.141 and 0.167, respectively (t-stats of 2.06 and 2.74). Although 
counterintuitive at first sight, these results show that implementing a feedback-
channel makes the investors more critical of the analysts’ forecast. In particular, 
the feedback-channel results in the investors’ forecasts moving away from 
analysts’ recommendations and towards the other information anchor which in this 
experiment is the consensus forecast. This is consistent with the feedback-channel 
increasing the investors’ evaluation of the analysts’ forecasts and their attention 
towards alternative sources of information. Thus, this supports the theoretical 
prediction that providing feedback enhances people’s cognitive ability to 
understand the task from the perspective of others; in this case, investors’ 
enhanced understanding of analysts’ biasing incentives.
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Although not a hypothesis, we also test whether investors adjust analysts’ 
forecasts differently for the incentive treatment. Intuitively, investors should 
recognize the analysts’ confronting incentives in the groups where the feedback-
channel are present and respond by adjusting their forecasts less compared to the 
groups without the feedback-channel. On the other hand, the task of providing 
feedback to the analysts makes investors more aware of analysts’ biasing
incentives and their consequences. Hence, according to this it is equally likely that 
investors will make greater adjustments to analysts’ forecasts when a feedback-
channel exists compared to when there is no feedback-channel. In the control 
group (no feedback-channel) the difference between the converge- and diverge 
incentive is 0.124 (t-stat of 1.78), while in the treatment group (with feedback) the 
difference is 0.150 (t-stat of 2.49). Hence, the difference in investors’ magnitude 
of adjustments to the incentives is not affected by the feedback-treatment (only the 
direction of this adjustment is). We perceive this indifference as a result of the two 
counteracting mechanisms discussed above. Consequently these two opposing 
effects plausibly resolve in no difference between the magnitude of investors 
adjustment to analysts’ incentives according to the feedback-treatment.
4.3. Robustness Checks
4.3.1. Analysts’ Increased Effort in Feedback Treatment 
To measure the effort analysts make in their written justification to investors we 
make the variable effortwords which is a continuous variable referring to the 
number of words that an analyst chooses to write in the justification to the investor 
(descriptive statistics of this variable are included in Table 3). We perceive more 
words in the written justification as that the analysts making a greater effort to 
explain the reasoning behind their forecasts to the investors. Using the number of 
words as a proxy of effort has previously been done by other studies in different 
fields (Pieterman et al. 1993; Gatewood et al. 2002; Blumenstock 2008). We 
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predict that analysts receiving feedback disclose more words in their written 
justification to investors in order to increase their chances of receiving positive 
feedback. 
The results, reported in Table 6, reveal a significant difference in the number of 
words disclosed by analysts across the two feedback treatments (t-stat. of -2.19). 
Analysts in the control group (no feedback) disclose 31 words as compared to 37 
words in the treatment group (with feedback). In summary, the number of words 
improves significantly when investors provide feedback to analysts supporting that 
a feedback-channel has a positive impact on analysts’ effort in line with 
predictions from theory.
4.3.2. Check Questions
To enlarge our understanding of the considerations participants had when 
performing the experiment, the participants were asked to answer a number of 
check-questions after they completed the forecasting task. Some of the check-
questions were given in order to make manipulation checks e.g. questions like 
“Were you playing the role as an analyst or an investor?” or “How much could 
you at maximum earn from this task?”. Others were conducted to deepen our 
understanding of the participants’ behavior in the forecasting task e.g. questions 
like “What strategy would be best in order to earn the greatest expected 
amount?”.
Difference
No Feedback Feedback
Number of Words (effortwords ) 31.14 37.30 -6.155 -2.19** -2.13**
Means of analysts’ effort (effortwords) tested on the feedback-treatment.                         
T-statistics and z-statistics are reported for two-tailed tests of difference in means. 
Stars indicate level of significance: ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.
TABLE 6                                                                                             
T-test results of analysts’ effort in their justification to investors
Wilcoxon tests 
(z-stat.)
T-tests 
(t-stat.)
Feedback Treatment
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Rerun H1 and H2 on a subsample
We found that 13 analysts’ provided incorrect responses to the question of the 
maximum earnings from the experiment. We therefore drop these analysts37.
Further, one analyst wrongly reported the assigned role and is therefore also 
dropped. We rerun tests of H1 with a reduced sample of 178 analysts (14 
dropped). Results (not tabulated) remain similar to the ones reported based on the 
full sample. We also drop 14 investors who provided incorrect answers to some of 
the check-questions (6) or who were matched-up with the 14 analysts that we 
dropped above (8). We rerun tests of H2 with a reduced sample of 132 investors 
(14 dropped). Results (not tabulated) based on the reduced sample remain similar 
to the ones reported above. These robustness tests confirm that our results are not 
driven by the analysts or investors providing incorrect answers to the check-
questions. 38
Indications from Check-Questions Supporting the Results
We ask all participants which strategy they think would be better to follow in 
order to receive most earnings from the forecasting task (the two options they may 
choose between differs between analysts and investors). We also ask the analysts 
if helping the investors was important to them (1 = yes, 2 = no) and 
correspondingly we ask the investors if they trusted the analyst to make an honest 
forecast (1 = yes, 2 = no). Finally, we ask all participants to assess their own 
performance in the forecasting task, relative to how they think the others 
participating in the experiment has performed, on a three point scale (1 = above 
average, 2 = around average and 3 = below average). Table 7 reports how analysts 
answered in panel A and how investors answered in panel B. All answers are 
37 The 14 analysts are evenly represented in the treatment groups.
38 Untabulated results are available upon request. 
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provided for the total sample and for each treatment group. T-tests (supported by 
non-parametric tests) are reported two-tailed.
The answers by analysts about which strategy would be better to apply in order to 
earn more are significantly different (t-stat. of -8.42) according to their given 
incentives to either diverge or converge. This supports our design that analysts 
respond as intended to our manipulation of biasing incentives. Further, more 
analysts without a feedback-channel than analysts with a feedback-channel believe 
that following the incentives is the best strategy. This supports that analysts 
receiving feedback from investors reflect more carefully about their incentive and 
the forecast they provide in line with the prediction of H1. Further, 
(insignificantly) more analysts answer ‘yes’ to the question if helping the investor 
was important to them when a feedback-channel exists. Indications from analysts’ 
answers to the check-questions supports our results of H1 that introducing a 
feedback-channel decreases analysts’ reactions to other incentives and increases 
their responsibility to investors resolving in more honest forecasts. 
When investors are asked which strategy would be better to apply in order to 
increase earnings, the group without the feedback-channel more often answers that 
following the analysts’ forecasts is a better strategy than does the group including 
a feedback-channel (t-stat. of -1.85). Further, (insignificantly) less investors trust 
the analysts to make honest forecasts when a feedback-channel exists. However, 
this difference is highly significant when looking isolated on the diverge incentive 
group (t-stat. of -2.68). This supports that investors providing feedback to analysts 
pay greater attention to analysts’ biasing incentives, decreasing investors’ naïveté 
in line with H2. Finally, we find evidence that the investors, who trust analysts to 
provide honest forecasts, respond by giving significantly higher ratings than the 
investors who do not trust their matched analyst (t-stat. of 2.461, results not 
tabulated).
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When asking our participants to assess their performance in the forecasting 
compared to others the average assessment is 1.90 for analysts with a feedback-
channel and 1.91 for analysts without a feedback (t-stat. of -0.61). 
Correspondingly, investors’ average assessment is 1.90 for the group with a 
feedback-channel and 2.05 for the group without a feedback (t-stat. of 1.77). Thus, 
Converge Diverge
Average 1.33 1.90 -8.42*** -7.13***
No Feedback 1.57 1.25 1.91 -8.80*** -6.54***
Feedback 1.63 1.44 1.80 -3.60*** -3.40***
T-tests (t-stat.) -0.78 -1.91* 1.59
Wilcoxon tests (z-stat.) -0.79 -1.88* 1.58
Average 1.36 1.35 0.06 0.06
No Feedback 1.37 1.36 1.38 -0.21 -0.21
Feedback 1.33 1.35 1.32 0.30 -0.30
T-tests (t-stat.) 0.23 0.13 0.64
Wilcoxon tests (z-stat.) 0.35 0.13 0.65
Average 1.83 1.95 -1.56 -1.58
No Feedback 1.90 1.78 1.96 -1.59 -1.55
Feedback 1.91 1.89 1.94 -0.50 -0.55
T-tests (t-stat.) -0.61 -0.98 0.20
Wilcoxon tests (z-stat.) -0.68 -0.98 0.16
Converge Diverge
Average 1.67 1.79 -1.31 -1.31
No Feedback 1.67 1.64 1.69 -0.37 -0.37
Feedback 1.81 1.74 1.87 -1.48 -1.47
T-tests (t-stat.) -1.85* -0.78 -1.86*
Wilcoxon tests (z-stat.) -1.83* -0.78 -1.82*
Average 1.49 1.33 1.90* 1.88*
No Feedback 1.37 1.58 1.14 3.83*** 3.44***
Feedback 1.44 1.41 1.46 -0.42 -0.42
T-tests (t-stat.) -0.71 1.40 -2.86***
Wilcoxon tests (z-stat.) -0.75 1.39 -2.72***
Average 1.95 1.99 -0.48 -0.49
No Feedback 2.05 2.00 2.10 -0.78 -0.78
Feedback 1.90 1.91 1.90 0.09 0.05
T-tests (t-stat.) 1.77* 0.76 1.86*
Wilcoxon tests (z-stat.) 1.75* 0.76 1.77*
Table 7                                                                                                        
Descriptive statistics and t-tests of analysts’ and investors answers to three check-questions
Means of analysts’ (Panel A) and investors’ (Panel B) answers to check-questions tested on the two 
treatments respectively.                                                                                                                                          
T-statistics and z-statistics are reported for two-tailed tests of difference in means.                                   
Stars indicate significance on level: ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.
Trust  Analyst
1 = yes             
2 = no
Own Performance
1 = above avg.       
2 = around avg.       
3 = below avg.
1 = above avg.       
2 = around avg.       
3 = below avg.
Best Strategy
1 = follow analyst     
2 = follow consensus
PANEL A - ANALYSTS
PANEL B - INVESTORS
Best Strategy
1 = towards consensus 
2 = away from 
consensus
Help Investor
1 = yes             
2 = no
Own Performance
T-tests 
(t-stat.)
Wilcoxon tests 
(z-stat.)Average
Incentive
Incentive T-tests 
(t-stat.)
Wilcoxon tests 
(z-stat.)Average
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while analysts have a constant assessment of their own performance across the 
feedback-treatment, investors with a feedback-channel seem to assess their 
performance above investors without a feedback-channel. This finding suggests 
that the feedback-channel increases investors’ confidence in their own estimate 
plausibly derived from applying meta-cognitive processes when solving the task. 
Finally, to make sure analysts understand that investors are better off at the middle 
point of the range (due the way we designed the payment-structure) we run a t-test 
to check the difference between the forecasts of those analysts declaring in the
check-questions that helping the investors was important to them and those that 
did not find it important. We expect that the analysts who want to help the 
investors forecast closer to the middle point of the range. However, this analysis is 
only done for analysts with an incentive to converge since those having a diverge 
incentive forecast around the middle to follow the incentive and hence we cannot 
infer that they do so because of considerations of the investors intentions. Results 
of the test support our expectations. The group of analysts that did not find it 
important to help the investor has a mean forecast at 0.42 at the range compared to 
the group of analysts that did find it important to help the investor who has a mean 
forecast at 0.50 (t-stat. = 1.78, significant at the 10 %-level). We interpret these 
results as evidence that analysts are aware of the investors’ optimal position in 
order to maximize their potential payoff. This is important since the experimental 
design reveals to the analysts that the true earnings are randomly decided.
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5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
In this study, we investigate the effect of having information end-users (e.g., 
institutional investors, individual investors) provide performance feedback to 
information intermediaries (e.g., financial analysts, financial advisors). Relying on 
theories from psychology and educational research, we predict that information 
intermediaries will increase effort and reduce bias, while information end-users 
will be more critical of advice and consider alternate information. We test these 
predictions in an experiment that replicates the information transmission from 
financial analysts to institutional investors, but our findings are equally applicable 
to the analogous setting of financial advisors and individual investors. Consistent 
with the predictions, the information intermediaries become less biased (no longer 
responding to incentives to converge or diverge from consensus) whiles the 
information end-users become more critical (increasing the weight given to the 
consensus over the analyst’s recommendation). 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to use the experimental method to test the 
possible effects of the broker vote system on both the role of the analysts and 
investors. By adding an additional incentive system (broker votes, or bonus 
payment) then the relative magnitude of the biased incentive will be reduced (from 
$60 to $30 in our case, career concerns for analysts) and the amount of bias will 
fall. We find evidence consistent with this, although the reduction close to zero 
that we observe is also consistent with the psychological theories. The 
experimental results imply that the broker vote system not only reduces the bias 
and increases the effort of analysts, it simultaneously enhances investors’ critical 
evaluation of available sources of information. Hence, we extend current academic 
research on the broker votes system (e.g. Maber et al. 2014) by investigating the 
psychological and behavioral effects of the system on both parties. The analysts 
are argued to increases their effort not only for monetary reasons but also in order 
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to maintain a positive self-image. Further, requiring investors to provide ratings 
like broker votes increases their understanding of the analysts’ role and other 
incentives because it demands more cognition at a higher level than performing 
the task without a requirement of feedback. This decreases the naivety of the 
investors towards analysts’ outputs which has otherwise been a challenge to affect 
without too much regulatory intervention. We also highlight some unintended 
consequences of the European Securities and Markets Authority’s proposed 
prohibition of indirect payments (ESMA 2014, Section 2.15), which would 
effectively prohibit the broker vote system in Europe. Such a prohibition would 
harm the information efficiency of the market unless the replacement system had 
similarly benefits.
The findings of this paper are also more broadly relevant to the design of financial 
markets. Given the extreme complexity of modern markets, information 
intermediaries will always have a critical role to play. Incorporating feedback-
processes can ameliorate the agency cost of these intermediaries by increasing 
their effort and reducing bias, while improving the end-users’ engagement. For 
example, in a setting with a financial advisor proposing products to a retail 
investor, having a feedback channel would reduce the likelihood of the advisor 
proposing non-suitable products (complex, high fees, etc.) while also increasing 
the likelihood of the investor considering competing products. But while these 
benefits are welfare enhancing overall, they may only be sub-optimal for the 
financial advisors, suggesting a possible role for regulation in implementing 
feedback-channels as best practice.
As with all experimental studies the world is rather simplified and consequently 
limits the generalizability. By running an experiment, we create an idealized world 
that allows us to easily manipulate the information space of each participant. But 
clearly some aspects of the design are less realistic and so less generalizable. In 
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particular, we draw the reader’s attention to the transparent incentives, with the 
investors receiving full information about the biased incentives of the analysts. In 
practice, this would never be the case. Hence we do not argue that investors 
should be given more information in order to de-bias the recommendations. 
Rather, we argue that feedback-channels should be used to reduce the bias at 
source and simultaneously enhance the investors’ critical evaluation. This implies 
the use of feedback-channels as a policy tool that is both more realistic and more 
powerful than full disclosure of biased incentives. 
This study does not take into account analysts-client communication which has 
been argued to play an important role in analysts’ decision process (Abhayawansa 
et al. 2015). Consequently, we cannot predict if a long term relationship between 
analysts and investors moderates the results of this paper. However, in the 
literature on feedback the results are rather scared from studies that investigate the 
role of friendship (e.g. Falchikov 1995; Hunter and Russ 1996; Corgnet 2012; 
Panadero 2016). Further, Maber et al. (2014) find the allocation of broker votes to 
be independent of established relationship between analysts’- and investment 
firms. Thus, we do not expect this simplification in our experimental design 
(excluding possible relationship establishments between the receiver and provider 
of feedback) to be a concern of the implications of this paper. 
In the present experiment we also highly constrain the role of the analysts’ 
forecasts by disclosing information that the realized earnings outcome is based on 
a random draw. Thus, otherwise relevant inputs to analysts’ forecast decisions 
such as accounting based information i.e. from fundamental analyses (Barker and 
Imam 2008) becomes less important in this setting. Consequently, possible 
moderating effects such as analytical skill, forecast experience and understanding 
of the valuation process are not directly included in this study. Thus, the effects 
found by this experiment might be enlarged or weakened in a real-world setting 
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which future research could investigate but it is out of the scope of this paper. 
However, since this study is the first to experimentally investigate the effects of 
incorporated feedback in a system comparable to the broker vote system we 
consider the benefits of a clear and controlled setting to outweigh the potential 
drawbacks of a simplified world. Further, limiting the need for sophisticated 
knowledge and skills in conducting financial forecasts creates a setting where 
graduate students in finance are well-suited participants. And finally, because 
other studies generally agree that feedback influences effects of self-image to a 
larger degree when the feedback is made public as oppose to private (e.g. Tafkov 
2012, p.333), we find it likely that effects of feedback found in this paper might be 
even more pronounced in the real-world to the extent that the allocation of broker 
votes are made publicly available. 
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APPENDIX A
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS FOR ANALYSTS WITH CONVERGE INCENTIVE 
AND NO FEEDBACK
Forecasting earnings as an analyst 
Background
In this experiment, you will play the role of a financial analyst making an earnings 
forecast about ABC Company’s quarterly earnings. Your forecast may help other 
CBS students (the investors) in later experiments. The investors will have access 
to the (consensus) forecast of other analysts, your forecast and justification, and 
may have access to your compensation scheme. The investors will make an 
investment decision that may result in their making or losing money depending on 
the actual earnings that the company announces (this will be announced sometime 
after the experiment is finished). You will forecast what the actual quarterly 
earnings will be for ABC based on the information below.
ABC Company
The company makes machines used in the food processing industry. Their 
quarterly earnings are generally quite stable. Last quarter the earnings were $2.40. 
Your Phone Call with the CFO
Yesterday, you had a private phone conversation with the CFO of ABC about the 
dairies (milk processing) division and the snacks division. The dairies division 
makes about 60 % of the profits of the company and it has been under pressure 
from a new entrant into the market. While the profit of the dairies division has 
been falling slightly, the profit at the snacks division has been increasing 
modestly. When the phone conversation turned to the performance of the dairies 
division, the CFO seemed very nervous and defensive. 
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Your Earnings View
For this quarter, recent forecasts of the 10 other analysts are normally distributed 
(with a standard deviation of 0.05) around an average (consensus) of $2.40 that is 
identical to last quarter’s earnings. The other analysts are not aware of your phone 
call and will not be talking to the CFO themselves. Therefore, you decide the 
consensus forecast is probably too optimistic about the dairies division. You 
(correctly) believe the earnings could be anywhere between $2.20 and $2.40 
(uniformly distributed). 
Your Compensation 
One analyst is expected to be fired at your firm. You probably won’t be fired if 
you act strategically with your forecast and hide in the crowd of the other analysts’ 
forecasts (consensus). If you avoid being fired you will earn your regular amount 
of DKK 500. But you will be fired and earn only DKK 100 if your forecast is the 
most inaccurate compared to the other 10 analysts (who have already made their 
forecasts).
Your Forecast
You must now provide a forecast (a single number) using the attached sheet and a 
written justification that may help the investors make an investment decision. 
Please only write your input in the section called ‘to be completed by the financial 
analyst’. 
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APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS FOR ANALYSTS WITH DIVERGE INCENTIVE 
AND FEEDBACK
Forecasting earnings as an analyst 
Background
In this experiment, you will play the role of a financial analyst making an earnings 
forecast about ABC Company’s quarterly earnings. Your forecast may help other 
CBS students (the investors) in later experiments. The investors will have access 
to the (consensus) forecast of other analysts, your forecast and justification, and 
may have access to your compensation scheme. The investors will make an 
investment decision that may result in their making or losing money depending on 
the actual earnings that the company announces (this will be announced sometime 
after the experiment is finished). You will forecast what the actual quarterly 
earnings will be for ABC based on the information below.
ABC Company
The company makes machines used in the food processing industry. Their 
quarterly earnings are generally quite stable. Last quarter the earnings were $2.40. 
Your Phone Call with the CFO
Yesterday, you had a private phone conversation with the CFO of ABC about the 
dairies (milk processing) division and the snacks division. The dairies division 
makes about 60 % of the profits of the company and it has been under pressure 
from a new entrant into the market. While the profit of the dairies division has 
been falling slightly, the profit at the snacks division has been increasing 
modestly. When the phone conversation turned to the performance of the dairies 
division, the CFO seemed very nervous and defensive. 
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Your Earnings View
For this quarter, recent forecasts of the 10 other analysts are normally distributed 
(with a standard deviation of 0.05) around an average (consensus) of $2.40 that is 
identical to last quarter’s earnings. The other analysts are not aware of your phone 
call and will not be talking to the CFO themselves. Therefore, you decide the 
consensus forecast is probably too optimistic about the dairies division. You 
(correctly) believe the earnings could be anywhere between $2.20 and $2.40 
(uniformly distributed). 
Your Compensation 
One analyst is expected to be promoted at your firm. You probably will be 
promoted you if you act strategically with your forecast and stand out from the 
other analysts’ forecasts (consensus). If your forecast is the most accurate 
compared to the other 10 analysts (who have already made their forecasts), then 
you will be promoted and earn DKK 300. Otherwise you will earn your regular 
amount of only DKK 100.
In addition, investors (who earn money according to the accuracy of their own 
forecast) will rate your help from 1-5 (where 5 is the highest rating). You will 
receive a bonus of DKK 200 if your help is rated 4 or 5 (this is paid whether you 
are promoted or not). 
Your Forecast
You must now provide a forecast (a single number) using the attached sheet and a 
written justification that may help the investors make an investment decision. 
Please only write your input in the section called ‘to be completed by the financial 
analyst’. 
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APPENDIX C
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS FOR INVESTORS MATCHED WITH AN 
ANALYST WITH CONVERGE INCENTIVE AND NO FEEDBACK
Predicting earnings as an investor
Background
In this experiment, you will play the role of an investor making an investment 
decision by predicting ABC Company’s quarterly earnings. The outcome of that 
investment (reflecting your payment for this task) depends on your accuracy (the 
actual quarterly earnings will be announced sometime after the experiment is 
finished). Another CBS student (the financial analyst) has already made an 
earnings forecast that may help you. The financial analyst had a recent private 
phone conversation with the CFO of ABC. You will predict what the actual 
quarterly earnings will be for ABC, based on the financial analyst’s forecast and 
justification (see the attached sheet on the following page), together with the 
(consensus) forecast of 10 other analysts (more information below).
ABC Company
The company makes machines used in the food processing industry. Their 
quarterly earnings are generally quite stable. Last quarter the earnings were $2.40. 
For this quarter, recent forecasts of 10 other analysts are normally distributed 
around an average (consensus) of $2.40 (and a standard deviation of 0.05). These 
analysts are not aware of the financial analyst’s private phone call with the CFO 
and will not be talking to the CFO themselves.
Financial Analyst Compensation 
The firm that employs the financial analyst has announced that one analyst is 
expected to be fired. The financial analyst (correctly) believes he is less likely to 
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be fired if he acts strategically with his forecast and hides in the crowd of the other 
10 analysts (consensus). If he avoids being fired he will earn the regular amount of 
DKK 500. But he will be fired and earn only DKK 100 if his forecast is the most 
inaccurate compared to the other analysts (who already made their forecasts).
Your Compensation
Reflecting the importance of earnings announcements for investment performance, 
you will “trade the announcement”. That is, you will write down your prediction 
of the earnings on the attached sheet. If you are exactly correct, you will earn 
DKK 500. For every $0.01 that the actual earnings are away from your forecast, 
the payment will reduce by DKK 20 (i.e., you will earn DKK 460 if the actual 
earnings are $0.02 higher or lower than your forecast).
Your Prediction 
You must now provide a prediction (a single number) and a written justification of 
your prediction using the attached sheet.
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APPENDIX D
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS FOR INVESTORS MATCHED WITH AN 
ANALYST WITH DIVERGE INCENTIVE AND FEEDBACK
Predicting earnings as an investor
Background
In this experiment, you will play the role of an investor making an investment 
decision by predicting ABC Company’s quarterly earnings. The outcome of that 
investment (reflecting your payment for this task) depends on your accuracy (the 
actual quarterly earnings will be announced sometime after the experiment is
finished). Another CBS student (the financial analyst) has already made an 
earnings forecast that may help you. The financial analyst had a recent private 
phone conversation with the CFO of ABC. You will predict what the actual 
quarterly earnings will be for ABC, based on the financial analyst’s forecast and 
justification (see the attached sheet on the following page), together with the 
(consensus) forecast of 10 other analysts (more information below).
ABC Company
The company makes machines used in the food processing industry. Their 
quarterly earnings are generally quite stable. Last quarter the earnings were $2.40. 
For this quarter, recent forecasts of 10 other analysts are normally distributed 
around an average (consensus) of $2.40 (and a standard deviation of 0.05). These 
analysts are not aware of the financial analyst’s private phone call with the CFO 
and will not be talking to the CFO themselves.
Financial Analyst Compensation 
One analyst is expected to be promoted at the financial analyst’s firm. The 
financial analyst (correctly) believes he is more likely to be promoted if he acts 
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strategically with his forecast and stands out from the crowd of the other 10 
analysts (consensus). If his forecast is the most accurate compared to the other 
analysts (who already made their forecasts), then he will be promoted and earn 
DKK 300. Otherwise he will not be promoted and earn the regular amount of only 
DKK 100.
In addition, you (as an investor) will be able to rate the help of the financial 
analyst on a scale of 1-5 (where 5 is the highest rating). If the help is rated as 4 or 
5, then the financial analyst will earn an additional DKK 200 payment (this is paid 
whether he is promoted or not). The financial analyst is aware of your control over 
this payment.
Your Compensation
Reflecting the importance of earnings announcements for investment performance, 
you will “trade the announcement”. That is, you will write down your prediction 
of the earnings on the attached sheet. If you are exactly correct, you will earn 
DKK 500. For every $0.01 that the actual earnings are away from your forecast, 
the payment will reduce by DKK 20 (i.e., you will earn DKK 460 if the actual 
earnings are $0.02 higher or lower than your forecast).
Your Prediction 
You must now provide a prediction (a single number), a written justification of 
your prediction and a rating of the financial analyst’s help using the attached 
sheet.
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APPENDIX E
THE ATTACHED SHEET
TO BE COMPLETED BY THE FINANCIAL ANALYST
Enter your earnings forecast:  $ . .
(this quarter’s earnings will not exceed last quarter’s earnings)
Enter a justification of your forecast to help the Investor:
TO BE COMPLETED BY THE INVESTOR
Enter your earnings prediction:  $ . .
(this quarter’s earnings will not exceed last quarter’s earnings)
Enter a justification of your prediction:
Rate the Financial Analyst’s help on a 1-5 scale (5 being the best rating):       .
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APPENDIX F
ILLUSTRATIONS OF RESULTS FOR H1 (FIGURE 1) AND H2 (FIGURE 2)
Figure 1 – Illustration of analysts’ forecasting behavior according to the 
treatments the middle of the true earnings range
Means of analysts’ forecasts measured by devcon for the two treatments (converge 
vs. diverge incentive and no feedback vs. feedback) compared to the middle of the 
true earnings range. The horizontal axis includes the none-feedback and feedback 
group respectively. The vertical axis takes numbers between 0 (the consensus 
estimate) and 1 (the lower point of the true earnings range) illustrating the 
deviation of analysts’ forecasts from the consensus estimate.
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Figure 2 – Illustration of investors’ forecasting behavior according to the 
treatments and their matched analyst’s forecast
Means of investors’ adjustments of their matched analyst’s forecast measured by 
devana for the two treatments (converge vs. diverge incentive and no feedback vs.
feedback) compared to the matched analysts forecast (0.5). The horizontal axis 
includes the none-feedback and feedback group respectively. The vertical axis 
takes numbers between 0 (the consensus estimate) and 1 (the lower point of the 
true earnings range) illustrating the adjustment investors make according to their 
matched analyst’s forecast and the consensus estimate.
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APPENDIX G
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ALL TREATMENT GROUPS
No 17 2.30 2.30 0.05
Yes 14 2.30 2.30 0.04
No 17 2.30 2.30 0.06
Yes 15 2.29 2.30 0.04
No 10 2.32 2.35 0.08
Yes 11 2.35 2.35 0.05
No 12 2.28 2.28 0.10
Yes 15 2.36 2.35 0.19
No 16 3.64 3.66 0.07
Yes 18 3.69 3.60 0.05
No 16 3.72 3.75 0.08
Yes 14 3.70 3.71 0.09
No 10 3.68 3.68 0.06
Yes 17 3.74 3.76 0.10
No 10 3.75 3.77 0.13
Yes 14 3.66 3.71 0.15
No 16 1.85 1.85 0.04
Yes 16 1.83 1.83 0.05
No 16 1.86 1.84 0.03
Yes 17 1.84 1.85 0.04
No 10 1.86 1.86 0.03
Yes 12 1.87 1.87 0.04
No 10 1.84 1.86 0.06
Yes 15 1.86 1.88 0.04
Company
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
ABC
MNO
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Analyst
Investor
TABLE A1
Descriptives of participants' forecast/prediction by company, role and treatments
SDRole
Analyst
Investor
Analyst
Investor
Incentive Feedback n Mean Median 
GHJ
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